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Synopsis 
The susceptibility of Steam Generator (SG) Tubes (particularly tubes manufactured 
from Inconel 600) to primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) has been a 
major concern to the nuclear industry since 1971, when this phenomenon was first 
observed outside the laboratory. 
Since the susceptibility of Inconel 600 to PWSCC in pure water was first established 
as a certainty, various electricity utilities have devoted considerable resources to 
determining the exact nature of this degradation phenomenon and to predicting its 
consequences. Whereas, the study of the nature of this degradation mechanism has 
led to many conflicting conclusions, the predictive methods developed have been 
more successful. Initially, the establishment of the Leak Before Risk of Break 
principle has allowed various utilities to justify SG operation with cracked tubes. 
Later, the development of probabilistic simulation methods, most notably by EdF and 
the Jozef Stefan Institute (JSI), have led to further justification of the existing 
maintenance regimes and also allowed the ability to do sensitivity studies with 
regards to various influencing parameters. 
The current maintenance regime at the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station (near Cape 
Town, South Africa) utilises tube plugging (when cracks exceed a certain length limit) 
and online leak detection (based on detection of radioactive Nitrogen 16) as the main 
means of ensuring safe SG operation. However, the plugging limit used is based on 
a conservative deterministic analysis, which may be penalising in some situations. 
Thus, the need for risk-based SG life-time optimisation was evident. 
The probabilistic fracture mechanics model developed in this study has been based 
on various aspects of the EdF and JSI approaches. A direct Monte Carlo Simulation 
(MCS) was used to determine the True Crack length distribution, the Critical Crack 
length distribution, and the resultant Tube Rupture probability. This particular study 
was based on the latest inspection data for the SG, considered most degraded at 
Koeberg. 
The Post Inspection crack length distribution indicated that increasing the plugging 
limit above the current plugging limit of 13 mm has no significant effect on the 
resultant tube rupture probability. In addition, it will be shown that a significant 
decrease in tube rupture probability can only be achieved by reducing the plugging 
limit to 7 mm. 
The Critical Crack length distribution generated by MCS clearly indicated the 
disadvantage of traditional deterministic methods. It will be shown that the plugging 
limit used at Koeberg is well within limits even for postulated accident conditions. A 
sensitivity analysis performed on the parameters, which define the critical crack 
length, revealed which parameters were most influential. 
The calculated SG Tube rupture probabilities were well below the established limits 
and provides confidence in the maintenance and operating regime presently in place 
at Koeberg. 
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Introduction 
1 Introduction 
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station (- 40 km outside of Cape Town), is a sea-cooled, 
twin unit (2 x 920 MW) Pressurised Water Reactor Plant, with a Framatome steam 
supply system. The two units have been operational since 1985. One of the major 
concerns of nuclear power plants of this type and age is degradation of the Steam 
Generator (SG) tubing, particularly primary water stress corrosion cracking. 
The vertically mounted SG's (three per unit) are heat exchangers that transfer heat 
from a primary system (Reactor cooling system) to a secondary circuit to produce 
steam to drive the turbine generator. See Figure 1 for an overview of the primary 
system layout. 
The tubing and tube sheet fulfils the following important roles: 
;;.. It provides a barrier between the radioactive primary circuit and non-radioactive 
SG circuit (the secondary nuclear barrier) 
;;.. Leaktightness 
;;.. Pressure boundary 
;;.. Heat transfer surface. 
SG tube failures cause contamination of the secondary system and may also lead to 
major plant transients. 
Figure 1: Primary System Layout 
STEAM GENERA TOR 
STrAM ouTLeT TO 
TURBINE 
PRIMARY COOLANT PUMP 
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Introduction 
There are generally three types of steam generators in use worldwide: 
» Vertical U tube 
» Horizontal 
» Once through 
Most American, Japanese, French, and German PWR suppliers use the vertical 
U-tube design with inverted tubes (as does Koeberg). 
Westinghouse, Combustion Engineering (CE), and Kraftwerk Union (KWU) produce 
variants of the inverted U-tube design, but there are important differences of detail 
between vendors and between the older and current designs. Babcock & Wilcox 
(B&W) use the once-through design. This design is a straight through tube with a 
vertical steam generator and vertical tubes. The Russian VVER and Canadian 
CANDU reactor designs use horizontal steam generators, which have the tubes 
mounted horizontally. No particular advantage has been seen from the horizontal 
versus the vertical designs. 
Eskom was aware that the SG's were considered to be the "Achilles Heel" of 
pressurised water reactors when Koeberg was ordered in 1976. The Koeberg SG's 
combined with ancillary plant design (including a condensate polishing plant) and 
operating specifications were considered to offer adequate protection against the 
known tubing degradation mechanisms. 
During commissioning of the Koeberg plant (Unit 1 in 1984 and Unit 2 in 1985) 
Electricite de France (EdF) made Eskom aware of primary side stress corrosion 
cracking in the tube to tube sheet expansion transition zone in reference to French 
steam generators. 
Following EdF's advice, Eskom chose to follow a "defect specific" analysis approach 
to deal with the threat of stress corrosion cracking. 
The defect specific analysis approach has provided Koeberg with a rigorous basis for 
maintaining the tubing integrity and the implementation of preventative and remedial 
measures. It also serves as a platform to launch the life cycle management program 
for the SG's. 
Although this program has maintained tube integrity and availability over the past 15 
years, the need still exists for an integrated plant life cycle management program, 
which avoids sub-optimisation. 
The increasing number of preventative and remedial measures available, and the 
improved modelling and predictive tools (probabilistic measures) for tubing 
degradation, has made the development of a more comprehensive approach 
possible. 
2 
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Introduction 
1.1 The Koeberg Steam Generators 
The Koeberg SG design was based on the original Westinghouse recirculating 
pressurised water reactor (PWR) steam generators, which were manufactured under 
licence by Framatome. The SG tubing was manufactured using mill annealed (MA) 
Inconel 600. One SG on unit one was manufactured with thermally treated (TI) 
Inconel 600 for improved primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) 
resistance. 
Figure 2 shows a cutaway drawing of a Koeberg SG with the essential features 
listed. 
Figure 2: Cutaway view of a French 900MWe SG 
r'i"'"'~--> ___ ----Steam nozzle 
./..;;:;.......,~ 
Positive entrainment Steam Dryers --iHtlor-..3lIi 
Secondary mallwav------~.), ~~~ 
Swirl vane moisture separaters---t-~..a~:/ 
Feed Water Inlet nozzle----~u 
Transition Conle--------+ 
Bundle Wrapper--------+-110 
Tube 
Water Box (or Channel head)----~ .. t_ 
-+-----Upper Shell 
]-Tubes 
ring 
f++----- Anti-vibration bars 
i-If------Tube Support plate 
-t------Lo~"er Shell 
-:-t------Tube Sheet 
-,I-,..-.-+-----Dlvlder plate 
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Introduction 
1.1.1 Design 
The Koeberg SG's are Framatome type 51 B, an improved version of the original type 
51A SG's. Changes were made to reduce or eliminate some of the secondary side 
corrosion mechanisms; denting, corrosion at the tube support plates, corrosion by 
residual phosphates (wastage) in the sludge zone, and tube to tube sheet crevice 
corrosion. The following design changes were incorporated: 
? Improved circulation above the tube sheet. 
? Flow slot baffles were installed to reduce lane cross-flow. 
? Full depth expansion - designed to prevent corrosion of the tubes within the tube 
sheet area by eliminating the tube to tube sheet crevice. 
? Kiss roll - designed to reduce the overall residual stress in the area of diameter 
change, i.e., roll transition zone (RTZ). This feature is explained in more detail on 
pg.8. 
? Introduction of a flow redistribution baffle, with a circular orifice in the centre, 
500 mm above the tube sheet, to control the upward fluid flow near the outside of 
the tube bundle creating a higher velocity flow along the tube sheet and 
minimising the number of tubes exposed to low flow velocities. This concentrates 
the low velocity area in the centre of the tube sheet where the blowdown 
extraction facilities are sited. 
? Improved blowdown - additional orifices were provided on blowdown tubes in the 
vicinity of the lowest flow velocities. 
? Quatrefoil broached support plates - corrosion was minimised at the support 
plates by using cruciform-broached (See Figure 13, pg. 43) support plate 
penetration ports instead of the round penetration ports (increased flow through 
the gaps). 
? 13% chromium tube support plate material - to prevent oxide jacking and hence 
denting of the tubes at the tube support plate level. The tube support plate 
thickness was increased from 19mm to 30mm. 
? Asymmetric distribution of J-tubes in the feedwater ring generating relatively cold 
feedwater for the hot leg. 
The SG has a primary side and a secondary side. The primary side of the unit is in 
the lower half. It consists of a hemispherical cap (known as a channel head), divided 
into inlet and outlet halves by a partition plate. The reactor coolant flows into one half 
of the channel head, through Inconel U-tubes, and back to the other side of the 
channel head where it exits to the reactor loop. The heat from the reactor coolant is 
transferred through the tube walls to convert the secondary side feedwater (flowing 
through the tube bundle) into steam. 
The U-tubes connect the two sides of the channel via a tube sheet. Together, the 
tube sheet and the tubes form the boundary between the primary and secondary 
sides. The tubes are welded to the tube sheet and full depth roller expanded to 
eliminate the crevice between tube and tube sheet, and hence to prevent leakage 
between the primary and secondary sides. 
4 
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The secondary side consists of a pressure boundary shell surrounding the lower tube 
bundle and an upper steam drum containing the moisture separation equipment. 
Feedwater enters through the feedwater nozzle, and spills from inverted J-tubes on 
the upper side of a feed ring; this prevents the ring from draining which could cause 
water hammer. 
The feedwater then flows down an annular gap between the inside of the lower shell 
and the wrapper barrel, which surrounds the U-tube bundle. The wrapper barrel 
ensures that the feedwater enters the U-tube bundle at the level of the tube sheet. As 
the feedwater flows upwards through the tube bundle, the heat from the reactor 
coolant raises the feedwater temperature to saturation; thereafter steam is generated 
until, at the exit from the tube bundle, approximately 30% of the water has been 
converted to steam. Since the turbine cannot accept this mixture of steam and water, 
the entrained water must be removed. This is achieved by a set of centrifugal 
moisture-separators (known as primary separators), located directly above the tube 
bundle; steam dryers (secondary separators), at the top of the steam generator just 
before the nozzle, improve the steam quality to at least 99.75% (i.e. 0.25% moisture) 
The entrained water that was removed by the primary and secondary separators is 
returned to mix with the incoming feedwater from the feed ring, and hence to 
recirculate through the tube bundle 
The main design parameters are listed in the table below: 
Table 1: Main Operating Parameters 
Design Parameter Value 
• General 
I Power per SG (MW - thermal) 928.33 MW 
Number of tubes per SG 3330 
Number of tube rows 46 
Number of tube columns 94 
Heat transfer area 4699 m" 
Primary Side Characteristics I 
Inlet temperature 314 Uc 
Outlet temperature 277 vC 
Average temperature 295.9 Uc 
Flow rate 4492.96 kg/sec 
Pressure 155 bar 
Pressure drop 2.45 bar 
Secondary Side Characteristics 
Feedwater temperature 219.4 vc 
Feedwater flow rate 502.78 kg/sec 
Steam pressure 58.17 bar 
Pressure drop 1.72 bar 
Dimensions and Masses 
Overall height (approximate) 20,800 mm 
Mass - Empty 298 Tonnes 
Mass - 100% charge 364 Tonnes 
Condenser characteristics 
Tube material Titanium 
Cooling Medium Seawater 
Full flow condensate polishing plant i Yes 
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* 
The SG tubing material is a Nickel-Iron-Chromium alloy designated INCONEL 600 
(UNS N06600). These alloys are noted for their superior corrosion and heat 
resistance and are used extensively in nuclear and fossil-fuel steam generators, heat 
treating equipment, heater element sheathing, and thermocouple tubes. 
These alloys are within the broad austenitic, gamma-phase field of the ternary 
Ni-Fe-Cr phase diagram. Inconel alloy 600 is a solid solution alloy with good strength 
and toughness from cryogenic to elevated temperatures and good oxidation and 
corrosion resistance in many media [1]. However, it has been found that this alloy is 
susceptible to SCC in primary (pure) water, which is the dominant tube degradation 
mechanism in SG1s of the Koeberg type. Inconel 690 (UNS N06690) was then 
developed, with further additions of chromium (- 30 % Cr concentration as compared 
with 14 to 17 %), for use in the nuclear industry and is particularly noted for its 
resistance to corrosion by high purity water. 
Additional information regarding SG components can be viewed in appendix A. the 
following tables are provided. 
;.. Table A 1: Gives a description of the main components of the tube bundle 
and the various materials associated with them. 
;.. Table A2: Shows data for the tubes for each SG obtained from heat 
certificate data. (values given are mean per SG) 
INCONEL is a trademark of the Inco family of companies. 
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1.1.2 Manufacture 
All six SG's at Koeberg were assembled by Framatome at Saint Marcel. The heavy 
sheet and plate fabrication was carried out at the Creusot Loire plant. The following 
table gives some general information: 
Table 2: General SG Manufacturing Information 
General SGinformation 
Design i Westinghouse 
Manufacturer Framatome 
Model Number 51B 
Type I CP1 
Number of SG's 3 per unit (3 loop/920 MW) 
Date of commercial operation 
• Unit 1 - April 1984 
Unit 2 - May 1985 
:: . ! 
SG Tube information 
i 
Billet manufacturer Ilmphy 
Tube manufacturer Vallourec 
The SG's have the following manufacturing designations: 
Unit 1: SG1 96 
SG295 
SG377 
Unit 2: SG1 98 
SG299 
SG3 100 
Fabrication began with the production of the tube sheet and first shell. The lower 
surface of the tube sheet (which makes contact with the reactor coolant) was clad 
with Inconel 600. Multiple pass submerged arc welding with automatic strip feed was 
used. The cladding was machined and inspected using NDE (ultrasonic and liquid 
penetrant). 
The tube sheet was then drilled (2 x 3330 holes) for penetration of the Inconel 600 
U-tubes. Drilling was performed using a numerically controlled drilling machine 
(single and multi-spindle). The tube sheet and first shell were then joined by welding. 
The shells were fabricated by bending and welding of rolled steel plate. The transition 
cone consists of two shallow drawn sections assembled by welding. The separate 
shell sections were then welded together. 
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The Inconel 600 alloy used for the tube bundle was produced in an electric furnace 
and processed in a vacuum or electroslag re-melting furnace. A typical range of 
thermo-mechanical treatments is given below: 
» Forging or hot rolling of billets. 
» Hot extrusions of forged (rolled) billets 
» Cold rolling. 
» I ntermediate annealing at 1000 - 1050 DC. 
» Cold rolling or drawing. 
For SG's 95, 96, 98, 99, and 100 the above treatments were followed by a final heat 
treatment at 950 - 980 DC, cleaning on the inside and external polishing, and finally 
cold bending. In addition to the above, the tubes of SG 77 were heated for 12 hours 
at approximately 700 °c before undergoing bending into final shape. SG 77 was 
acquired because, during construction, one SG was rejected by Eskom and replaced 
by Framatome. Thus, 5 SG's were manufactured using Mill Annealed (MA) Inconel 
600 tubes while the sixth (SG 77) was fitted with Thermally Treated (TT) Inconel 600 
tubing. Tubes of this type are considered to be Significantly less susceptible to SCC 
than MA tubes [2, 3] and this has been confirmed by Koeberg experience. 
The tubes were welded to the cladding on the reactor coolant side of the tube sheet 
in a single pass. The welds were slightly recessed in the tube sheet to prevent 
accidental damage. Automatic gas tungsten-arc welding (GTAW) was used, with no 
filler metal, producing a uniform Ni-Cr-Fe alloy weld. The welds were visually 
checked after each bead was laid down and underwent liquid penetrant examination 
at the final stage. Leak tightness was checked using a nitrogen leak test at 1.4 MPa. 
The tubes were then expanded along the entire thickness of the tube sheet. 
Anchoring the tubes in this way is considered to have several advantages: 
» Ensuring leak tightness 
);> Stress reduction at the tube to tube sheet weld. 
» Increased mechanical strength of the assembly. 
» Crevice between tube and tube sheet is virtually eliminated 
A second intermediate tube expansion (kiss roll) was performed to reduce the 
external residual stresses in the roll transition zone (RTZ) between the expanded and 
non-expanded sections of the tubes in order to minimise the risk of circumferential 
cracking. Figure 3 illustrates the difference between normal full depth expansion and 
expansion with a kiss roll. 
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Figure 3: Tube Expansion 
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The SG's were then subjected to final qualification as follows: 
}> Examinations of welds for pressure rated jOints. These examinations cover: 
a. Longitudinal and transverse tensile tests, bending and impact tests to 
determine the mechanical characteristics of the joint (parent metal, weld 
metal, and heat affected zone (HAZ)). 
b. Hardness profile across the joint. 
c. Chemical composition of the weld metal 
}> All Ferritic weld joints and zones affected by cladding operations underwent at 
least one stress relief treatment at a temperature between 595 and 625 DC. 
}> The full SG assembly was then subjected to an on-site hydrotest at 1.33 x design 
pressure for the primary side and at 1.5 x design pressure for the secondary side. 
The SG's were then positioned over their bunkers and lowered onto the vertical 
supports and secured. 
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A number of manufacturing abnormalities was observed during manufacture and the 
Pre-Service Inspection (PSI). They are listed below: 
, Tube sheet anomalies: SG 98 had three locations with incorrect tube sheet 
drilling. No tubes were inserted and the tube sheet was plugged at those 
locations. SG 99 had one location (cold leg side) where the tube sheet had not 
been drilled. The corresponding hot leg side hole was thus plugged. 
, Volume loss: Six tubes showed small volume loss signals of over 40% wall 
thickness during the 100% Bobbin coil examination of the PSI. These six tubes 
were preventatively plugged. 
, Dents: More than 200 dents were detected under the upper four support plates in 
the peripheral zones of the SG's of Unit 1. No dents were found on Unit 2. The 
dent pattern was consistent with the position of the non-broached and reduced 
diameter holes in the upper support plates. It was concluded that the dents were 
caused by excessive manipulation of the tubes during installation. The size of the 
dents was determined by performing a supplementary signal analysis using a 
reference tube with simulated dents. The most severe dents were sized at 
0.4 mm. The presence of deformations at the fourth support plate prevented the 
passage of the BC probe. Three peripheral tubes were identified as having dents 
and were preventatively plugged. These dents were attributed to impact or bundle 
twisting during final shell welding stages. 
, Expansion Anomalies: Some 126 tubes with tube to tube sheet expansion 
anomalies were detected with a multi-frequency BC eddy current probe. Two 
tubes had multiple anomalies. Some of the expansion anomalies were re-
expanded on-site and a repeat inspection was carried out. None of the expansion 
anomalies were considered significant enough to warrant plugging. 
In the period between the startup of units 1 and 2, EdF reported PWSCC in the roll 
transition zone of tubes of similar material and expansion design as the Koeberg 
SG's. To anticipate this threat, the PSI data, stored on magnetic media, was re-
examined to characterise the data in the hot leg roll transition zone and classify the 
expansion anomalies in terms of possible preferential susceptibility to PWSCC. 
Eskom/Koeberg, with the recommendations of both EdF and Framatome, considered 
that any tube with defined anomaly classifications would require special surveillance. 
These were therefore included in the inspection scope in addition to routine 
sampling. 
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1.1.3 Design Modifications 
The SG's of both Unit 1 and 2 were shotpeened in the hot leg roll transition zone 
during outages 102 and 201 respectively. The purpose of shotpeening is to create a 
compressive residual stress on the inner surface of the roll transition zone to prevent 
the initiation of PWSCC. It is predicted that shotpeening will have little effect on the 
propagation of existing defects in the roll transition zone. On this basis, unit two 
should have fewer instances of PWSCC since the shotpeening was carried out much 
earlier in its operational history than Unit 1 (9,148.8 EFPH compared to 14,323.2 
EFPH). This has been verified by tube degradation statistics (see section 1.2 below). 
Experience world-wide has shown that PWSCC can occur in the U-bends (rows 1 
and 2) of the small radius U-bends due to residual stresses caused by tube bending 
during manufacture of the tube bundle. This has led to an extensive preventative 
plugging programme of small radius U-tubes. To prevent this, Koeberg heat treated 
the U-bends of rows 1 and 2, on both units during outages 105 and 205 respectively. 
The heat treatment employed was 2 to 6 minutes between 700 and 840°C. 
Initially the plugs used at Koeberg were manufactured from Inconel 600. However, 
due to French and world-wide experience of stress corrosion cracking of the plugs 
themselves, all Inconel 600 plugs at Koeberg have been removed and replaced with 
Inconel 690 plugs. 
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1.2 Current Status of the Koeberg steam generators 
As predicted by the defect specific analysis performed during the initial operational 
phase, both units at Koeberg are affected by axially orientated, primary water stress 
corrosion cracking (PWSCC) in the roll expansion transition zone. This is the only 
significant form of tubing degradation to manifest itself after 13 cycles t (- 18 years) of 
operation. Tables, A5 and A6 (Appendix A) details the extent of PWSCC and tube 
plugging for each SG at each outage: 
It is clear that the main cause for tube plugging on Unit 1 is PWSCC indications, 
which accounts for 31 % of the tubes plugged to date. Manufacturing defects 
accounts for 15.6% of tubes plugged, 00 wall loss due to loose parts makes up 9%. 
The balance is caused by a variety less common degradation mechanisms. 
Unit 2 has a much lower incidence of tube plugging and has not had any tubes 
plugged due to PWSCC. Again, this can be attributed to the application of 
shotpeening to Unit 2 before Unit 1. 
The main cause of tube plugging in Unit 2 was due to manufacturing defects, which 
accounts for 35% of all tubes plugged to date. The rest is caused by U-bend 
indications (24%), loose parts damage (18%), and a variety of other less common 
degradation mechanisms. 
Plugging, however, is not a very useful indication of the state of SG tube bundle 
degradation. The decision to plug is based on many parameters. Often it is more 
convenient and cost effective to plug a tube preventatively i.e. before the mandatory 
plugging criteria are met. This is sometimes done to minimise the primary to 
secondary leak rates during the next cycle. EdF's plugging policy has evolved as 
plant experience and research has progressed, and thus the decision to plug at each 
outage has been based on different areas of focus. 
Although the plugging data cannot be used conclusively to determine the major 
degradation mechanisms, experience at Koeberg and internationally has indicated 
that PWSCC is the dominant tube degradation mechanism for Inconel 600 tubed 
SG's. The extent of PWSCC at Koeberg (number of cracked tubes) is considered a 
better indication of the state of SG tube bundle degradation and is shown graphically 
below. 
t A Cycle refers to the period between successive refuelling outages for a particular unit. Koeberg uses 18 month fuel cycles 
and has currently undergone 11 cycles on Unit 1 and 10 cycles on Unit 2. 
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Figure 4: Extent of Unit 1 PWSCC 
Unit 1 - SG PWSCC in RTZ 
OUTAGE 10103 0104 0105 0106 .107 .108 1'1109 .110 .111.1120113 1 
SG 1 
SG 1 
SG2 SG 3 SG 1 SG2 
OVERALL STEAM GENERATOR SLUDGE ZONE 
Figure 5: Extent of Unit 2 PWSCC 
Unit 2 - SG PWSCC in RTZ 
OUTAGE 10204 ~205 0206.207.208 C 2090210.211.212 1 
SG2 
OVERALL 
SG3 SG1 
STEAM GENERATOR 
SG2 
SLUDGE ZOI'E 
Introduction 
SG 3 
SG3 
It should be noted that the sludge zone (300 tubes) was reduced to 150 tubes from outage 110 (Unit 1) and outage 208 (Unit 
2). This batch represents the reduced sludge zone (as verified by televisual inspection). Thus, to maintain consistency, the 
sludge zone plots do not include the results for outage 110, 208, and 210. Outage 209 was included since the entire tube 
bundle was inspected (Le. the extent of cracking in the 300-tube sludge zone could be determined). 
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Again, the increased resistance to crack initiation by Unit 2 (by a factor of -2) can be 
attributed to the application of shotpeening to Unit 2 one cycle before application to 
Unit 1. 
The results also appear to indicate behaviour typical of the early failure region of the 
classic bathtub failure rate curve (this curve is fundamental to the understanding of 
reliability characteristics). The bathtub curve is divided into three portions. The early 
failure region is a period of high failure rate because of initial defects. It is in essence 
a 'shakedown' period in which weak units, with susceptible materials and improper 
workmanship and manufacture (e.g. improper tube expansion and loose parts) are 
culled out. This is evident from the decreasing failure rate observable in Figure 4 and 
Figure 5. The useful-life period follows the early failure period and is characterised by 
an approximately constant failure rate. Failures are at a low rate and of a random 
nature. Last is the period of wear-out. This region exhibits a sharp rise in failure rate 
because of ageing and wear. The SG's are designed to operate for the life of the 
plant and thus should not reach the wear out phase. 
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1.3 Fracture Mechanisms in Metals and Alloys 
Intergranular fracture has been identified as the dominant fracture mechanism for SG 
tubing of PWR plants [4, 5, & 6]. The following section serves as an introduction to 
the various fracture mechanisms, particularly Intergranular fracture. 
Since World War II there has been great progress in understanding the ways in 
which materials fracture. Such knowledge has proved essential to better formulation 
of fracture mechanisms. Nevertheless, it is still not possible to use this knowledge, 
together with other material properties, for predicting fracture behaviour in 
engineering terms (Le. in a deterministic sense) with a high degree of confidence [5]. 
The four most common fracture mechanisms in metals and alloys are as follows: 
1.3.1 Ductile Fracture 
Ductile materials usually fail as a result of nucleation, growth and coalescence of 
microscopic voids that initiate at inclusions and second phase particles. The voids 
grow together to form a macroscopic flaw, which leads to fracture. 
1.3.2 Cleavage 
Cleavage fracture involves the rapid propagation of a crack along a particular 
crystallographic plane. The fracture path is transgranular in polycrystalline materials. 
Cleavage can be brittle, but it can be preceded by large scale plastic flow and ductile 
crack growth. The preferred cleavage planes are those with the lowest packing 
density, since fewer bonds must be broken and the spacing between planes is 
greater. 
Cleavage is most likely when plastic flow is restricted. This occurs when insufficient 
slip systems for ductile behaviour are present. Face centred cubic (FCC) metals, 
such as nickel, are usually not susceptible to cleavage because there are ample slip 
systems for ductile behaviour at all temperatures. 
1.3.3 Fatigue 
Structures, which are subjected to cyclic loading, may fail by fatigue fracture. Fatigue 
cracks can be initiated in a number of ways; however, the important fact is that they 
are usually nucleated at a free surface from small flaws, scratches, or other stress 
raisers. Crack initiation and early growth occurs above a characteristic "threshold" 
stress intensity (LlKth) and is generally termed Stage I growth; fatigue propagation of 
a significant flaw (~3 mm long) is termed Stage" growth; the crack grows a finite 
increment in each load cycle. During this stage crack growth is relatively insensitive 
to microstructure and flow properties. Stage II continues until the crack becomes 
large enough for unstable fracture, Stage III. 
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1.3.4 Intergranular Fracture 
In most cases metals do not fail along grain boundaries. Ductile metals usually fail by 
coalescence of voids formed at inclusions and second phase particles, while brittle 
metals typically fail by transgranular cleavage. Under special circumstances, 
however, cracks can form and propagate along grain boundaries. 
There is no single mechanism for intergranular fracture. Rather, there are a variety of 
situations that can lead to cracking on grain boundaries, including [4]: 
);> Grain boundary cavitation and cracking at high temperatures. 
At high temperatures, grain boundaries are weak relative to the matrix, and a 
significant portion of creep deformation is accommodated by grain boundary 
sliding. In such cases void nucleation and growth (at second phase particles) is 
concentrated at the crack boundaries, and cracks form as grain boundary 
cavities, grow and coalesce. Grain boundary cavitation is the dominant 
mechanism of creep crack growth in metals. 
);> Precipitation of a brittle phase on the grain boundary 
Brittle phases can be deposited on grain boundaries through improper tempering. 
Temper embritllement, which occurs when an alloy steel is tempered at - 550°C, 
involves the segregation of impurities, such as phosphorous and sulphur, to prior 
austenite grain boundaries. These thin layers of impurity atoms are not resolvable 
on the fracture surface. They can be detected in the laboratory with surface 
analysiS techniques such as Auger electron spectroscopy. 
);> Hydrogen embrittiement and liquid metal embrittiement 
Hydrogen can severely degrade the toughness of an alloy. The precise 
mechanism of hydrogen embritllement is not completely understood. It is thought 
that atomic hydrogen bonds with the metal atoms and reduces the cohesive 
strength at grain boundaries. Hydrogen can come from a number of sources, 
including moisture and hydrogen containing compounds. 
);> Environmentally assisted cracking 
Environmentally assisted cracking is related to hydrogen embrittlement, since 
hydrogen plays a role in the cracking process. High strength alloys are most 
susceptible to environmentally assisted cracking. The cracking is usually time-
dependent and follows grain boundaries. The chemical and transport processes 
that lead to environmental assisted cracking are as follows: 
1. Transport of the harmful environment to the crack tip. 
2. Reactions of the environment with the crack surfaces, resulting in localised 
dissolution and production of hydrogen. 
3. Hydrogen absorbtion into the alloy. 
4. Diffusion of the hydrogen to an embrittlement site ahead of the crack tip. 
5. Hydrogen-metal interactions leading to embritllement and crack propagation. 
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);- Intergranular corrosion 
Intergranular corrosion involves preferential attack of the grain boundaries, as 
opposed to general corrosion, where the material is dissolved relatively uniformly 
across the surface. Intergranular attack is different from environmentally assisted 
cracking, since there is no embritllement mechanism associated with the grain 
boundary corrosion. 
In U-tube SG's, intergranular cracking of the Inconel 600 tubing has occurred at 
various locations e.g. within the tube sheets, just above the tube sheets, in dents at 
support plates, and in tight radius U-bends. 
While the mechanisms causing the Inconel 600 cracks at these various locations are 
not well understood, their characteristics and the prevailing environment support the 
* 
view that stress corrosion is dominant [6]. Examination of pulled tubes also supports 
this view. Sulphur has been found on the crack faces of these pulled tube specimens, 
and may have been involved in crack propagation, since it has long been recognised 
that sulphur can induce cracking of Inconel600. 
The SG tubes are exposed to two differing environments. Pure water on the primary 
side and a caustic environment on the secondary side. The relative susceptibilities to 
sec are affected by oxygen and caustic concentration. Inconel 600 appears to be 
most susceptible to sec in weak caustic concentrations. Based on this, the 
hypothesis has been put forward that the phenomenon of sec in Inconel 600 in pure 
water is of the same nature as that in a caustic medium [6]. 
Since the attack is almost always intergranular, the role of grain boundary carbides 
and the related chromium depleted layers in the process has been extensively 
studied. However, no universally accepted model is available to explain the sec 
behaviour of Inconel 600, although grain boundaries carbides and the segregation of 
impurities (Phosphorous and Sulphur) to the grain boundaries clearly play an 
important role in the process. 
Attempts to improve the see resistance of Inconel 600 have pursued modification of 
the grain boundary microstructure. Of the two heat-treatment processes in use, viz. a 
high temperature "purification" anneal and a thermal treatment, the thermally treated 
tubing has superior caustic see resistance to the mill-annealed product in all cases. 
Thermal treatment in the carbide precipitation temperature range (above - 597 DC) 
introduces a variety of grain-boundary microstructures. Grain-boundary precipitation 
range from fine discrete particles, to a semicontinuous layer, to large discrete 
particles. The maximum improvement in caustic sec resistance is achieved with a 
thermal treatment of - 704 DC (for 1 to 24 hrs) and at - 593 DC (for at least 100 hrs) 
and - 649 DC (for 10 to 100 hrs). Thermal treatments at these temperatures and 
corresponding duration's have produced tubing with sec resistance as good as, if 
not superior to, that of Alloy 800 [6]. 
* 
A sec Mechanism can be defined as the combination of mechanical, physical, and chemical processes that accomplishes the 
separation of bonds at the crack tip, thereby advancing the crack. 
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The maximum improvement in caustic see resistance correlated with a grain-
boundary microstructure consisting of a semicontinuous precipitate without an 
associated chromium-depleted layer but with phosphorous segregated to the 
boundaries. 
Thermal treatment increases the critical stress level above which rapid crack 
propagation occurs, as well as decreasing the crack propagation rate. The improved 
see resistance has been attributed to a reduction in residual stress (retarding crack 
initiation) and grain boundary structural modification (inhibiting crack growth). 
Another benefit obtained from thermal treatment is a reduction in the variability of 
caustic see resistance. 
There is a large scatter in the data on the caustic see resistance of mill-annealed 
Inconel 600 presumably due to the testing of different heats of material with different 
thermomechanical processing histories. 
Literature relevant to the intergranular corrosion of Inconel 600 in pure water and 
caustic environments are discussed in subsequent sections. 
18 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Tube Degradation Mechanisms 
2 Tube Degradation Mechanisms 
Pressurised water reactor SG tubes have been subject to failures/degradation's due 
to various mechanisms, including Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC), 
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and Intergranular attack (IA) on the secondary side, 
pitting, wastage, denting, fretting, vibration fatigue, and loose parts damage. 
Figure 6 below illustrates these degradation mechanisms and their location within the 
tube bundle. 
Figure 6: Tube Degradation Mechanisms and Locations 
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It has been observed that the dominant failure mode has changed over the years, as 
illustrated in Figure 7 [7] below: 
Figure 7: World wide causes of tube plugging 
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From Figure 7 it is clear that the major cause of tube failure in the early 70's was 
wastage. This is the corrosion on the secondary side, generally in relatively stagnant 
regions, which resulted in tube wall thinning. It was concluded to be acid phosphate 
attack resulting from the use of phosphate based secondary water chemistry. Thus, 
most operators changed from this to A VT (All Volatile Treatment) chemistry in the 
early to mid 70's. Some failures due to wastage have occurred since this time, but 
these have been mainly confined to those plants, which retained phosphate 
chemistry to a later date (e.g. Siemens/KWU). A few plants experienced wastage 
after the switch to AVT but this was as a result of residual phosphates, and a few 
where significant condenser in-leakages were believed to have introduced impurities 
into the SG's. Thus, the change to A VT had a significant effect on the occurrence of 
wastage. 
The switch to A VT chemistry and its effect on wastage resulted in the emergence of 
denting as the predominant failure mode in the late 70's. This degradation 
mechanism was also largely eliminated by around 1980. For existing plants this was 
achieved by tightening of the secondary water chemistry controls, particularly the 
feedwater quality, to reduce the levels of chloride and copper ions resulting from 
condenser and feed-train materials. 
In the longer term, i.e. for new and replacement SG's, the problem of denting has 
also been addressed by changes to the tube support plate material (carbon steel 
replaced by stainless steel) and design (drilled holes replaced by broached hole or 
egg crate designs). In addition, newer plants have employed high integrity 
condensers tubed with titanium or stainless steel to further improve feedwater quality. 
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During the 60's, 70's, and early 80's many tube failures occurred due to the design of 
the tube to tube sheet joint which left deep annular crevices around the tubes on the 
secondary side thereby providing stagnant regions where aggressive species could 
concentrate, leading to denting, wastage, and sec. 
This condition was aggravated by sludge accumulations at these regions, which 
could help provide the aggressive species and assist in their concentration, thus 
leading to further such failures and also to pitting at and just above the tube sheet. 
Modifications were therefore carried out to eliminate tube annular crevices. Early 
explosive expansion techniques largely achieved this aim, but resulted in residual 
stresses in the tubes, which in some cases led to sec. Later, tube expansions were 
by mechanical or hydraulic means, the latter being generally preferred as it is 
believed to result in lower residual stress levels. Such measures significantly reduce 
the incidence of failures at the tube sheets and all manufacturers now employ full 
depth tube expansion. 
Since the early 80's the proportion of tubes plugged (and sleeved) due to pwsee on 
the primary side and SCe/lGA on the secondary side has increased. In 1994 
pwsee accounted for about 22% of all tubes plugged. 
The Koeberg SG's have followed these worldwide trends and suffers mainly from 
pwsee in the roll transition zone, U-bend cracking, and secondary side IGAlSee 
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2.1 Tube Degradation Mechanisms at Koeberg 
2.1.1 Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) * 
PWSCC of Inconel 600 was identified in the laboratory as early as 1959, when 
Coriou et al. [8] reported cracking of this material in high purity water at 350° C. In 
that early work, the researchers proposed "that there exists in high temperature 
austenitic iron - chromium nickel alloys a special kind of intergranular sensitivity not 
related to chromium carbide precipitation" [9]. In 1971 this laboratory cracking 
phenomenon in high purity water became an in-service degradation mechanism, with 
the first confirmed primary-side cracking of hot leg roll transition regions at the 
tubesheet and suspected primary cracking in U-bends at Obrigheim+. Initially this 
behaviour was thought to be an anomaly due to the apparent absence of water born 
contaminants that would promote this type of failure. Subsequent lab tests and, more 
importantly, SG tubing service experience confirmed the IGSCC susceptibility of 
Inconel 600 in primary water. An interesting historical account of known SG tube 
ruptures (SGTR's) is given in Appendix B. 
2.1.1.1 Degradation Mechanism 
In spite of the extensive research work carried out since 1960, the mechanisms 
causing PWSCC are still not fully understood. The main causes are thought to be 
anodic dissolution of material in the region of the cracks and a hydrogen induced 
cracking mechanism [10, 11]. Totsuka et al. [12] has found that the IGSCC of Inconel 
600 on exposure to a slightly alkaline (pH - 8) aqueous solution at 350°C is 
cathodically controlled and occurs only at potentials more negative than 
- -0.835 VSHE (VSHE indicates potentials referred to the standard hydrogen electrode 
scale). He also suggests that the entry of hydrogen and its accumulation at locations 
where a state of high complex stresses and strains exist is mainly responsible for 
intergranular cracking. The entry of hydrogen into the alloy was found to be affected 
by oxide (hydroxide) films on the surface. Recently, Thomas and Bruemmer.[13] 
examined the microstructure of PWSCC affected material using advanced methods 
of high resolution analytical transmission electron microscopy (ATEM) to gain inSight 
into the mechanism of PWSCC. The observations suggested that an active-path 
dissolution or oxidation process controlled PWSCC. However, like many studies of 
this nature, more questions were raised than answered, and more work is still 
needed to fully understand the mechanisms causing PWSCC. 
* The terms Primary Water Stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) and Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) refer to 
the same degradation mechanism. The term PWSCC emphasises the fact that IGSCC is initiated on the primary side of the SG. 
+ 
Obrigheim: Two loop German PWR (340 MWe) built by Siemens (Operational since 1969). 
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2.1.1.2 Main Influencing Factors 
The most important factors influencing PWSCC are: 
};> Coolant temperature. 
};> Water chemistry parameters such as hydrogen content and possibly also the 
lithium concentration in the coolant. 
};> Material properties: Annealing temperature, strength, grain size etc. 
};> Tensile Stress, particularly internal stresses due to cold working. 
2.1.1.3 Crack Initiation Times and Time to Failure 
The formation of cracks as a result of these factors generally occurs after operating 
times of a year (8,760 hours) or more [14]. However, axial SCC was first detected at 
Koeberg after 20,000 operating hours on the primary side, hot leg, RTZ of a mill 
annealed SG [15]. 
Accelerated tests [16] undertaken on reverse U-bend (RUB) specimens in high purity 
water with hydrogen addition at 365°C, indicated that all regular alloy 600 tubes, both 
mill annealed (MA) and thermally treated (IT) had cracked after 20,000 hrs. These 
results can be extrapolated to an equivalent time of 45 years at 320°C. 
PWSCC generally occurs in the hot leg side, RTZ (initiating from the inside diameter) 
of recirculating SG's. The high residual stresses in the RTZ contribute significantly to 
the onset of cracking and subsequent time to failure. Some sources [17] have shown 
that the time to failure is inversely proportional to stress raised to the fourth power i.e. 
1 
t FAILURE oc -4 
(J 
In common with many stress corrosion phenomena, lifetime-to-failure of Inconel 600 
in primary water can be fitted to an empirical formula of the form [18]: 
t FAILURE = C -} -exp(~) 
a 1m RT 
where: tFAILURE 
C 
(j 
1m 
E 
R 
T 
Time to failure (hours) 
Constant 
Applied Stress (MPa) 
Material sensitivity index (Table 3) 
Activation Energy (180 kJ/mol in this case) 
Universal gas constant (1.987 cal/mol) 
Absolute temperature (K) 
Equation 1 
The temperature and operating stress can be calculated or measured, however, the 
intrinsic material sensitivity to SCC as represented by 1m is more difficult to estimate. 
This is due, in part, to the difficulty in determining the carbide morphology of an 
Inconel 600 component still in service. Thus for assessment purposes, a system of 
material indexes (Table 3) deduced from minimum observed times-to-failure in 
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service or in laboratory tests has been devised [18]. The reference point for this 
system of material indexes for Inconel 600 is 1m = 1 when the temperature is 325 DC, 
the stress is 450 MPa, and the minimum time-to-failure observed is 10,000 h. 
Table 3: Maximum Indices for Inconel600 sensitivity to PWSCC [18] 
Material Index (1m) Comment 
SG tubes, Mill annealed, very resistant, 
0.2 
or thermally treated, very significantly improved. 
SG tubes, Mill annealed, not very sensitive, 
0.5 
or thermally treated, improved. 
Pressure Vessel bottom head penetrations 0.6 
SG tubes, Mill annealed, sensitive, Reference Point. 
or thermally treated, little improved, 1.0 325°C, 450 MPa 
SG partition plates, reactor support pads. 10,000 h (min) 
SG tubes, Mill annealed, very sensitive. 2.0 
Pressure Vessel upper head penetrations 2.5 
2.1.1.4 Stress Contribution 
The stress state has a significant effect on crack susceptibility. Domain et al. 
[19] have observed that the absence of lateral branching in cracks suggests that a 
high elastic stress is necessary for crack growth. If crack growth was less dependent 
on stress, then branching of the cracks in directions other than normal to the principle 
fibre stress would have occurred. High stresses occur in the RTZ, due to the 
mechanical rolling process used to expand the tube into the tube sheet. 
Woodward et al. [17] indicates that roller expansions introduces longitudinal tensile 
stresses towards the outside diameter and circumferential tensile stresses towards 
the inside diameter. The maximum stresses are greater than 150 MPa, 
which is about 50% of the yield strength of Inconel 600. This condition is further 
aggravated by expansion anomalies introduced during mechanical rolling of the 
tubes into the tube sheet. These anomalies include; excessive rolling, over expanded 
kiss roll, and over diametering of tube sheet bore. These anomalies were detected 
and in some cases re-expanded during the pre service inspection (PSI) at Koeberg. 
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2.1.1.5 Temperature Contribution 
PWSCC of mill annealed Inconel 600 tubing is also a highly temperature dependent 
phenomenon and can be described using an Arrhenius" relationship with an 
activation energy of - 40 kcal/mol (167.47 kJ/mol) [9, 20]. The activation energy is, 
however, characterised by a high degree of scatter. Economy ef al. [21] have 
suggested a range of 30 to 70 kcal/mol and Scott [18] has observed a typical value of 
43 kcal/mol with a scatter band of 19 to 53 kcal/mol. 
EdF's work to date as cited by Nicholls [22] indicates that time to crack (te) is given 
by the following relationship: 
where 
k1 and k2 are constants dependant on materials processing etc. 
T is the temperature (K) and 
E is the activation energy (kcal/mol). 
Equation 2 
Andresen [23] has shown that water chemistry strongly effects the dependence of 
crack growth rate on temperature, especially above 200 DC. His research has shown 
that in pure water (associated with :s; 200 ppb O2) crack tip chemistry was more 
benign, a peak in crack growth rate was observed at about 200 DC with a rapid drop 
in crack growth rate observed above 250 DC. 
2.1.1.6 Crack Morphology 
Two forms of PWSCC have been observed, axial cracking and circumferential 
cracking. Axial cracks are usually numerous around the circumference and originate 
where the residual stresses are the highest i.e. between the roll expansion and the 
kiss roll. Circumferential cracks are less common and only two tubes with indications 
of this type have been detected at Koeberg to date. These types of cracks have also 
been observed in French plants. Circumferentially cracked tubes are plugged upon 
detection. This is because a circumferential crack failure leaves a tube severed. The 
tube is thus free to whip around inside the tube bundle and may damage the 
surrounding tubes. 
* Arrhenius' Law is a rate law, which has great generality. It states that the rate increases exponentially with temperature 
(or that the time for a given amount of corrosion, creep, oxidation etc. decreases exponentially with temperature). 
If the rate of a process which follows this law is plotted on a In scale against 1rr a straight line with slope -aIR is obtained, 
where Q is the activation energy (kJhnol) and R is the Universal gas constant (8.31 J/mol.K). [241 
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Axial cracks are allowed to grow and are plugged when their free length (measured 
from the last point of contact with the tube sheet) is in the region of 13mm. These 
cracks generally become through wall when their length is approximately 6mm long. 
After 12mm the inside diameter crack length and outside diameter crack lengths are 
almost similar [15] 
The levels of cracking are highest in the sludge zone with a progressive reduction in 
cracking from the centre of the tube sheet outwards to the periphery. Wicker [15] has 
analysed Koeberg's crack growth rates and cracking trends and found that some 
benefit was derived from shotpeening the hot leg RTZ's of both units. On Unit 2, 
where shotpeening was performed one outage earlier (Outage 201) there appears to 
be a considerably lesser incidence of cracking. 
2.1.1.7 The Leak-Before-Risk-of-Break Principle (LBRB) 
The stability of axial cracks up to a free length of 16mm under a feedwater line break 
condition (this is the most severe transient since maximum depressurisation, 
~P ~ 170 bar, of the secondary side occurs) has been shown by Hutin and Billon 
[25]. The acceptable free length increases to 16.5mm in the transition zone due to 
the tube sheet reinforcement effect. The plugging criteria for axial cracks in the RTZ 
is that its free length does not exceed 13 mm. The safety margin of 3.5 mm was 
derived from statistical analysis [26] and is based on the following: 
>- 2 mm RPC length evaluation uncertainty (Le. an error of ± 1 mm can be 
expected). 
>- 1.5 mm potential crack propagation per cycle of cracks with initial lengths greater 
than 10 mm. 
Scott [18] has observed that in thermally treated Inconel 600 tubes, axial cracks at-
10 mm long arrest, for all practical purposes. Thus, provided the overall leak rate is 
acceptably low. there is no need to plug these tubes in contrast to their mill-annealed 
counterparts. 
It was further shown that a significant primary to secondary leak should precede tube 
failure. This has become the basis for the principle of Leak Before Risk of Break 
(LBRB) and has allowed the operation of SG's with limited leak rates. The Koeberg 
safety case KSS 6.46 [22] demonstrated that as long as a 30 litres/hour per SG leak 
rate limit was maintained, the tube integrity under normal and accident conditions 
was assured for IGSCC defects. 
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2.1.1.8 The Influence of Metallurgical Parameters 
A fairly good correlation between crack initiation time (CIT) and certain metallurgical 
parameters has been shown by various studies [10, 16, 19, 21, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. It 
is, however, important to emphasise that there is not a single product called "mill-
annealed" Alloy 600 tubing. Each tubing manufacturer employs a different process to 
produce "mill-annealed" Alloy 600 tubing, and the resistance to SCC varies greatly 
with the process. Additionally, the resistance to SCC may vary for different Heats 
(batches) of tubing by the same manufacturer. 
The findings for the effects of the metallurgical parameters are summarised below: 
~ Annealing· Temperature: The final annealing temperature has considerable 
influence on CIT. A linear relationship has been observed, See Figure 8 below. It 
can be seen that a high annealing temperature has a beneficial influence. A high 
annealing temperature is required to dissolve the majority of the carbon in the 
alloy into solid solution. For heats given a low annealing temperature that is not 
sufficient to solutionize the carbon, the benefit of thermal treatment is not as great 
[21]. 
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Figure 8: Influence of Final Anneal Temperature [16] 
CIT vs Final Annealing Temperature 
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When metals are forged, rolled or drawn, they work harden. After a deformation of perhaps 80% a limit is reached, beyond 
which the metal cracks or fractures. Further rolling or drawing is possible if the metal is annealed (heated to about 0.6 T 101) 
T 101 = melting temperature. During annealing, new, undeformed grains replace old deformed grains, and the working can 
continue for a further - 80%. [32] 
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} Carbon Content: No correlation was found between total carbon content (CTOT) 
and CIT. However, fairly good correlation has been obtained between carbon 
content and CIT if the difference between total carbon content and soluble carbon 
content is regarded i.e. (CTOT - CSOL). This represents the carbon content that 
could not have been dissolved. See Figure 9 below. EdF [26] has suggested that 
post manufacture heat treatment limits the risk of PWSCC especially when the 
level of carbon in the material is less than 0.035 %. This limit prevents excessive 
chromium depletion due to carbide precipitates during heat treatment. Excessive 
undissolved carbides can also inhibit grain growth during annealing [2]. 
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Figure 9: Influence of Carbon Solubility [16] 
CIT vs Carbon Solubility 
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} Grain Boundary Carbides: A linear relationship has been observed between the 
amount of grain boundary carbides and CIT (see Figure 10 below, NB. 0 = no 
carbides at all and 5 = grain boundaries are completely covered). Bruemmer et a/. 
[27] has suggested that dislocation source activity at grain interfaces are critical in 
controlling IGSCC susceptibility. Effective sources such as grain boundary 
carbides promote crack blunting (because of their effectiveness as a dislocation 
source), decreasing the crack tip stress state, and thus increases resistance to 
cracking. 
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Figure 10: Influence of Grain Boundary Carbides [16] 
30 
25 
20 
16 
10 
6 
0 
·1 
CIT vs Amt of Grain Boundary Carbides 
• MA • TT' •••• L inea r Trendl in. I 
Ii 
'. . ~! -~ ---,. . 
" " " -
• 
• 
2 
. -.' . ----
3 
Ami. of Grain Boundary Carbides 
5 
28 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Tube Degradation Mechanisms 
).> Grain Size and Yield Stress: Good correlation has been shown between these 
parameters and CIT, but it could not be concluded if this just reflects the influence 
of annealing temperature. Both parameters are strongly dependent on final 
annealing temperature. The laboratory results indicate that a larger grain size and 
lower yield strength reduce susceptibility to cracking. 
• 
A good example of the resistance due to larger grain size is Doel 1 and 2 [22]. Both 
units have the same design and are operated identically, but Doel 2 has had major 
SG tube problems whereas Doel 1 had virtually none [Doe I 1 having significantly 
larger grain size (ASTM 9) than Doel 2 (ASTM 7)]. An inconsistency has been noted 
in the literature. References 27, 21, 30, 22 support the correlation between large 
grain size and SCC resistance, however Norring et al. [16] suggests the opposite. 
This discrepancy could be attributed to the small sample size used during these tests 
(10 MA and 1 IT specimen). 
Tubing performance of Combustion Engineering designed SG tubing has been 
enhanced by employing a specification that aims at obtaining a yield strength of 
310 MPa with an upper limit of 379 MPa [30]. This control prevents the use of a low 
temperature annealing and avoids the high yield strength and carbide free 
boundaries that contribute to primary side SCC susceptibility. A typical yield strength 
trend is shown in Figure 11 below. 
Figure 11: Influence of Yield Strength [16] 
CIT vs Yield Stress 
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* 
Ooel1 and 2 are Belgium Pressurised Water Reactors (392 MWe), operational since 1975. 
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~ Chromium Content Tsai ef a/. [28] have shown that chromium depletion due to 
carbide formation during heat treatment processes reduces the resistance of 
Inconel 600 to SCC. The chromium content should thus be sufficiently high to 
mitigate this effect. An EPRI study [33] has indicated that a thermal treatment 
(15h at 705 DC), following annealing (at 980 DC to 1010 DC), provides enough time 
for grain boundary chromium content to recover. The major benefit derived from a 
high chromium content is that the area immediately surrounding carbide particles 
retains enough chromium to resist sensitisation. Tsai ef a/. [28] have shown that 
there exists a critical chromium concentration, ranging from -8 to 10 % (wt), 
above which corrosion does not take place. 
~ Nickel Content Sedriks ef a/. [29] have shown, using RUB specimens, that the 
resistance of Inconel 600 to SCC increases with increasing Nickel content. The 
reasons for this Nickel trend have however not been ascertained. It has been 
noted that increasing Nickel content is accompanied by a change in crack 
propagation path from transgranular to intergranular. Any model proposed for this 
trend should thus take this into account. 
The results of these trends, obtained from literature, are summarised below: 
The specifications for a "SCC resistant generation of Alloy 600 SG tubing", as 
recommended by Stein [31], are also included. 
Table 4: sec Resistant Metallurgical Parameters 
Parameter Parameter value for Reference 
SCC resistant tubes 
Metallurgical Parameters 
Anneal temperature (Final) High (>950 DC) 16,27,21,30 
(CTOT - Csod Low 16, 19 
Carbon content 
CTOT 0.025 - 0.050 % 34,31,26 
Chromium content Above - 8 % 28 
Nickel content High (~72.0 %) 29,31 
Co content 0.015 % Max 31 
Ti content See Text below 
Si content 0.50 % Max 31 
Mn content 1.0 % Max 31 
Fe content 6.0-10.0 % 31 
Cu content 0.50 % Max 31 
AI content See Text below 
Small 16 
Grain Size 
Large 27,21,30 
Grain boundary carbides High 16,19,27,21,30,2 
Mechanical Properties 
" 
Yield Stress (Room temp.) Low (-310 to 379 MPa) 16,30 
Ultimate Tensile Strength 552 MPa Min. 31 
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It should be noted that these trends exhibit a high degree of scatter and are based on 
a small sample of laboratory specimens, however, the studies are all in agreement 
on the overall trends, except for the grain size discrepancy mentioned above. The 
scatter could be accounted for by variations in processing history. Bandy and van 
Rooyen [34] have suggested that the susceptibility of Inconel 600 cannot be judged 
on the basis of micro-structural analysis alone, since small variations in processing 
history also have a significant effect. 
It is difficult to ascertain if resistance of a given alloy to SCC derives from resistance 
to initiation, propagation or both. This uncertainty is especially true for the resistance 
due to high Nickel content. 
No data was available for the effects of aluminium and titanium content. However, 
the ASM handbook of Metallographic Techniques and Microstructures [35] indicates 
that the aluminium and titanium content and the aluminium/titanium ratio are very 
important for the performance of Nickel-base alloys. Increasing the 
aluminium/titanium ratio improves high temperature properties. Exact compositional 
values were not obtainable. 
2.1.1.9 Inspection Method 
Tubing degradation assessment is by means of eddy current non-destructive testing 
methods. A rotating pancake coil (RPC) is used to detect cracking in the RTZ. The 
inspections are either 100% (3330 tubes) or concentrated in the sludge zone 
(300 tubes). The sludge zone scope has been reduced to the reduced sludge zone 
since outage 110 and 208. 
2.1.1.10 French Experience 
No unplanned outages have occurred in French plants due to axial PWSCC since 
1988, therefore the frequency of SGTR can be estimated to be less than 2.32E-3 
(1/(36 plants x 12 years)). EdF have carried out a probabilistic study which indicates 
that the actual frequency of SGTR from axial PWSCC in the RTZ is less than 10-7 for 
up to four additional cycles assuming the current maintenance regime and plugging 
criteria are employed at each shutdown. 
No unplanned outages have occurred in France since 1984 due to circumferential 
PWSCC in the expansion transition zone. Therefore the frequency of SGTR due to 
this form of degradation can be estimated as less than 1.74E-3 (1/(36 plants x 16 
yea rs)) [7). 
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2.1.2 U - Bend Cracking 
This form of tube degradation constitutes the second most significant damage 
mechanism in French plants. 
Cracking has been found to be intergranular and although no corrosive medium has 
been identified this form of cracking has been termed SCC. It is assumed that the 
same dependencies on metallurgical parameters as described for PWSCC are 
applicable. 
Cracking occurs in the apex of the U-bend and the transition between the straight 
section and bent section. The defects on the Westinghouse tubes initiate from the 
inside of the bend and those on the Vallourec tubes initiate from the outside. 
The tubes most susceptible to this form of degradation are the row 1 and 2 U-tubes 
(smallest bend radius) especially those without a pre-fabrication thermal treatment or 
a post fabrication stress relieving heat treatment. Koeberg applied U-bend heat 
treatments (UBHT) to both units during the fifth outage. 
Because of the limited incidence of this type of cracking and the limited NDE data 
available, the crack initiation times and crack propagation rates are not well known, 
however some observations have been made. Cracks have been detected in 
Westinghouse manufactured row 1 tubes after 24,000 hrs and in row 2 tubes after 
57,000 hours (no UBHT had been performed).The defects on these tubes have gone 
through wall inside 1 fuel cycle [22]. Vallourec tubing of the type Koeberg has, has 
been shown to be significantly less susceptible to this problem. Vallourec 
manufactured row 1 tubes have been shown to crack after 35,000 hrs without UBHT 
[15]. 
The EdF SG's with Westinghouse tubes have had all their first row (small radius) 
U-bends plugged preventatively because of potential leakage problems. The same 
practice has not been followed for the Koeberg SG's. Currently three tubes have 
been plugged preventatively at Koeberg due to U-bend indications (SG 99). 
The causes of U-bend cracking are as follows: 
}> Corrosive environment I Material susceptibility 
}> High Stress levels due to: Primary Stresses 
Secondary Stresses 
Residual Stresses 
Primary stresses are those due to the pressure gradient across the tube wall during 
operation (100 bar during normal operation and 170 bar during accident conditions -
Feed water line break) 
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Le [36] has shown, analytically, that secondary stresses are significant and usually 
high due to severe operating conditions. The following secondary stresses have been 
identified: 
}> Type 1: 
}> Type 2: 
}> Type 3: 
Stresses due to temperature drop across the tube wall. 
O"TYPE 1 = 60 MPa for a temperature drop of 30 DC. 
Stresses due to axial movement of the two legs of a U-tube as a 
result of the temperature difference between the two legs. 
O"TYPE 2 = 110 MPa for a U-tube having a bend radius of 6r 
(r = mean radius of tube cross section). 
Stresses due to thermal expansion of the bend radius. 
O"TYPE 3 = 5 MPa for Inconel 600 tubes with Stainless steel TSP's. 
It has also been suggested that, due to the severe operating conditions, the overall 
stresses in the U-bend region of the small radius U-bends (with a bend radius of less 
than 6 times the tube diameter) may experience very high stress levels, because of 
secondary stresses, so that this may constitute the leading cause of short failure 
times of tubes by SCC. 
Residual stresses are due to the cold bending of the U-tubes during manufacture. 
This is usually accompanied by significant ovality of the tube cross section. To 
prevent this, Koeberg heat treated the U-bends of rows 1 and 2, on both units during 
outages 105 and 205 respectively. The heat treatment employed was 2 to 6 minutes 
between 700 and 840DC. It is difficult to assess the effect of UBHT due to the limited 
data available. Crombie [7] has thus suggested that the current scope and frequency 
of inspection for the row 1 and 2 U-bends be maintained until an adequate data base 
(Koeberg and world wide) can be built to develop further inspection policies. 
Flaw detection is by means of U-bend rotating pancake coil (UBRPC). The results 
obtained from this method are extremely conservative in both flaw detection and 
sizing estimates. However, some plants have experienced leaking tubes in the 
U-bend region immediately after 100 % examinations of the inner two rows [7]. 
The frequency of SG tube rupture (SGTR) due to this form of degradation has been 
estimated at 3.9E-3 [7]. 
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2.1.3 Secondary Side IGA and IGSCC 
Intergranular attack and Intergranular Stress corrosion cracking (IGAlIGSCC) have 
been experienced within crevices between tubes and tube support plates and within 
crevices between tubes and tube sheets of SG's in PWR plants. This form of 
degradation also occurs in the region of the sludge pile (See Figure 6 above). 
2.1.3.1 Crack Morphology 
There are distinct differences between IGA and IGSCC. The corrosion morphology 
for IGSCC consists of single or multiple major cracks with minor to moderate 
amounts of branching. Experience suggests that IGSCC require stresses greater 
than 0.5 yield in order to propagate rapidly. At lower stress levels crack propagation 
rates may be very low, and the corrosion may take another intergranular form [37]. 
IGA may be described as general intergranular attack or volumetric intergranular 
attack. Its morphology is characterised by uniform attack on all grain boundaries over 
the surface of the tubing. In the purest case, stress does not contribute substantially 
to the morphology of IGA, which distinguishes this phenomenon from IGSCC. 
However, there is a close relationship between IGA and IGSCC, since major cracks 
(IGSCC) often initiates at regions weakened by IGA. 
The general nature of this form of degradation is thus extensively intergranular with 
breakdown on planes perpendicular to the principal stress plane (for IGSCC). 
Outside diameter IGSCC is the dominant form of this degradation type [7]. 
2.1.3.2 The Influence of Metallurgical Parameters 
Unlike PWSCC, no consistent dependence of IGSCC on microstructure has been 
established. It has also been shown that the metallurgical structure and the IGSCC 
susceptibility for mill-annealed samples varied from heat to heat with no apparent 
correlation [3]. 
2.1.3.3 Environmental Requirements 
IGA of Alloy 600 MA occurs when either a strong alkaline or acidic condition exists 
together with free caustics and an oxidising environment [38]. 
It is difficult to establish the exact sources of these caustics (corrosive products) arid 
oxidants. Some of the possibilities put forward are as follows [38]: 
Caustics are thought to be generated from welding slag and fumes remaining in the 
secondary system during the construction phase and introduced into the SG during 
trial operations. The introduction of make-up water also contributes to these caustics. 
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Dissolved oxygen concentrations in the condensate was high during the initial stage 
of trial operation. It is thought that copper oxide and hematite'" existed in the SG 
secondary side, which contributed to the oxidants present. 
SG's with full depth crevices are especially susceptible to IGNIGSCC [39]. The build-
up of impurities in these tube sheet crevices over time can lead to a highly corrosive 
environment. The Koeberg SG's do not suffer from this problem since the tubes are 
expanded to the full depth of the tubesheet. The crevice is further reduced by the kiss 
roll transition (see Figure 3). The Koeberg SG's are however susceptible to 
IGNIGSCC above the tubesheet (in the sludge zone) due to the accumulation of bulk 
water impurities, which concentrate in crevice regions and sludge. This is refered to 
as 'hideout' and this phenomenon occurs continuously during normal operation. 
Silicon compounds have been found to occur abundantly in hideout returns and in 
the deposits of pulled tubes, however their effect on the behaviour of SG tube 
material has not been adequately studied. A recent study by Navas et al. [40] 
indicated an inhibiting effect of silicon compounds on the IGSCC of mill annealed 
Alloy 600. The inhibiting effect appeared to be related to the incorporation of silicon in 
the oxide layer. 
'" Hematite: A hard translucent mineral consisting mainly of ferric oxide 
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2.1.3.4 Temperature and Stress Contribution 
The operating temperature and stress state also plays a significant role in the 
initiation and propagation of IGSee. However. in comparison with the chemical 
driving forces. the stress appears to be a contributing factor rather than a dominant 
factor [41]. 
The stress intensity factor (K) at the crack tip and the environmental conditions are 
considered key parameters in IGAlIGSee propagation behaviour. Kawamura and 
Hirano [42] have studied the effects of K at the crack tips on the IGAlIGSee 
propagation behaviour of SG tubes. Their findings may be summarised as follows: 
~ K at the crack tips increased with increasing crack length. For a long crack. K 
decreased with an increasing number of cracks. However. for a short crack. K 
decreased only slightly with an increasing number of cracks. 
~ Double cantilever beam (DeB) test results showed IGAlIGSee cracks did not 
propagate rapidly with K ranging from 0 MPa rm to 60 MPa rm. which was 
considered typical of the IGAlSee crack tips of typical SG tubes under PWR 
operating conditions. Also. the crack velocity decreased with decreasing 
temperature. 
~ In general the relationship between crack velocity and stress intensity could be 
divided into three regions (i.e. regions of stress dependent crack growth 
[Region 1]. stress independent crack growth [Region 2]. and rapid increase crack 
velocity with increasing stress [Region 3]). In region one the crack velocities were 
assumed to be controlled by the kinetics of a chemical reaction between the metal 
and the environment that filled the crack. In region two it was believed that the 
crack velocity was limited by the transport of hydroxyl ions to the crack tip. The 
resultant curves are typical for sec [5]. See Figure 12 below: 
Figure 12: Effect of K on Crack Velocity [42] 
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2.1.3.5 Preventative Measures 
Various preventative measures are in use world wide. The main purpose being to 
improve the secondary side water chemistry to reduce impurities and to establish a 
reducing environment. These measures include the following: 
>- NatCI molar ratio control using ammonium chloride (NH4CI). 
>- Corrosion potential reduction by high hydrazine (H2NNH2) operation. 
>- Lab tests have demonstrated that boric acid (H3B03) injection can inhibit the 
initiation and growth of IGAlIGSCC in MA Alloy 600 in caustic environments 
[39]. The mechanism by which this inhibition occurs has, however, not been 
determined. The use of boric acid in the SG secondary side has been qualified. 
>- Feedwater de-aeration to minimise oxidant levels. 
>- Full condensate polishing plant. 
}> The use of high integrity condensers with titanium tubing, thus limiting the risk of 
condenser in-leakage. 
>- The heat treatment of areas with high manufacturing residual stresses such as 
the small radius U-bends. 
>- Tube sheet crevice flushing (TSCF) operations help reduce IGAlIGSCC in deep 
sheet crevices [39]. This has been shown in laboratory tests and from operating 
experience. TSCF operations cause boiling to occur within the tube sheet crevice 
thus forcing concentrated (or dilute) liquids out. These operation are repeated 
several times depending on the available outage time. 
>- Titanium dioxide (Ti02) has been identified as the cracking inhibitor that is most 
effective in caustic environments. It results in the formation of a protective nickel 
titanate (NiTi02) film on the tubing surface. This inhibitor has been applied at 
Kori-1 with positive results [41]. 
~ Thermal treatment of the tube bundle during manufacture (typically 700 DC for 
16 hrs) has significantly decreased the IGSCC susceptibility in caustic solutions 
[2, 3]. Koeberg's SG 77 was thermally treated at 700 DC for 12 hrs. 
>- SG's with Inconel 690 TT and Incoloy 800 (SiemenstKWU plants) tubing have 
shown significant resistance to IGAlIGSCC compared to Inconel 600 [38]. Their 
application, however, would imply expensive replacement of SG tubing or the 
entire SG. 
2.1.3.6 Crack Initiation Time 
The apparent incubation times, before IGAlIGSCC is observed non-destructively, are 
in excess of - 40,000 h, even in the worst case, but from that point the problem 
develops more rapidly than primary side cracking [18]. It is thought that these long 
incubation periods are linked to the fouling of crevices and development of the local 
environment conducive to IGAlIGSCC. 
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2.1.3.7 French Experience 
No unplanned outage has occurred in France due to this degradation mechanism 
and therefore a conservative estimate of the frequency of SGTR is considered to be 
less than 2.0E-3 [7]. The frequency of SGTR for this degradation mechanism for 
Koeberg is considered to be even lower than this due to improved local thermo-
hydraulic conditions of the model 51 B, tubesheet lancing, strict control of secondary 
side chemistry and condenser leak tightness. 
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2.2 Other Tube Degradation Mechanisms 
The following degradation mechanisms have not yet been detected on Koeberg 
SG's. They have, however been detected on many types of SG's throughout the 
world. These degradation mechanisms are of interest since it is thought that some of 
them may eventually manifest themselves as the Koeberg SG's age. 
2.2.1 Vibration and Mechanical Problems 
Mechanical problems due to flow induced vibrations were first identified in 1973, but 
have only become significant during the last decade. 
This degradation mechanism has manifested itself as fretting/erosion. Fretting is a 
corrosion mechanism which generally occurs at the tube/tube-support structure 
intersections as a result of tube vibration. It is essentially a wear process, which 
could be better described as erosion, continually creating new surfaces which 
become available for electrochemical corrosion processes, thereby tending to 
accelerate degradation. Fretting has been noted to some degree in all major PWR 
steam generator designs, e.g. at the anti-vibration bars (AVB's) in the U-bend regions 
of Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering units, and at the support plates in 
Babcock and Wilcox once-through SG's [7]. The Koeberg type SG's are mainly 
susceptible to AVB wear and damage due to loose parts. 
2.2.1.1 AVB wear 
Fretting has been observed at the large radius U-bends/AVB interface of PWR SG's 
(See fig. 2 for the location of the AVB's). AVB wear could potentially affect up to 500 
tubes, however few are in fact affected. Wear is created by the impact/fretting 
between the large radius U-bends and the AVB's. 
AVB wear has been observed after 6 cycles of operation in 900 MW units of the 
Koeberg type. The average wear rate was observed to be 2% / year, with a 
maximum observed wear rate of 17% / year. The critical dimensions for the worn 
area are 74% of the wall thickness for accident conditions and 85% of the wall 
thickness for normal conditions [15]. 
The problem has been reduced by design and operating modifications. Some plants 
have replaced their AVB's with those of improved design (shape and clearances) 
and/or materials. Chromium plated Inconel 600 was used in the early mid 80's (the 
Koeberg AVB's are of this type) but stainless steel was used in later designs. 
However, these modern designs/materials have not mitigated this degradation 
mechanism. 
This problem seems to be developing only very gradually. In addition, it has been 
shown that such wear cannot lead to real tube rupture given the small size of the 
defect. EdF has thus determined that no additional action appears to be necessary 
[26]. 
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2.2.1.2 Loose Paris Damage 
The presence of loose parts in the secondary side can cause severe damage due to 
flow induced fretting between the object and the tube. Loose parts originate as 
detached structural pieces or objects left behind during manufacture or maintenance. 
Thus, loose parts damage is most common shortly after commissioning of a new 
plant. 
Most commonly, loose parts result in localised wear on peripheral tubes. It has been 
found that loose parts, which do penetrate to the centre of the tube bundle, have a 
low wear potential due to their small dimensions and limited flow excitation [15]. 
Because loose parts settle on top of the tube sheet, tubes are usually affected on the 
outside diameter of the RTZ. 
Loose parts damage is not generally manufacturer/design specific, but is more often 
a consequence of human error; thus it cannot easily be "designed-out" and reduction 
in such incidents may be best achieved by attention to procedures, quality 
assurance, and cleanliness during maintenance. 
A total of 12 tubes (9 in SG96 and 3 in SG99) have been plugged at Koeberg due to 
loose parts damage. The latest incident resulted in two plugged tubes during outage 
107. However, the incidence of loose parts damage is expected to decrease 
significantly as the SG's age and cleanliness is maintained during outages. 
This type of damage is random in nature and the effects, in terms of plugged tubes, 
is low in comparison with those for other types of degradation [7]. 
2.2.1.3 High Cycle Fatigue 
The incorrect positioning of the AVB's and embedding of a tube at the upper tube 
support plate can significantly increase the risk of rupture of the tube at the level of 
this plate due to vibration fatigue over a large number of cycles. The presence of 
"aggravating factors" (denting etc.) affecting the integrity of the tube at the level of the 
upper tube support plate or bend, can also increase the risk of tube rupture. 
The latest data indicates that two SG tube ruptures have occurred due to this reason, 
North Anna (USA) in 1987 and at Mihama (Japan) in 1991 [26]. 
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2.2.2 Pitting 
This degradation mechanism is characterised by small diameter tube-wall 
penetrations. Pitting is usually observed in regions where flow is restricted (thus, 
regions where aggressive chemicals can concentrate) such as the sludge pile region. 
Pitting has been attributed to the ingress of condensate demineraliser fines and 
cooling water inleakage. Chloride ions, sulphate acids, copper, and oxygen have 
been identified as possible promoters of this degradation mechanism [7]. 
The result of these concentrated corrodents is local acidic conditions adjacent to 
tubes which can lead to the formation of local corrosion cells and pitting. 
Examination of a typical SG pits [43] has revealed a laminar appearance, which is 
caused by the presence of metallic copper layers. In addition, the corrosion deposit 
was enriched in chromium and depleted in nickel and iron compared to the base 
metal. 
The following thus causes pitting: 
? Presence of chlorides 
? Low pH 
? Presence of oxidants such as cupric chloride (CuCb) or oxygen. 
Pitting has not been observed in Koeberg's SG's. 
2.2.3 Wastagenube Thinning 
Initially phosphate was used to control the coolant pH of PWR SG's. However, it was 
soon observed that these phosphates caused secondary side corrosion damage in 
the form of wastage/tube thinning. 
The mechanism of wastage/tube thinning or "phosphate thinning" is still not 
completely understood. Garnsey [44] proposed the following viable mechanism 
although it is only a qualitative approach. He bases his model on the sodium 
phosphate phase diagram, which indicates that, above 546 K (273 DC), solutions with 
an Na/P04 ratio of between about 2.8 and 2, when sufficiently concentrated, will 
precipitate an immiscible liquid phase. This phosphate-rich liquid phase, which is a 
molten sodium hydroxyphosphate, is extremely corrosive to both ferritic steels and 
high nickel alloys. 
As a result of this degradation mechanism, most of those SG's that were initially 
operated with phosphate were converted to all-volatile treatment (A VT), utilising 
hydrazine or morpholine. Since Koeberg also employs AVT, phosphate thinning is 
not expected to affect the SG's. 
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2.2.4 Denting 
The conversion from phosphate to A VT water treatment (including new units started 
with AVT) resulted in a decrease in tube wastage and pitting but introduced a new 
damage process, termed "denting", which is considered to be much more serious 
[45]. 
Denting is a circumferential inward movement, or dent, of SG tubing at support plates 
and at tube-sheet locations having open crevices. Distortion of the tubes is caused 
by the volume expansion of oxides that form when accelerated corrosion of carbon 
steel occurs in the drilled holes of support plates. The oxide volume expansion also 
distorts the support plates, which can have serious side effects, such as deformation 
and sometimes cracking of inner-radius tubing of U-bends. 
Mild steel can be oxidised to magnetite (Fe304) in aqueous conditions at 570 to 
670 K (297 to 397°C) and the oxide growth is non-protective in the presence of 
ferrous, nickel (e.g. in the vicinity of Fe-Ni-Cr alloys), and chloride ions. The nickel is 
believed to act as an efficient cathode in an electrochemical metallic oxidation 
reaction under cathodic control. 
Sample intersections of tubes and support plates removed from dented SG's have 
shown local chloride concentrations of over 4000 ppm in the dented region [37]. The 
high local chloride concentration is caused by local thermal-hydraulic conditions 
within the crevice between the tube and the tube support plate. The chloride source 
is generally condenser leakage, especially at plants cooled by seawater. This is not a 
problem at Koeberg since the titanium-tubed condenser effectively prevents 
condenser in-leakage. 
The denting by itself has not threatened tube integrity, however, the increase in 
tensile stress in the tube wall can lead to PWSCC or IGSCC local to the dents. 
Cracking has been observed on both the inside and outside surfaces of the tubes in 
the region of the dents. 
Three tubes were plugged at Koeberg due to manufacturing dents, which caused 
probe blockage, in Unit 1 during the pre-service inspection (two tubes in SG 96 and 
one tube in SG 95). Since then denting has not been observed at Koeberg. This may 
be attributed to the following: 
);;- High AVT chemistry regime 
);;- High pH (9.6) 
);;- Titanium-tubed condenser (Minimise chloride in-leakage) 
);;- The use of broached quatrefoil (improves fluid flow) martensitic stainless steel 
tube support plates, see Figure 13. 
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2.3 Environmental effects 
The factors, which affect corrosion damage, are as follows: 
;.. Hydraulic design 
;.. Thermal design 
;.. The presence of concentrators such as crevices or sludge 
;.. The presence of impurities 
In an operating unit, thermal and hydraulic designs and the presence of 
concentrating regions are not easily alterable. Thus, efforts to reduce the impact of 
the generic degradation mechanisms have concentrated on the primary and 
secondary side chemistries, since the presence of impurities and sludge 
concentrators are more easily controlled. 
2.3.1 Primary Coolant Chemistry 
The primary coolant chemistry is responsible for the following: 
;.. To control the reactivity throughout the fuel cycle 
;.. To control the level of radioactivity within the circuit. 
;.. To minimise corrosion and the associated problems of corrosion products. 
These requirements are achieved by the addition of the following chemicals: 
Hydrogen 
Radiation adversely affects the primary chemistry since water molecules dissociate 
under these conditions into hydrogen and oxygen. This leads to the corrosion of 
metal surfaces in the primary system. Corrosion in the primary circuit can be 
minimised by reducing the level of dissolved oxygen, maintaining an alkaline pH, and 
by removing impurities from the coolant. The dissociation of water is controlled by 
dosing the reactor coolant with 25-50 cc/kg of hydrogen in accordance with EPRI 
guidelines as indicated by Davies [46]. 
Boric Acid 
Boric acid (H3B03) is added for reactivity control. The concentration of boric acid is 
varied to control long term reactivity changes, such as fuel depletion and fission 
product build-up. The quantity of boric acid maintained in the reactor coolant is 
usually plant specific. In general it ranges from ca 2000 ppm boron or less at the start 
of a fuel cycle to ca 0 ppm boron at the end [1]. Boric acid can affect the pH, which 
can affect the corrosion rates in certain circumstances. 
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Lithium Hydroxide 
* Lithium hydroxide (UOH) is used to control the coolant pH and acts as a crud 
inhibitor. The pH is currently maintained at 7.25 at 295 DC in accordance with EdF 
practice as indicated by Davies [46]. Research [47] has indicated that PWSCC is 
dependent on UOH and Boron concentrations in the primary circuit. A decrease in 
boron concentration (at constant LiOH concentration) results in an increase in 
PWSCC susceptibility. However, application of UOH/B chemistry control is difficult 
due to the variability of plant to plant conditions. Currently, a limit of 2.2 ppm LiOH 
has been set by the fuel manufacturer used by Koeberg. This may change in the 
future due to recommendations by the fuel manufacturer to maintain pH above 6.9 
with maximum UOH concentrations of 3.5 ppm for limited periods of time [46]. 
However, the high lithium values, required for pH values between 6.9 and 7.4 at 300 
DC, during the initial part of the fuel cycle, have the potential of accelerating the 
corrosion of Zircaloy fuel cladding and of increasing the susceptibility of mill-annealed 
Alloy 600 tubing to PWSCC [1]. 
In addition to the chemical additions, the following operational interventions are in 
place to limit radioactivity and to mitigate PWSCC: 
RCVCleanup 
The primary side operates with continuous RCV (Chemical and Volume control 
system) cleanup at 15 tonnes/hr, with a maximum of 30 tonnes/hr. This is done to 
limit radioactivity in the primary circuit. It also reduces the quantity of aggressive 
contaminants, such as chloride ions, reaching the SG's [46]. 
ORT 
Koeberg adopted operation at reduced temperature (ORT) in July 1994 (Unit 1) and 
December 1994 (Unit 2). Reducing the primary coolant temperature can mitigate 
PWSCC problems. Thus, ORT resulted in a 10 DC reduction in average reactor 
coolant outlet temperature without a significant decrease in unit output. The effect on 
PWSCC susceptibility has, however not been quantified. 
Additional Primary system specifications (values given are for normal power 
operation) are given below in Table 5. 
Table 5: PWR Primary System Specifications [1] 
Parameter Normal Value[1] Normal Value 
[KoebergJ 
O2• ppb <5 <5 
H2• mllkg H20 (at STP) 25 - 50 i 25 - 35 
CI, ppb < 50 I < 50 
F, ppb I < 50 < 50 
S04. ppb < 50 < 50 
i Suspended solids, ppb < 350 < 50 
Si02, ppb < 100 < 200 .. 
ppb = parts per billion 
Crud: Generic tenT! for the corrosion products in the primary system that circulate with the flow and settle on other 
components in the primary side. such as the core. These are primarily Fe. Co. Mn, Ni. and Cu-based compounds produced by 
corrosion of the steel surfaces. 
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2.3.2 Secondary Side Chemistry 
On the secondary side of the PWR, the objective is to ensure that corrosion rates are 
as low as possible, particularly of non-stainless materials in the feed train, as well as 
to minimise sludge transfer to heat transfer surfaces. 
Koeberg has a carbon steel secondary circuit which suffers from flow assisted 
corrosion (FAC). This is an electro-chemical process, which is accelerated by fluid 
flow (the fluid dissolves the magnetite metal oxide layer faster than it is formed). This 
results in the presence of corrosive substances (the principle source) and the 
accumulation of sludge deposits in regions of low flow velocity. The following 
parameters influence FAC; Material composition, Component configuration, Fluid 
velocity, Turbulence, Steam quality, Oxygen, Temperature, and pH. 
The following measures are in place to minimise FAC: 
Ammonia Regime I Ethanolamine (ETA) Regime 
The secondary side chemistry at Koeberg is characterised by a high A VT and high 
pH regime. The advantage of A VT is that it can protect both the feedwater and steam 
systems. The chemicals added (Hydrazine, Ammonia, and ETA) are volatile, which 
means that they are carried out of the SG in the steam flow rather than concentrating 
in the liquid phase and being removed by the SG blowdown system. As the 
chemicals are carried through the steam system, they are able to protect the whole of 
the secondary circuit including the turbines. 
From the outset, AVT of the secondary circuit using ammonia was selected by EdF 
due to world-wide experience of phosphate tube wastage (the phosphate treatments 
were non volatile and gave rise to chemical reactions resulting in precipitation [26]). A 
feedwater pH of 9.5 was maintained until January 1989. After this date the pH was 
raised to 9.7 still using ammonia. Hydrazine (N2H4) is added to the condensate (70 -
100 ppb) to scavenge for oxygen and maintain a reducing environment. Hydrazine 
also breaks down to ammonia, thus assisting with pH control. 
In 2000, Koeberg changed from ammonia treatment to Ethanolamine (ETA) 
treatment. This is to produce a more uniformly basic environment throughout the 
secondary system. ETA has a higher steam/water partition coefficient and as such, 
remains in the water phase to a greater extent than morpholine (alternative amine 
used on all EdF stations) and ammonia which are highly volatile. It is considered that 
implementation of ETA would reduce corrosion products to almost negligible levels 
and result in a significant reduction in the risk of tube rupture due to secondary side 
induced degradation. Additionally, significant cost savings could be achievable since 
the frequency of sludge lancing could be reduced. Since the implementation of ETA 
the amount of sludge deposited in the SGs has been steadily reducing to 
approximately half that of ammonium hydroxide. However since it is not possible to 
run on ETA conditioning with the ATE (Condensate polishing plant) plant in service, 
Koeberg must change back to ammonium hydroxide conditioning whenever there is a 
condenser tube leak. The changing of conditioning chemicals has an adverse effect, 
and results in more sludge being deposited in the SGs. 
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Condenser 
The Koeberg condensers are cooled by seawater. These condensers are titanium-
tubed to minimise inleakage and provide defence against faulted water chemistry 
conditions. 
Condensate Polishing Plant (CPP) 
Although the titanium-tubed condenser minimises the risk of inleakage, the water, on 
its journey through the rest of the cycle, can pick up metallic ions such as iron and 
copper from pipelines. Thus to maintain continual flow of high quality water a 
condensate polishing system is used. Condensate polishing is accomplished by 
passing the condensate through large demineralizing vessels that contain both cation 
and anion resins. The resins remove dissolved solids and act as filters for impurities 
and suspended solids. 
Each unit has a full flow (3780 m3/hr) deep bed CPP. These plants are comprised of 
five cations followed, through a common header, by five mixed beds. 
Initially full flow condensate polishing resulted in high sodium concentrations, 
detected in the SG blowdown, during startup operations. This was a result of sodium 
slippage from the CPP. As an interim measure, partial flow condensate polishing was 
adopted to mitigate this problem. Subsequently, the regeneration of the mixed bed 
resins was optimised to a level where SG blowdown sodium can be maintained 
* below 1.5 Ilg/kg even with full flow polishing. The Na cation conductivity is regularly 
maintained at less than 0.12 IlS/cm. Normal operation is considered to be within 
6 }lg/kg and 0.8 J.!S/cm [46]. 
Slowdown 
This is another measure to control feedwater purity. Slowdown lines periodically 
remove a portion of the water, which is then cooled and treated for reuse. A common 
treatment uses cartridge filters to remove suspended solids, notably iron and copper 
oxides, through the use of filters and demineralizers. In PWR SG's the general 
practice is to use throwaway filter cartridges followed by deminerilizers. 
Koeberg operates with relatively high continuous blowdown (- 30 tonnes/hr) at the 
expense of power output to minimise sludge build up and impurities. 
This loss in power output is proportional to the blowdown flow and is in the region of 
7 MWe, at a blowdown flow of 50 tonnes/h. At Koeberg's 1999 cost of production of 
approximately R60/MW hour, this equates to about R3 700 000 per year. This loss 
has to be compared to the replacement costs of steam generators (which are 
currently about R500 million per unit) that would eventually be a consequence of 
poor steam generator chemistry. 
It therefore follows that a balance between thermal losses and water chemistry 
conditions is necessary and the operators and chemists need to be aware of and 
work closely towards this. 
* 
Conductivity is proportional to the ionic concentration of the solution i.e. the number of cations and anions present Therefore. 
water purity is indicated by the ability/inability of a solution to conduct current The unit IlS/cm (micro Siemens/em) is equivalent 
to /lffiho/cm where mho is the unit of conductance i.e 1/Resistance. 
47 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Tube Degradation Mechanisms 
Wet and Dry Conservation 
During plant shutdowns, special care is taken to minimise secondary side corrosion. 
General corrosion is caused if water and oxygen are present simultaneously in the 
system. Thus, two strategies have been adopted for lay-up of the secondary system, 
namely wet and dry conservation. 
Wet conservation is the preferred option, however, it cannot be used for refuelling 
outages. If the outage is of short duration (less than 10 days, mid-cycle shutdown) 
then wet conservation is used. The 8G is enclosed in a Nitrogen blanket to prevent 
oxygen ingress and normal feedwater is circulated. If the duration is greater than 10 
days, and the 8G can remain closed, then wet conservation can still be used, but the 
feedwater is dosed with hydrazine and ammonia. In addition, nitrogen is bubbled 
through the 8G to maintain oxygen levels below 100 ppb. 
Dry conservation is adopted for refuelling outages. The rate of general corrosion of 
• 
non-alloyed steel in atmosphere is proportional to the relative humidity. A low 
relative humidity is thus required to minimise general corrosion. The corrosion rate is 
negligible below 60 % and is nearly zero below 35 % [46]. At Koeberg, the SG's are 
drained as early as possible after they reach a temperature of 120 °c so that the 
residual heat can dry the 8G. A compressed air system is connected to maintain a 
continuous air flow for the duration of the dry conservation. This ideal procedure is, 
however, not always practical since 8G's are on the Outage critical path and 
maintenance and inspection operations interrupt the dry conservation. 
Sludge Lancing 
Sludge lancing of the top of the tubesheet is carried out whilst the 8G's are still wet 
for each refuelling outage. However, there has been no significant reduction in 
sludge accumulation during the operational history of the 8G's at Koeberg [46]. 
Relative Humidity: The ratio of the Amount of moisture the air holds to the Maximum Amount of moisture the air can hold at the 
same temperature. 
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Additional secondary side system specifications (values correspond to normal power 
operation) are given below in Table 6. 
Table 6: PWR Secondary Side Chemistry General Specifications [1] 
~ Parameter Fee dwa ter Blowdown Water 
L [1J I KBG
c 
i [1J 
Components (ppb)8 I i 
Hydrazine (N2H4) I < 100 70-100 i I 
02 <5 < 1 I 
Na I ca 2 
CI I 
I 
ca 2 
!~(Totall l <5 <5 
Cu (Total} < 1 
S04 ca 3 
Cation Conductivityal 25 UC 
(j.JSlcm) 
Co rrectedb ::; 0.2 < 0.1 
a ppb = parts per billion 
b Corrected for the presence of organics such as acetates and formates 
C KBG (Koeberg) values listed are Target values 
KBGc 
i 
! 
<2 
<5 
I 
I 
I 
<5 
I 
< 0.15 
The following figure summarises the primary and secondary chemistry regimes in 
place at Koeberg. 
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Figure 14: Summary of the Koeberg Water Chemistry 
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3 Tube Inspection Programme 
The SG maintenance strategy has the following objectives: 
y SAFETY: The prevention of an SGTR 
Y A VA/LABILITY: The prevention of an unplanned outage due to large primary to 
secondary leaks exceeding operational technical specifications. 
The overall in-service inspection (lSI) requirements for Koeberg are based on 
Section XI' of the ASME Boiler and Pressure vessel code (1980 edition). However, 
during preparation of the Koeberg In-service Inspection Programme (1981), it was 
realised that strict adherence to the ASME code requirements would not provide the 
best strategy to ensure safety and availability at Koeberg [22]. The code specified 
single frequency eddy current examination, limited plugging criteria and inspection 
sample selection criteria which were both difficult to use and did not take into account 
specific defect characteristics. As a result, in joint agreement with the CNS (SA 
licensing authority), Koeberg based the lSI requirements on the NRC Regulatory 
Guide 1.83 (1975). It was the joint position of the CNS and Eskom that defect specific 
acceptance criteria, inspection scope selection criteria, and corrective action criteria 
would be justified on a case-by-case basis. 
The defect specific analysis approach consists of identifying and analysing the 
degradation mechanisms which could affect the SG tubing. and using this analysis to 
determine measures which have to be taken in order to keep the risk of tube failure 
at an acceptably low level. This approach requires continuous monitoring during 
operation and an extensive outage inspection programme during refuelling outages. 
The EdF specific analysis [26] is considered to be appropriate because of the 
similarity in construction and operating regimes of the SG's in France and at 
Koeberg. The specific non-destructive examination programme. leak monitoring 
regime, and corrective action criteria was established in Koeberg Safety Case 6.48 
[48]. However, the analysis will remain under active review based on Koeberg, 
French, and world-wide experience. 
3.1 Continuous Monitoring 
The leak before risk of break principle (LBRB) has been accepted, in several 
countries, for certain types of defects affecting the safe and economic operation of 
PWR's, notably PWSCC of SG tubing. For a proven LBRB defect, initiation would be 
followed by a period of stable crack growth before complete tube rupture and the 
defect would manifest itself as a small but detectable leak. EdF consider that 
monitoring primary to secondary leaks during operation provides a good indication of 
tube degradation and is the best means of SGTR prevention [26]. Evolution of leak 
rates during a cycle may provide insight into the levels of inspection required at the 
next outage. 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Section XI: Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components. 
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A Koeberg specific LBRB safety case [22] was established for PWSCC. This safety 
case was based on extensive theoretical and experimental work done in France. 
These tests have shown that the critical crack size corresponds to leak rates of over 
100 litres/hour [25], however, to ensure that adequate safety margins are maintained 
a limit of 30 Iitres/hourlSG was set. The case thus justifies a plugging criteria based 
on crack length with observance of limiting primary to secondary leak rates. Even for 
defects where the LBRB concept has not been rigorously proven, EdF consider that 
rupture is, in most cases, preceded by a limited but rapidly growing primary to 
secondary leak which, if acted upon promptly, will allow plant shutdown prior to tube 
rupture [26]. 
The principle source of primary to secondary leaks at Koeberg is PWSCC in the RTZ. 
During normal operation, these leaks are typified by a gradual increase in leak rate 
(below 5 IIhrlSG) corresponding to defect growth. Plugging of tubes during outages is 
intended to limit the stabilised leak rate to 5 I/hrlSG (Le. after the peak due to 
startup). 
The leak rates vary not only according to defect growth but also according to the 
stages of the operational cycle. Start-ups are accompanied by initially high leak rates, 
followed by a slow decrease in leak rate before stabilisation after 20 to 30 days of 
operation. Certain transients can induce significant variations in leak rates, up to 
20 IIhrISG. Below a threshold of 150 ppm, the decreasing concentration of boron 
during the cycle leads to an increase in leak rate. This occurs at the end of a cycle 
and stabilises during stretch-out. 
At Koeberg, the evaluation of changes in the primary to secondary tube leak rate is 
based on continuous monitoring of N16 (Nitrogen 16) and chemistry grab samples. 
EdF consider this to be the best means of prevention of SGTR [26] 
3.2 Outage Inspection 
The inspection techniques generally used on SG tubing are internal eddy current 
inspection, visual inspection of the peripheral and sludge zone regions at the 
tubesheet level and leak testing using helium or water. 
The outage inspection programme is implemented at a general level and at a defect 
specific level. The objective of the general inspection is to detect the appearance of 
possible tube degradation (in tubes considered sound). This is achieved by a 
sampled whole length tube inspection with the Bobbin Coil probe. At Koeberg a 
sampled 1 in 8 Bobbin Coil inspection was performed on all SG's during the first 
refuelling outage. Table 7 below summarises EdF's general inspection programme, 
based on the plant condition. 
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Table 7: Summary of EdF General SG Inspection Programme [49] 
Condition of Plant 
Leak Tests 
(Proportion of 
Eddy Current 
tubes affected by 
Inspection If Leak deteated If Leak not detected 
defects) 
Programme during operation during operation 
On one SG each 
<5% Year: Hydraulic Test 
1 tube in 8 
On two SG's each Hydraulic Test plus 
5 % to 10 % Year: Helium Test if small 
1 tube in 8 leak 
On two SG's each Hydraulic Test plus 
> 10% Year: Helium Test 
1 tube in 4 
Helium Test 
The defect specific programme follows the general programme if tube degradation is 
detected. The objectives of this programme are to monitor defect development and 
determine the extent and nature of the affected zone. The first refuelling outage at 
Koeberg was followed by an indexed sample on one SG at each subsequent 
refuelling outage. Tubes that have an increased risk of damage augment this sample. 
EdF has developed special inspection programmes for each of the following 
degradation mechanisms [26]: 
> Expansion zone PWSCC 
> U-bend PWSCC 
» Tube support plate (TSP) PWSCC 
);> Expansion zone secondary side corrosion 
> TSP secondary side corrosion 
» AV8 wear 
» High cycle fatigue 
» Secondary side wear - Loose parts 
» Corrosion near flow distribution baffle 
» Plug degradation. 
Visual inspection of the peripheral tubes of each SG at each refuelling outage before 
and after sludge lancing was also specified. 
To augment the defect specific analysis, full RPC inspections were performed during 
the fourth and fifth (lSI 105, 205, 106, and 206) refuelling outage on both units and 
the sixth (lSI 107) refuelling outage on Unit 1 on selected SG's to determine the full 
extent of the SCC problem. 
Specific Eddy current techniques have been developed by EdF to detect and analyse 
the various degradation mechanisms. 
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3.2.1 Eddy Current Techniques 
Eddy Current inspection is based on the principles of electromagnetic induction and 
is used to identify or differentiate among a wide variety of physical, structural, and 
metallurgical conditions in electrically conductive ferromagnetic and non-
ferromagnetic metals and metal parts. 
This method consists in studying the variations in impedance in two coils of an 
inspection probe placed near to a non-ferromagnetic conducting part (the SG tube). 
When a defect is encountered, the electrical balance of the device becomes 
modified. A defect signal is recognisable from its amplitude, its phase, and its form. 
The signal can be analysed in the form of a Lissajous curve on a cathode ray screen. 
Certain combinations of signals at different frequencies can reveal the characteristics 
of particular defects. 
One of the rapidly increasing applications for this method is the inspection of thin-wall 
(0.9 to 1.5 mm) Inconel 600 SG tubing and heat exchanger tubing [50]. SG tubing 
has been extensively tested using these multifrequency techniques since 1977. The 
focus of SG tube inspection by eddy current has shifted from concentrating solely on 
the detection of and characterisation of tube wall denting and wastage to more 
complex tube wall degradation mechanisms. These complex degradation 
mechanisms include intergranular attack (IGA), stress-corrosion cracking (SCC), 
mechanical wear, and pitting. In response to the complexity of these newer problems, 
eddy current instrumentation has also evolved from a single-frequency to a multiple-
frequency configuration. The analog instrumentation has been replaced by digital 
multiple-frequency instrumentation, offering more consistent data acquisition. The 
wider dynamic range offered by the digital instrumentation allows analysis of eddy 
current data obtained from traditionally difficult areas, such as dented tube 
support/tube sheet interfaces and roll transition/roll expansion areas within the 
tubesheet. 
The following Eddy current probes are in use at Koeberg during refuelling outages: 
3.2.1.1 Bobbin Coil (SC) 
This is the basic method for monitoring of 900 MW and 1300 MW SG tubes. The BC 
is used to inspect the full length of the tubes because of its general detection 
capability and the speed of inspection. The following types of defects can be 
detected: 
);> Material loss due to wear (Loose parts or AVB wear) 
);> sec in U-bends, TSP zone, and free span. 
);> SCC in expansion or expansion transition zones. (This has been replaced by the 
RPC) 
);> Expansion anomalies 
~ Dents and impacts, especially at the TSP zones 
);> Measure the height of the sludge above the tubesheet 
);> Measure the proximity of tubes to one another. 
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3.2.1.2 Rotating pancake coil (RPC) (STL) 
The RPC is used to detect and characterise tube end cracking. This is a pinpoint 
probe comprising 2 parallel coils on ferrite cores set at 45° to the tube generating 
line. The coil follows a helical movement allowing for inspection of part of the tube 
length. The characteristics of several cracks of a single tube can be detected. The 
detectable characteristics include; location in relation to the tubesheet, crack length, 
crack depth, and crack orientation (axial or circumferential). EdF have developed 
auto analysing software (ESTELLE), allowing for good levels of reliability of 
measurements and allows for faster analysis [26]. 
The uncertainty associated with this detection method is 2 mm or ± 1 mmt [46]. 
3.2.1.3 U - Bend Rotating pancake coil (URPC) (STS) 
The U - Bend Rotating pancake coil (URPC) is used to inspect the small radius 
U - bends. The tube is inspected from the bend to 10mm below the upper TSP on 
the other side. The URPC consists of a head and coil assembly, a series of beads 
that comprise a flexible neck and a rigid probe body with a drive motor and an optical 
pos:tion encoder. The probe is based on an American design and the detection 
capability is claimed to be better than the Bobbin Coil probe [51,26]. 
In addition to the necessity for inspecting with inside coils (BC, RPC, and URPC). all 
test probe positioning for tube selection and probe insertion/withdrawal functions 
must be performed remotely due to the radiation levels in the vicinity of the tube 
access areas. 
3.2.2 Helium/Hydro Tests 
Helium and Hydro leak testing are performed to check for leaking tubes, which may 
contribute to the overall SG leak rate. These tests are not mandatory, but are used to 
maintain the SG leak rates within the allowable specified leak rate limits. 
Hydrotests are performed by pressurising the secondary side of the SG with a 
volume of water (as high as 45 bar) and checking for leaks from the tube ends (in the 
channel head). A fluorescent substance can be added to secondary side water to 
increase the sensitivity of this method of detection. The hydrotest is used to measure 
large leaks and it is generally accepted that this method will reveal a tube with a leak, 
during operation, of more than 20 IIhr [26]. For smaller leaks or when the overall 
leakage may be the result a large number of leaking tubes, this method is not always 
sufficient. 
The acronyms STL and STS are used by EdF 
t Nureg/CR6365 recommends ± 1.5 mm or 3 mm RPC length uncertainty. 
55 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Tube Inspection Programme 
The Helium test is used to detect and measure, for each tube, the leakage rate of a 
mixture of 5% (sometimes 10%) helium and air, held at a pressure of 5 bar in the SG 
secondary side. An air current is sent from the cold channel (primary side) and a 
mass spectrometer is used to measure the concentration at the other end of the tube. 
For through wall cracks due to PWSCC at the tube ends, information obtained from 
the RPC is increasingly being taken into account to select important leaks. 
3.2.3 Visual Inspection 
Visual examination of the tube bundle periphery is performed on all SG's at each 
refuelling outage to check for loose parts and post plugging tube damage. 
Additionally, visual examination of the sludge zone is carried out on a less frequent 
basis. 
A detailed listing of the inspections performed at each refuelling outage is given in 
Appendix A, Table A3 and A4. 
3.3 Destructive tests 
3.3.1 Examination of Pulled Tubes 
Examination of pulled tubes have been practised widely for several years, more than 
350 tubes had been examined in this way by 1997 [26]. 
The tubes are examined in the EdF Hot Cell Laboratory (SCMI) at Chinon. 
Examination generally involves carrying out one or several of the options below, as 
required: 
? Leak test at 100 bar and 172 bar. 
? Burst test. 
? Radiological inspection of degraded areas 
? Visual inspection of both the inside and outside diameter walls before and after 
opening and flattening of the tube. 
? Dye-penetrant inspection of the tube material. 
? Chemical analysis 
? Noting of mechanical and geometric characteristics of the tube. 
The process of pulling a tube and its subsequent expert examination constitutes a 
costly method of monitoring that must remain exceptional. Thus, no decision to pull 
must be taken without firmly founded justifications. It is not expected that Koeberg 
will have any tubes pulled, but will rely on experience gained from French analysis of 
pulled tubes. 
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4 Preventative Measures 
4.1 At Koeberg 
Numerous methods have been implemented internationally in an effort to minimise 
and even prevent tube degradation due to SCC. The following have been 
implemented at Koeberg. 
4.1.1 Shot Peening RTZ 
Shot peening to produce residual surface compressive stresses is a well-known 
approach for providing resistance to SCC [37]. This method has been investigated for 
use inside tubes in the RTZ [52, 53] and its benefits have been established. A 
general trend towards stabilisation of the number of indications has been observed 
[54]. It is suspected that peening will serve to prevent initiation of new cracks, but will 
not prevent growth of existing cracks through the wall thickness. 
In this procedure, shot (metallic beads) is blown up the tube so that it impinges on a 
conical deflector located in the area to be peened. It is important that the 
compressive stresses developed on the tube inside diameter must be balanced by 
tensile stresses in the remaining wall thickness. Excessive peening could result in 
increased susceptibility to secondary side IGSCC. 
The Koeberg SG's were shot peened in the RTZ on the hot leg during outages 102 
and 201. Unit 2 has a much lower incidence of tube cracking. This can be attributed 
to the application of shot peening to unit 2 before Unit 1, and is a clear indication of 
the effectiveness of this method. 
Only the hot leg side of the SG tubes were shot peened because the higher 
temperature ( - 314 DC) makes this side more susceptible to PWSCC. The cold leg 
temperature is approximately 279 DC. At this temperature and from predictions based 
on activation energy, initiation time, and temperature calculations, it is anticipated 
that cracking may occur on the cold leg side from approximately 60,000 hrs. For this 
reason it may become advisable to shot peen the cold leg side of the Koeberg SG's 
in the near future [15]. 
4.1.2 U-Bend Heat Treatment 
World-wide experience has shown that PWSCC can occur in the U-bend regions of 
small radius (rows 1 and 2) Inconel 600 5G tubes [53, 51}. Cracking occurs primarily 
at the apex and near the tangents of the U-bends. This is due to the residual stresses 
caused by tube bending during manufacture of the tube bundle. To prevent the risk of 
rapid degradation of these regions, operators adopted an extensive plugging 
programme of small radius U-bends. 
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To mitigate this problem and prevent loss of heat transfer surface area, Koeberg 
heat-treated the U-bends of rows 1 and 2 on both Units during outages 105 and 205. 
The U-bend heat-treatment (UBHT) employed was 2 to 6 minutes between 700 and 
840 DC [46]. 
The effectiveness and relative speed of in-situ UBHT has been demonstrated in 
laboratories and operating units [53, 51]. Vaccaro et al. (53] claims that UBHT in 
combination with shot peening of the roll transition zone (RTZ) will extend SG tube 
life beyond the design life. The effectiveness of induction heating methods for the 
stress relief of the RTZ has also been noted [52, 17]. The results show that the 
optimal temperature for stress relief heat treatment of this region is in the range of 
700 to 750°C. 
A novel means of delivering in-situ heat treatment of welded or expanded tube ends 
has been proposed by Tait (55] and is currently under development at UCT. This 
method utilises a high intensity light bulb (1.0 to 1.5 kW) as the heat source. Light 
bulb heat treatment can attain 600 DC in 10 min. However, the effectiveness of this 
method in different situations, and its effect on the residual stresses in the 
surrounding tubes, still needs to be quantified. 
4.1.3 Operation at Reduced Temperature (ORT) 
During the commissioning of the Koeberg plant (1984-1985) EdF made Eskom aware 
of PWSCC in the tube-to-tube sheet expansion transition zone, in reference to 
French SG's. This type of tube degradation was first detected in the Koeberg SG's 
during the second outage in the central hot leg zones (two tubes in Unit 1 and six 
tubes in Unit 2, located in the sludge zone). Initial studies indicated that if this 
degradation type were allowed to propagate without intervention, the SG's would not 
last for their full, 40 year, design life. 
One way to reduce tube degradations due to SCC is to operate the units with a 
reduced primary coolant temperature. The dependence of SCC on temperature has 
been well established [37,20,9,21, 18]. This reduction in temperature results in both 
an increase in crack initiation time and a decrease in the crack growth rate. Several 
other plants, such as Ringhals 3 (Sweden) have implemented reduced primary 
coolant temperature with positive results [15]. 
Koeberg thus adopted operation at reduced temperature (ORT) in July 1994 (Unit 1) 
and in December 1994 (Unit 2). ORT is an operating regime whereby the 
temperature of the reactor coolant is reduced while the nominal power output is 
maintained by redefining the operating windows and changing set points. 
The disadvantages associated with ORT is as follows: 
);;> A reduction in electrical power output 
);;> ORT is limited by the turbine operating characteristics (moisture carry over limits) 
and can lead to erosion-corrosion problems in the associated pipework. 
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The implementation of ORT at Koeberg resulted in a drop in average reactor coolant 
outlet temperature by - 10 0 C. This resulted in an initial reduction in power of 0.9% 
for Unit 1 and 2.8% for Unit 2. The reduction in primary temperature on Unit 2 
resulted in an increase of the moisture content of the steam to the turbine. A 
modification was performed on the steam drying equipment (upper internals) during 
the seventh outage to return the steam moisture content to specification (0.25%). A 
further modification to the Unit 2 governor system has allowed this unit to operate at 
99.9% nominal power. 
A study done by FRAMATOME (Doc. No. EE/G-DC-1612) suggested that the 
benefits of ORT for Koeberg (Unit 1 only) to be the following: 
);> SCC growth rates reduced by - 20% 
);> PWSCC at the top of the tube sheet would be avoided on SG 77 until 1,000,000 
EFPH. 
);> Small radius U-bend cracking on SG 77 would be postponed until 50,000 EFPH 
);> U-bend cracking postponed from 32,000 to 38,000 EFPH for SG 96 and SG 95. 
4. 1.4 Secondary Side Water Chemistry Control 
The control of the secondary-side water chemistry is achieved by the following 
measures: 
);> High AVT 
);> Titanium tubed Condenser 
);> Condensate Polishing plant (Full flow) 
);> Continuous Blowdown 
);> Sludge Lancing (at each refuelling outage) 
These measures and their effect on SCC prevention have been discussed in section 
2.3.2. 
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4.2 Additional Preventative Measures 
Additional preventative measures, not implemented at Koeberg, are discussed 
below. 
4.2.1 Nickel Plating 
The nickel plating repairing technique was deemed sufficiently attractive by 
FRAMATOME and BELGATOM to launch important development programs on it. 
Nickel is applied to the inside surface of the SG tube by electrochemical means. This 
nickel deposit fulfils three functions: 
» Bridges the through wall cracks and stops primary water leakage into the 
secondary system, 
» Prevents the penetration of primary water in the crack tip region and thus arrests 
PWSCC propagation, 
» Prevents contact between the primary water and the tube wall and avoids 
initiation of new cracks. 
An important part of the development work was to select an adequate plating 
procedure and to develop tooling for use inside the small diameter tubes. This was 
achieved successfully and the entire process requires a single tool (except for the 
initial brushing of the surface) inserted in the tube [56]. All the parameters of the 
process are continuously checked and monitored on charts during the operation. 
This method has the following advantages: 
» It is harmless to the tube because the residual stresses generated in the tube or 
the plating are very low and no subsequent heat treatment is required. 
» It can be applied anywhere in the straight part of the tube and the RTZ. 
» The tube retains its functional characteristics after plating with no significant 
decrease in heat transfer. 
» No significant geometrical restriction occurs for inspection equipment or for any 
other maintenance equipment. 
» The process is considered reversible. If necessary, the nickel deposit can be 
stripped chemically without damage to the tube. 
» Nearly all the tubes of the SG can be reached by the plating device. 
The one major drawback of nickel plating is that it does not impart structural strength 
to the tubes. Additionally, secondary side corrosion can damage the tubes to such an 
extent that tube rupture can become a possibility. The use of nickel plating is not 
recommended as a remedial measure, but rather as a preventative measure for 
tubes that have not yet cracked and as such, its effectiveness depends on how early 
it is implemented. 
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Another disadvantage of this method is that it invalidates the use of the eddy current 
rotating pancake coil (RPC), since the nickel layer constitutes a barrier to the small 
magnetic field created. Consequently, a new ultrasonic inspection technique has 
been developed [56]. This system uses a rotating mirror concept that focuses the 
ultrasonic beam in the tube wall to ensure the detection of either axial or 
circumferential PWSCC defects. The probe uses a high-resolution transducer with a 
focal spot of 0.5 mm. The qualification tests show that there is nearly no influence of 
the nickel layer on the ultrasonic signals and that the detectability for small width 
PWSCC is higher with the ultrasonic than with the eddy current technique. 
Another issue which required extensive research was the validity of the leak before 
risk of break (LBRB) criteria for a nickel plated tube. Under the unlikely assumption 
that a crack would grow undetected under the plating, it had to be shown that the 
nickel ligament would rupture (allowing detection of a leak) before the crack length 
reached the critical length. Initial results have indicated that the nickel film does 
indeed rupture [56]. 
All the laboratory tests, as well as the operational experience on nickel plating at 
DOEL 2 and 3 (Belgium) since 1988, have demonstrated the adequacy of nickel 
plating as a repair method for tubes affected by PWSCC in the transition zone. The 
optimised procedure developed during these trials has allowed FRAMATOME to offer 
this repairing technique at an industrial scale. This method was however, developed 
too late for implementation at Koeberg since cracking had already occurred in the 
RTZ of several tubes by 1989 and the preventative intent would have been lost. 
4.2.2 Chemical Cleaning 
Chemical cleaning is used to remove the hard sludge, which accumulates on top of 
the tubesheet in the region of low flow velocity. Hard sludge is very difficult to remove 
by sludge lancing and this facilitates the concentration of aggressive chemical 
species in tube-tubesheet crevices. These chemical species cannot always be 
removed by boiling during an outage [15]. 
Chemical cleaning is the only method capable of cleaning these areas as well as the 
whole tube bundle. Its action can be of two types: 
>- Preventative, with a shorter treatment time but carried out periodically, in order to 
avoid the formation of hard sludge. 
>- Corrective, with a longer treatment time necessary for the removal of hard 
deposits present on the tubesheet, and the oxides filling the tube-tube support 
plate crevices. 
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The process was developed and patented by the Groupement des Laboratoires of 
EdF. Framatome has acquired the world-wide license. The EdF chemical cleaning 
process is applied in two phases and three stages: 
Phase 1: Dissolution and disintegration of sludge using a chemical solution. 
The solution is comprised of the following: 
Gluconic acid 7.5% (approx.) 
Citric acid 4% (approx.) 
Mulliserv corrosion inhibitor "P6" 0.8% (initially) 
Ammonia to obtain a pH of 3.3 
Process temperature 85 0 C 
~ Stage 1: The solution dissolves the magnetite. 
~ Stage 2: An oxidant (air bubbling) is added and the pH is adjusted to 9.5 (by 
adding ammonia) to ensure dissolution of copper. 
Phase 2: Finishing phase 
~ Stage 3: Remove residual Sulphur 
The inhibitor P6 contains sulphur. Although laboratory tests have not been 
able to show any harmful effect of these compounds, a complementary 
finishing phase is put into effect in order to remove this residual sulpur. 
The composition of the solution used is as follows: 
Citric acid 0.4% 
pH adjusted to 3.3 by addition of monoethanolamine 
Inhibitor without sulphur 
Alcanization of this solution ensures surface passivation. 
The sequencing (and possible use of several new solutions) and the duration of the 
treatment are chosen and adjusted in relation to the quantity of sludge to be 
dissolved and of its physical and chemical characteristics. The low aggressivity of the 
process permits long treatment times (up to 172 hours), sometimes necessary for 
virtually complete removal of hard or very thick sludge. 
Operations carried out at Nogent 1 (1989) and Saint-Alban 2 (1990) by Framatome, 
Multiserv and Electricite de France (57] have demonstrated how chemical cleaning 
can be applied on an industrial scale and in a controlled manner. The process has 
been improved for further applications in more severe situations (Le. SG quite heavily 
fouled up, with no prior cleaning). Even if this treatment does not stop the corrosion, 
it can cause it to slow down, delaying the time for SG replacement. 
Chemical cleaning is currently under consideration for use on Koeberg's SG's. It is 
hoped that this process will reduce the possibility of IGA or IGSCC on the secondary 
side. 
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4.2.3 Primary Side Zinc Addition 
Research has indicated that the addition of Zinc to the primary water of PWR SG's 
delays the initiation of PWSCC of Inconel 600 (Mill-annealed). However, the 
inhibitory effect of zinc addition and its mechanism has not been clarified. Research 
is still ongoing and as yet this preventative measure has not been implemented 
internationally. 
Kawamura et al [58] have recently attempted to clarify the inhibitory effects of zinc on 
PWSCC susceptibility of Inconel 600 (Mill-annealed) in the as-received condition and 
after extended exposure to primary water at 360 0 C, creating an oxide prefilm. It is 
well known that the stability of the oxide film formed on the material plays an 
important role in the initiation and growth of SCC. Therefore, it is very important to 
clarify the variation of the oxide film characteristics accompanying a modification of 
water chemistry. 
The study found that a double layered oxide film was formed on Inconel600 MA. The 
outer layer was composed of NiFe204. and the inner layer was composed of NiCr204. 
With the addition of zinc at approximately 10 ppb in PWR primary water, zinc was 
incorporated into the inner spinal structure, the outer inverse spinal oxide was 
diminished or thinned so that the oxide thickness was reduced. 
It was concluded that zinc addition (> 10 ppb) into the simulated primary coolant 
suppressed the hydrogen reduction reaction on the surface of Inconel 600 MA and 
enhanced the formation of a stable oxide film composed of a zinc-chromium phase. It 
was suggested that these oxide film characteristics are the contributing factors to 
PWSCC resistance in Inconel 600 MA. 
Some PWR utilities are planning to modify the primary water chemistry by zinc 
addition with the objective of reducing radiation field build up, SCC, and maintenance 
costs. Currently, Koeberg does not intend to implement primary side zinc addition 
[15]. 
4.2.4 Increased Boron concentration in secondary water 
An increase in the boron concentration in the secondary side water has been shown 
to decrease the incidence of IGA. However, no estimate can be made of its 
effectiveness [37]. 
On-line addition of boric acid has been employed at several plants, however, this 
intervention is not being considered for Koeberg. 
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5 Remedial Measures 
In operating nuclear power plants, failure of a SG tube may be regarded, not simply 
as an SGTR, but as a state of unacceptable risk. This limit is reached when crack 
lengths are in excess of the acceptable limits discussed previously. When this 
occurs, a tube may be removed from service by plugging, or repaired by sleeving or 
laser surface remelting. 
5.1 Tube plugging 
A tube that poses a safety risk may be removed from service by means of plugging. 
The plugs used (Inconel 600 or Inconel 690) are of various types: 
~ Welded to the tube 
~ Mechanical, expanded in the tube, without welding 
~ Removable: expanded in the tube, but to a lesser degree than mechanical plugs, 
allowing easy removal of the plug. See Figure 15 below 
Figure 15: Removable Plug in the "inserted" position (Framatome) 
A: Inc6nel600 Tube 
B: Inconel690 Shell 
c: Nickel Insert 
0: Stainless Steel Expander core 
It should be noted that the technology has developed whereby even permanent plugs 
can be removed without extensive damage to the tube. 
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The plugs are inserted in both the hot and cold legs. They are seated flush with the 
lower end of the tube to minimise the effect of flow eddies. Initially, explosive plugs 
were used. In this process, the plug could be positioned in the tube to be plugged, 
and then explosion-welded in place instantaneously by a small amount of explosive 
contained in the hollow blind nipple. Problems have been experienced, however, with 
misfired plugs, and the eventual leaking of cold-worked plugs. 
Further techniques were thus developed and currently a mechanical device is used. 
Plugging is achieved in two stages as follows: 
~ Positioning of a cylindrical plug in the mouth of the tube to be plugged, 
~ Drawing on a contained threaded member which expands the plug into the tube. 
Removable plugs were developed to enable eventual removal, thus permitting the 
tube to be returned to service. The use of removable plugs means that when the 
plugging limit is reached, plugs can be removed and a proportion of the previously 
plugged tubes can be sleeved or repaired using some alternative corrective action. 
This increases the life of the SG with the possibility of the development of better 
repair procedures in the interim. 
Framatome developed a removable plug with a shell made of heat-treated Inconel 
690, an insert of nickel 201, and an expander core of cold drawn 316L austenitic 
stainless steel. Installation and removal are each performed in a single operation 
using the same tool. 
The plugging criteria, as established by the Koeberg defect specific analysis [48] is 
summarised in Table 8 on the next page. 
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Table 8: Plugging Criteria 
Category Plugging Criteria J 
PWSCC within tubesheet Circumferential Crack within 80 mm of the top 
the tubesheet. 
).> Axial Crack, FL ~ 13 mm, Lower end within 
tubesheet or within 3 mm of the last point of 
contact of the tube with the tubesheet. 
).> Axial Crack, FL ~ 10 mm, Lower end 3 mm or 
more above the last point of contact of the 
* 
tube with the tubesheet. 
PWSCC in the RTZ ).> Axial Cracks, ~12 cracks per tube. 
).> Circumferential Crack indication. 
).> Indication characteristic of a deformation due 
to oxide jacking above the tubesheet. 
).> Axial Cracks, FL ~ 13 mm if plant availability 
is at risk due to large primary to secondary 
leak rates. 
Indication characteristic of a defect within the U-
SCC in small radius U-bends bend region. (defect sizing and propagation data 
not available). 
).> Wall loss indication of 40 % or more of tube 
wall thickness. 
Wear by Loose parts on Secondary side ).> If there is contact or potential contact with a 
loose part that cannot be removed, even in 
the absence of measurable wear. 
Wear due to contact with AVB's 
Wall loss indication of 40 % or more of tube wall 
thickness. 
).> A 500 mV indication as characterised by the 
BC. 
).> An 00 wall indication of amplitude> 200 mV 
as characterised by the RPC. 
Secondary side corrosion at the top of the ).> An indication of external corrosion detected 
tubesheet (hot leg) with the BC with an amplitude> 200 mV, 
together with an indication of an axial crack in 
the RTZ (measured with RPC) with a FL ~ 
10 mm when these two defects cannot be 
separated by more than 8 mm in height. 
Other Modes of tube degradation 
Based on specific Engineering evaluation 
performed to determine corrective action. 
FL:;:: Free Length (measured from last point of contact with the tubesheet) 
RTZ = Roll Transition Zone 
Two axial cracks which are separated by a ligament less than 7 mm axially and 35 0 circumferentially will be considered as a 
single crack for the application of plugging criteria. 
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Plugged tubes still require routine surveillance since plug cracking has been known 
to occur. After the rupture of an Inconel 600 mechanical plug in the USA, all of the 
plugs of that type, installed in the hot legs of 900 MWe SG's, were equipped with 
blanks (plug in plug, PIP) to limit the risk of plug rupture [26]. The nature of plug 
cracking in mechanical and welded plugs is as follows: 
~ Mechanical Plug Cracking: 
This damage mechanism is essentially PWSCC of the mechanical plug resulting 
in both axial and circumferential cracks of the plug shell, on both sides of the 
expanded zone. Axial cracks may lead to a pressurisation effect. Circumferential 
cracks may lead to the risk of plug expUlsion into the tube due to the pressure 
differential and subsequent U-bend wall damage. 
The initiation time is estimated by Ed F to be at least one cycle, therefore 
inspection of plugs should be carried out at every outage. The risk of this form of 
degradation at Koeberg has been reduced due to the use of Inconel 690 TT 
mechanical plugs. Additionally, the number of plugged tubes is extremely low at 
Koeberg (45 in total), therefore the risk of cracking is considered to be low [7]. 
~ Welded Plug Cracking: 
As above, this degradation mechanism is PWSCC in the weld zone resulting in 
axial cracks, which may, in turn, lead to the pressurisation effect. The only case of 
this type of degradation detected in France had an initiation time of 11 cycles with 
a conical hollow welded plug design [7]. 
Prior to operation, Koeberg had 13 tubes plugged preventatively with Inconel 600 
welded plugs. During the seventh outage on Unit 1, a sample of these solid plugs 
was examined by dye-penetrant testing. No cracks were found. This established 
confidence that none of the welds contained any surface breaking cracks [59]. 
The pressurisation effect mentioned above, has also been called the 'diode effect' 
and the 'boiler effect' due to the circumstances which lead to the eventual tube 
failure. 
~ Diode effect: Refers to the crack allowing water to leak through in one direction 
but then restricts flow out in the reverse direction. The parameters governing this 
phenomenon are still not fully understood. 
~ Boiler effect: Refers to the increase in pressure of the trapped water (Le. near 
constant volume) when it is heated, on start-up, from cold shutdown for example. 
The actual damage to the plugged tube is caused by the cycling of water flow 
through defects in the plugs themselves. Water fills the tube during cold shutdown 
and expands the tube when heated on start-up. This plastically deforms the tube but 
without sufficient pressure to cause tube rupture. The plastic deformation increases 
the internal volume of the tube so that, during the next cold shutdown, more water 
can enter the tube through the cracked plug. The cycle is repeated until a sufficient 
volume of water is within the tube to cause tube rupture on expansion during start-up. 
It is estimated that tube rupture will take at least 1 to 3 cycles [7] 
67 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Remedial Measures 
The extent of tube plugging is limited by operating requirements. Plugging results in a 
loss of heat exchanger surface area and a subsequent drop in pressure and thermal 
efficiency. The tube plugging limit at Koeberg is 5 % of the tube bundle (Le. 167 
tubes, 5 % of 3330). This ensures that the thermal efficiency of a SG is maintained 
within acceptable limits. The plugging limit of 5 % is conservative since the SG's are 
operated at reduced temperature (ORT) which also lowers thermal efficiency. The 
tube-plugging limit is between 5 to 10 % without ORT. The worst SG (in terms of 
number of tubes plugged) is SG 96 with 15 plugged tubes after 10 cycles (Le. 0.45 % 
of the tube bundle). 
Currently 45 tubes are plugged in all six SG's. Thirteen of the plugs were installed 
during manufacture or after the pre-service inspection, with the balance (32 tubes) 
being installed subsequently because of various degradation mechanisms. 
5.2 Sleeving 
Sleeving is the main alternative to tube plugging. Sleeving a tube involves the 
insertion of a tubular insert (mostly Inconel 690) into the damaged area and attaching 
the sleeve to sound material on either side of this area. The ends of the sleeves are 
expanded hydraulically or explosively and are in most cases sealed by rolling, 
welding or brazing. Sleeves are placed mainly in the region of the RTZ and at the 
levels of the TSP's where PWSCC and denting may occur. 
Various methods have been developed, differing mainly with respect to the method of 
attachment, of the sleeve ends to the inner tube surface. These methods are as 
follows: 
>- Mechanical Sleeving 
>- TIG welded Sleeving (Framatome) 
>- Brazed Sleeves 
>- Kinetic (Explosive) Sleeves 
>- GT AW Sleeves 
>- Laser Welded Sleeves 
* >- Elbowed Sleeves. 
EdF have experimented with the first two methods listed [26]. The mechanical sleeve 
fitting technique has been improved and is qualified; however, the TIG welded 
sleeving method is still under review. Laser welding (replacing TIG welding) is 
presently being adopted throughout the world. It gives excellent control of welding 
parameters and good reproducibility in implementation. In 1993, the laser welding 
process developed by Framatome was qualified [26]. 
* 
In order to allow for repair of tubes at the periphery of the bundle. this method consists in introducing an elbowed sleeve, 
which is straightened when it is introduced. 
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The major types of defects that can be repaired are: 
)p> Internal and external corrosion 
)p> Denting 
? External tube wall wear. 
This remedial method offers the following advantages: 
)p> Reduced plugging rate with a consequent increase in service life of the SG's. 
)p> The method is suitable for repairing most types of tube defects. 
)p> The applicability of the LBRB principle (or in-service inspectability) is still 
considered valid by EdF [26]. 
)p> The consequences of a sleeve rupture are less than those of a tube rupture (anti-
dislocation device) [26]. 
)p> The risk of sleeve corrosion is extremely low due to the use of 'mature' 
technologies, such as the use of Inconel 690 and stress-relief thermal treatment 
of welded ends. 
The following disadvantages have been noted: 
)p> The accessibility of the tube becomes limited i.e. it is not possible to install 
sleeves at successively higher TSP levels. This implies that tube life is limited to 
the time taken for corrosion damage, at the TSP level, to make the tube 
unserviceable. 
)p> Slight pressure losses and heat transfer capacity losses occur as a result of 
sleeving. Studies have shown that 100 sleeved tubes are equivalent to 2 plugged 
tubes, although in practice, it has been found that 10 sleeved tubes are equivalent 
to 1 plugged tube [15]. 
Special precautions must be taken when sleeves are installed to prevent water from 
being trapped in the gap between the sleeve and the tube. Trapped water may result 
in a pressurisation effect, which occurs on start up, and can lead to tube deformation 
or tube rupture. In addition, the accumulation of contaminants in the gap must be 
avoided to prevent IGA and IGSCC. 
Several thousands of sleeved tubes are in service throughout the world. These 
sleeves have been inserted using a variety of assembly techniques. Sleeving has 
been in limited use in France. 
Sleeving is viewed by Koeberg as the most suitable remedial method for PWSCC 
tube damage in the RTZ [15]. No tubes have been sleeved at Koeberg to date due to 
the cost of installation (French crew required). However, it is envisaged that the use 
of removable plugs will allow a program of sleeving to be implemented once the 
plugging limit has been reached. 
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5.3 Laser Surface Melting / Laser Remelting 
Both tube plugging and sleeving result in loss of heat transfer capacity and 
subsequent operational penalties. In addition, these remedial measures are limited 
by accessibility problems. These problems can be overcome by tube surface 
modification using a laser beam, which can easily reach failed parts of a tube through 
a beam transmission system, such as an optical fibre, to repair them. This technique 
has been under development by Westinghouse since 1988 and was first tested at 
Duquesne Light Co's, Beaver Valley - 1 in April 1993. This repair technique is the 
first in-situ SG repair technique that does not employ other materials such as weld 
overlay. 
The laser surface melting (LSM) technique is essentially a preventative measure. A 
laser is used to melt the surface layer of the SG tubing. This effectively prevents SCC 
by introducing a thin barrier layer between the corrosive medium and the susceptible 
microstructure. Tests have shown that cracks arrest in the zone which has been laser 
melted. 
* Lim et al. [60] investigated the effects of sensitization treatment on microstructural 
evolutions in laser surface melted Inconel 600 samples using equipment such as 
scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and transmission electron microscopy/energy-
dispersive X-ray (TEM/EDX). A comparison was made between sensitized samples 
of solution annealed Inconel 600 (SA + sensitization) and those subjected to LSM 
(LSM + sensitization). It was found that carbon solubility was enhanced in the LSM + 
sensitization specimens thus minimising the carbon available at grain boundaries for 
chromium depletion. The minimum chromium concentration in the SA + sensitization 
sample was measured to be 7 wt % whereas a minimum of 12 wt % was measured 
in the LSM sample 
The laser remelting technique is an in-situ repair/remedial measure. This is a remote 
technique, which uses pinpoint lasers to apply heat directly to cracks, melting and 
resolidifying the metal. Cracks are repaired from inside the tube and this technique 
can achieve up to 80 % through wall penetration, It is anticipated that 100 % through 
wall penetration will be achieved in the near future. 
Sensitization: In austenitic stainless steels, the precipitation of chromium carbides, usually at grain boundaries, on exposure to 
temperatures of about 550 to 850 0 C (in this case 600 0 C for 24 h - one of the most susceptible heat treatment conditions to 
IGAlIGSCC in this alloy), leaving the grain boundaries depleted of chromium and therefore susceptible to preferential attack by 
a corroding (oxidizing) medium [37]. 
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6 Predictive Methods 
Various methods have been developed to predict SG service life and to verify the 
safe operation of existing units with susceptible SG's. These methods are mainly of 
the deterministic type e.g. Arrhenius plots, finite element analysis, and the leak 
before risk of break principle (LBRB). Recent developments in probabilistic methods 
(particularly simulation based probabilistic fracture mechanics methods) have not 
only allowed for improved predictive capabilities but also allowed optimisation of 
plugging limits and inspections scopes. In the last few years, the need for rationally 
based tube-plugging criteria and aids for planning and decision making on remedial 
measures, including SG replacement, has become increasingly apparent. This need 
has made the probabilistic approach increasingly attractive. 
The initial focus, after the first in-service cracks were confirmed in 1971, was to 
demonstrate the safety of the existing SG fleet. Failing which would have been 
disastrous to the industry (the EdF fleet alone has 170 SG's in operation equipped 
with tube bundles made of lnconel 600 or 690). EdF made the LBRB concept a key 
element of its safety policy and the resulting surveillance philosophy [61]. A vast 
study program was therefore developed in the 1980's, covering both break criteria 
and behaviour under leak conditions. These studies, which focussed on the main 
degradation phenomena (cracks in the RTZ), were based on theoretical models 
supported by numerous tests on models. Further analysis and tests on pulled tubes 
have been used to validate the assumptions of these theoretical studies. Since the 
late 1980's the focus has shifted to developing optimal plugging criteria and 
inspection scopes based on probabilistic methods. 
It is perhaps important, at this point, to note the difference between deterministic and 
probabilistic methods. Deterministic Engineering seeks to answer a question with a 
single number, assumed to occur with certainty, while probabilistic methods provide a 
range of likely answers, plus a statement on the probability of a given result. 
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6.1 Deterministic Methods 
The two important deterministic studies of relevance to Koeberg is that by Stein et 81. 
[9, 20, 31, 62], and EdF/Framatome [25, 61]. These two studies establish the 
sensitivity of Inconel 600 SCC to temperature and the Leak-before-break principle 
respectively. 
6.1.1 Arrhenius Plot 
It is well established that failure (SCC initiation) of Inconel 600 tubing is a thermally 
activated process and follows an Arrhenius relationship (see section 2.1.1 above for 
introductory remarks concerning this relationship). The Arrhenius plot can be used to 
predict the minimum service life of Inconel 600 tubing in primary water. 
A typical Arrhenius plot (also referred to as the Minimum Survival Curve) is shown 
below. 
Figure 16: Minimum Survival Curve from Stein et al. [9] 
SCC of Alloy 600 In high Temperature Water 
I· <>. MA + 593 10 621 degr C -0-MA + non pickled -0-MA + pickled I 
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e 
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s 0 .. failures based on average 
E tube operating temperatures r:::: 
10 
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1fT K (x E·3) 
. 
The slope of the lines is an indication of the Activation energy (- 40 kcal/mol-K). The 
activation energies observed from these results are close to the activation energy for 
bulk diffusion of Carbon in Nickel based alloys. The activation energy is a constant 
for SCC of Inconel 600 in primary water and therefore parallel lines may be drawn 
through the most conservative data for other material conditions plotted. 
The process of Activation is the changing of a passive surface of a metal to chemically active state. 
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The following conclusions may be drawn from these studies: 
~ The plot indicates that Inconel 600 SCC is strongly temperature dependent 
(Justification for Operation at reduced temperature, ORT) 
~ The plot indicates that heat treatments at 593 to 621 0 C or 705 0 C improve the 
SCC performance over that of the Mill-annealed conditions by at least a factor of 
2.5. 
~ The Mill-annealed conditions are extremely important in defining the carbide 
precipitation characteristics and resultant SCC performance in primary water. 
~ By judicious choice of material processing a material can be produced that can 
survive the 40 year design life. (see Table 4: SCC Resistant Metallurgical 
Parameters required) 
6.1.2 Flaw Analysis and the Leak-Before-Break Principle 
Since 1981, EdF and Framatome have done considerable work to define failure 
criteria, critical crack lengths and ultimately establish the validity of the Leak-Before-
Break principle. This was an important process to justify continued operation with 
susceptible SG's. 
6.1.2.1 5G Tube Rupture Failure Criteria 
More than 1000 burst tests on Inconel 600 tubing were performed in various test 
configurations. The tests have shown that the instability limit pressure can be 
accurately estimated using Plastic Instability Criteria (i.e. applied stress, amplified by 
bulging, is compared to a flow stress limit). The results have also shown that tube 
rupture occurs after extensive strain, as a consequence of the high ductility and 
toughness of the tubes. 
It was also experimentally confirmed that the instability limit pressure of a tube with a 
crack located in the roll transition zone at the top of the tubesheet is higher than that 
of a tube with the same type of defect located in a straight section remote from 
discontinuities. The gain in critical pressure is due to two combined effects: local 
mechanical strengthening due to seating in the tube sheet, which limits tube bulging. 
and an increase in the flow stress due to strain hardening of the material in the roll 
transition zone during the rolling operation. 
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6.1.2.2 Critical Crack Sizes 
Hulin and Billon [25] used failure criteria similar to the CEGB R6 approach and a 
finite element model to determine the critical crack sizes for the worst case transient. 
The most severe transient was determined to be a feedwater line break accident 
since this results in rapid depressurisation of the secondary side. The results 
obtained are as follows: 
Table 9: Critical Crack Sizes 
I Free Span 
Axial Cracks Circumferential Cracks 
2a = 16 mm 2a = 1800 
i Roll Transition Zone 2a = 16.5 mm 2a == 1800 
It should be noted that these are lower bounds of aCRIT due to conservatism's, 
especially of material properties. Koeberg has established a plugging limit of 13 mm 
for axial cracks and immediate plugging if any circumferential crack indications are 
detected. 
These results, in conjunction with a leak rate model, have led to the conclusion that 
tube rupture due to see should be preceded by significant primary to secondary 
leakage. This would allow the reactor to be shut down before failure (tube rupture) 
occurs. 
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6.2 Probabilistic Methods 
The deterministic approach to structural mechanics typically employs conservative 
estimates of the influencing parameters and the use of a "safety factor" to account for 
uncertainties inherent in these parameters. This is how probabilistic considerations 
are admitted "via the back door" [63]. 
To illustrate this point consider Figure 1 below. This figure shows the probability 
• 
density functions of the Failure Parameter (or Load Parameter) (L) and the 
Resistance Parameter (R), including their interference (overlap). Typical examples of 
load and resistance parameters are listed in the figure. It should be noted that the 
area of overlap is not equal to the failure probability. However, the area is 
qualitatively proportional to the failure probability as long as the mean value of load is 
less than the mean value of resistance. 
The conservatism associated with the deterministic approach is also clearly shown. 
Load Parameter calculations are typically based on conservative assumptions and 
result in load values well above the mean (indicated by Sd. Safety factors are usually 
applied to the resistance parameter to account for uncertainties and may result in 
resistance values well below the mean (indicated by SR). The typical deterministic 
analysis thus ensures that the Load Parameter (Sd is less than the Resistance 
Parameter (SR), given these conservative considerations. 
Figure 17: Load Parameter-Resistance Curves 
-------------- ----------------------------------
LOAD PARAMETffi: 
Stress 
Stress Intensity 
Crack Size 
AREA OF OVER.AP: 
-------------------
RESISTANCE: 
/ 
Strength (a" UTS) 
Fracture Toughness 
Olical Oack Size 
For convenience, in the subsequent discussion the Failure Parameter, which typically includes crack size, effective applied 
stress, stress intensity factor, etc, will be referred to as the "Load Parameter", The use of this term is thus not restricted to 
applied force only, but to any of the above variables. 
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A better way to deal with uncertainty is by means of probabilistic structural 
mechanics methods. This is particularly pertinent in the case of fatigue and fracture 
mechanics analysis since the parameters involved exhibit relatively large degrees of 
random scatter. 
The following section serves as an introduction to the field of probabilistic structural 
mechanics, which is the basis for the development of a probabilistic fracture 
mechanics model for the tubing degradation of the Koeberg SG's. 
6.2.1 Probabilistic Structural Mechanics 
Probabilistic Structural Mechanics (PSM) is an evolving and expanding field within 
structural mechanics. This subject has been comprehensively reviewed by 
Sundararajan [64]. The past four decades have seen significant advances in this field 
and still considerable research and development activities are in progress. The 
recent advances in computing power, in particularly, has led to an increasing interest 
in simulation based reliability methods and the subsequent ability to analyse more 
complex situations. 
The basic concept of the classical theory of structural reliability and risk based design 
starts with the definition of the performance function. The first step towards 
evaluating the reliability of a structure is to decide on the relevant load and resistance 
parameters called the basic variables Xi' and the functional relationship among 
them. Mathematically this relationship can be described as: 
Equation 3 
The failure surface can then be defined as Z O. This is the boundary between the 
safe and unsafe regions in the design parameter space. The limit state function 
(performance function) plays an important role in the development of structural 
reliability analysis methods. These methods were developed corresponding to limit 
state functions of different types and complexity. 
The probability of failure is thus given by: 
Equation 4 
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A mathematical expression for the failure probability is: 
Equation 5 
in which !r(xp x2"",xn ) is the joint probability density function for X p X 2 , ••• ,X" and 
the integration is performed over the region in which g(Xp X 2'"'' X /I) < O. If the 
• 
random variables are statistically independent, then the joint density function may be 
replaced by the product of the individual density functions in the integral. 
The computation of Pm by the above equation is called the full distributional 
approach and can be considered to be the fundamental equation of structural 
reliability analysis. In general, the joint probability density function of random 
variables is practically impossible to obtain. Even if this function were available, the 
evaluation of the multiple integral would be extremely complicated. 
Various methods have been developed to solve equation 5. Stress-Strength 
Interference methods are useful for simple applications only, where the defining 
probability density functions are relatively simple. First and Second Order reliability 
Methods (FORM and SORM) use analytical approximations of the integral that are 
simpler to compute and allow more complex applications to be analysed. Simulation 
based reliability methods have gained popularity due to the complex applications that 
can be analysed and the relative power of modern computers. Monte Carlo 
Simulations (key tool for simulation based reliability methods) are versatile and can 
solve virtually any probabilistic structural mechanics problem that has an underlying 
deterministic solution. 
The Monte Carlo Simulation technique was developed during the Manhattan Project 
of World War II (in the development of the atomic bomb) for simulating complex 
physical processes, and in particular, for modelling neutron transport in atomic bomb 
design. Its name comes from its resemblance to gambling. This analogy to games of 
chance is a good one, but the "game" is a physical system and the outcome of the 
game is not a pot of money or a stack of chips (unless simulated) but rather a 
solution to some problem. 
* 
Two events A and B are statistically independent if the outcome of one in no way affects the outcome of the other, Therefore, 
two random variables, X and Y, are statistically independent if information on one variables probability of taking on some value 
in no way affects the probability of the other random variable taking on some value. One of the most significant consequences 
of this statement of independence is that the joint probability of occurrence of two (or more) random variables can be written as 
the product of the individual marginal probabilities [65]. 
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Direct Monte Carlo simulation techniques (classic use of simulation-based methods) 
can be used to estimate the probability of failure defined in equations 3, 4, and 5 
above. Each random variable in a relationship is represented by a distribution 
function. A random number generator picks a number from the distribution with the 
probability of being picked proportional to the probability density function (pdf). After 
selecting weighted random numbers for all the stochastic variables, the relationship 
is calculated by feeding them into the performance function. Failure occurs when 
g(XPX2 , ... , X,,) < 0, therefore an estimate of the failure probability can be found by 
Equation 6 
where N f is the number of simulation cycles in which g(X), X 2, ... , Xn) < 0 and N is 
the total number of simulations. As N approaches infinity, PTR approaches the true 
probability of failure. 
The accuracy of equation 6 can be evaluated in terms of its variance. For a small 
failure probability and I or a small number of simulations, the variance of PTR can be 
quite large. It may thus require a large number of simulations to achieve a specified 
accuracy. The variance of the estimated failure probability can be computed by 
* assuming each simulation cycle to constitute a Bernoulli trial [65]. Therefore, the 
number of failures in N trials can be considered to follow a binomial distribution. The 
variance of the estimated failure probability can then be computed as follows: 
.( ) _ (1 -p" ) P m 
Vat P TR ::::: -----
N 
Equation 7 
The recommended measure [64] of statistical accuracy for the failure probability is its 
coefficient of variation: 
COV(p~)=~--_N---­
P TR 
A Bernoulli trial satisfies the following assumptions IBS]: 
1. There are only two possible outcomes for each trial 
2. The probability of success is the same for each trial 
3. There are N trials where N is a constant. 
4. The N trials are independent. 
Equation 8 
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It is evident from equations 7 and 8 that as N approaches infinity, va{ PTR) and 
COV(PTR) approach zero. A small coefficient of variation thus indicates better 
accuracy. 
The amount of computational time needed for the Direct Monte Carlo method is 
relatively large, however the computational effort per simulation is relatively small. 
Variance reduction techniques have been developed to increase the efficiency and 
accuracy of simulation based methods for a relatively small number of simulations, in 
addition to expediting convergence. However, the level of computational difficulty for 
each simulation cycle increases. 
The Direct or Classical Monte Carlo method will be used in this study. 
Specific engineering applications of PSM are to Finite element analysis, Fracture 
mechanics and Fatigue analysis. Some surveys have reported that .... 80 % [64] of all 
failures are due to fracture and fatigue. Since the random scatter in fracture and 
fatigue properties of structural materials are usually wider than that in other material 
properties, probabilistic methods are especially apt for fracture and fatigue analysis. 
The figure below is a graphic representation of these various branches of 
probabilistic structural mechanics. 
Figure 18: Probabilistic Structural Mechanics 
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7 Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics (PFM) Model 
The need for high levels of SG reliability has led to an increasing use of sophisticated 
in-service inspection techniques as a means of detecting and monitoring defects, and 
* to the plugging of many tubes. This is both expensive and may lead to early 
retirement of SG's due to loss of heat transfer area as a result of extensive plugging. 
Plugged tubes may be placed back in service by sleeving, however this ;s also an 
expensive and time consuming process. The purpose of this study is to develop a 
probabilistic fracture mechanics model to optimise the maintenance strategy (in 
terms of plugging limit and inspection scope) for the Koeberg SG's. 
Steam Generator tube rupture (SGTR) accidents are considered in the design of the 
plant and it's probability of occurrence must be less than 10-2 per reactor year (third-
category event, between 10-2 to 10-4) [66]. This will be used as a target range, for the 
probability of a SGTR, within which to optimise the SG maintenance strategy. 
7.1 Background 
Initially the worlds most widely used tube plugging criteria was based on an 
acceptable level of tube wall degradation, allowing for a 40 to 50% tube wall 
thickness reduction [67]. It soon became evident that the dominant form of tube 
degradation was PWSCC in highly stressed areas, which was difficult to detect with 
the eddy current techniques employed at that time. In such cases the plugging 
criteria based on allowable tube wall thickness was regarded as overly conservative. 
For this reason, EdF and the "Jozef Stefan" Institute, set out, independently, to 
develop an alternate plugging criteria that would allow safe operation with axially 
stress-corrosion cracked SG tubes. Both approaches rely on the ductile fracture 
behaviour of Inconel 600, which has been verified in independent experimental 
programs [61]. 
The PFM models developed for this purpose by EdF [26, 61,66, 68, 69, 70] and the 
"Joief Stefan" Institute [67, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75] have been the basis for the 
development of a similar model, specific to the Koeberg SG's. 
These two models have differences with regards to certain sub modules; however, 
the overall approach is the same. In both cases three distinct phases can be 
identified: 
» Estimation of Initial Crack Size Distribution 
» Initiation and Growth of Defects 
» Failure Analysis Module 
The time required for a full scope (i.e. all tubes) Eddy Current inspection of all three SG's at Koeberg is typically 6.5 days. This 
has an impact on the cost (in terms of normal costs and radiation dose to personnel) and duration of outages. 
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7.1.1 The EdF Approach 
In 1988 EdF began work on a probabilistic maintenance study, which led to the 
* development of the eOMPROMIS code [26, 61, 66, 68, 69, 70]. The first version of 
this code (available in 1992) could deal with longitudinal stress corrosion cracking in 
the RTZ. The initial model was based on the 1990 inspection data for Bugey 5. 
The code is based on a probabilistic fracture mechanics computation, which 
calculates the probability of occurrence of a SGTR. The probability of occurrence can 
be summarised by the equation: Prob [a{t) > ac] where a(t) denotes the size of an 
existing crack at time t and ae the critical crack size which would lead to fast fracture 
under the analysed loading conditions. The probabilistic approach allows for the 
factors which contribute to the uncertainties on sizes a(t) and ae to be taken into 
consideration. 
The code is made up of the following three stages: 
Estimation of Initial Crack Size Distribution 
The ability of the in-service inspections to detect and measure defects is taken into 
account in the form of probabilistic detection distributions and measuring errors that 
depend on the size of the defect. The manipulation of these factors to produce a true 
reflection of the defect size distribution after inspection is based on a method 
developed by Barnier et al. [68]. This method is based on Bayes' theorem, which can 
account for the reliability of the inspections in detecting and sizing in order to 
reconstruct the exact distribution of true crack sizes. 
Initiation and Growth of Defects 
The purpose of the second module is to simulate, over time, the evolution of the 
initial defect size distribution i.e. a(t). The crack propagation model was derived from 
a model developed for stainless steels and adapted to Inconel 600 on the basis of 
laboratory tests and operating experience [66]. The code covers the case of axial 
sec in the roll-transition zone. 
Failure Analysis Module 
The last stage calculates, for each time step, the probability of a tube rupture based 
on a comparison of a(t) and ae and information about leaks detected in service. The 
analysis was performed for the most severe transient (feedwater line break) resulting 
in the maximum AP across the tube walls i.e. a AP of 17.2 MPa [69]. 
COde de Mecanique Probabiliste de la Rupture pour Optimiser la Maintenance et les Inspections en Service (Probabilistic 
Fracture Mechanics code of SGTR to optimise SG maintenance and in-service inspections) 
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The code was used primarily for the following: 
~ T a test and compare various maintenance scenarios with a view to cost/safety 
optimisation (parameters considered: type of inspection, frequency, sampling 
strategy, plugging criteria) 
~ To investigate the sensitivity of the results to various sources of uncertainty, 
making it possible to identify the most influential weaknesses and guide research 
into areas, which would be most beneficial to pursue. 
~ To predict the operational life of a SG by simulating the number of tubes plugged 
versus time. 
Initial results (based on the SG most affected in the French fleet with a 1/8 inspection 
sample) indicate that it would be necessary to wait four operating cycles without 
inspection for the risk to reach the limits imposed by the design rules, Le. 10-2 to 10-4 
[66]. It was also shown that a 100 % inspection has a significant influence and can 
substantially reduce the risk of failure especially for highly damaged tube bundles. 
Sensitivity studies also showed that the probabilities of failure based on worst-case 
(deterministic) values are greater by an order of four decades to the probabilistic 
approach. 
These results were used to confirm the validity of the EdF SG maintenance policy. If 
subjected to the initial design plugging criteria, the concerned SG's would have been 
retired prematurely. 
The lack of new literature since 1993, with regards to the COMPROMIS code, seems 
to indicate that further development of the code stopped after these initial results 
were obtained. 
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7.1.2 The Joief Stefan Institute (JSI) Approach 
The Reactor Engineering Division of the Joief Stefan Institute (JSI) have developed 
and refined a probabilistic fracture mechanics model for the SG tubing degradation of 
the Siovenian Krsko Nuclear Power Plant (Westinghouse D-4 SG) since 1990 
[67, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75]. This model was based on the "Belgium approach" as 
described by Frederick et al. [76]. 
Whereas the EdF approach concentrated on supporting a particular maintenance 
strategy, the JSI approach proposed similar probabilistic fracture mechanics 
techniques to estimate the reliability of degraded SG tubing treated by a set of 
possible maintenance strategies. The strategies covered were based on crack length 
and plugging limit. 
The model proposed initially by Mavko and Cizelj [67] has been further refined and 
expanded since 1992. These refinements include the following: 
~ Comparison of the failure probabilities calculated by FORM and SORM to those 
obtained by various Monte Carlo simulation methods [71]. This was used to 
validate the Monte Carlo simulation method. It was found that applying both 
FORM and SORM bounded the Monte Carlo solution in the range of practical 
interest i.e (8 mm < PL < 14 mm). 
~ Implementation of the method developed by Barnier et a/. [68] to account for the 
effects of inspection error on the initial crack size distribution. This is the same 
method used in the EdF approach. 
~ The development and verification of a Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics based 
model describing the propagation of axial stress corrosion cracks in Inconel 600 
SG tubes [73]. 
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The JSI approach may also be broken down into three distinct phases similar to the 
EdF approach: 
Estimation of Initial Crack Size Distribution 
The initial model could account for cracks exceeding the plugging limit. which may 
have been missed during the inspection process. This simple model was based on 
the sizing error and detection probability. Based in this model, the crack length after 
the in-service inspection was defined by the random variable ao : 
{
a til + a e ' a ttl + a e < P L 
ao am+ae , a",+ae 2:::PLandc;::;pAaJ 
o Otherwise 
Equation 9 
with 
~I (a m) = 1-e -OASa", Equation 10 
where am and ae are random variables representing measured crack length and 
measurement error, respectively. pAa
tll
) and c; are the detection reliability function and 
a uniformly distributed random variable, respectively [72]. The coefficient, - 0.45, 
used in the detection reliability function PAaJ was based on a study of typical 
inspection performance data. 
As indicated earlier, this simple model has been replaced by the more rigorous 
method developed by Barnier et al. 
Initiation and Growth of Defects 
The JSI model, in its current form, utilises a Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics based 
model to describe the propagation of axially orientated stress corrosion cracks [73]. 
This propagation law was developed for axial cracks (assumed to be through wall) in 
the tube expansion transition zones. The residual stress field was considered as the 
major contributing factor driving short cracks while operational stresses dominate the 
growth of longer cracks. An estimate of the residual hoop stress was obtained using 
a non-linear finite element simUlation of the tube to tube-sheet rolling process. 
Failure Analysis Module 
Similar to the last stage of the EdF approach, the probability of a tube rupture is 
based on a comparison of a(t) and ac. However, the JSI approach does not take 
credit for the leak detection capability and is thus conservative. In both approaches, 
the failure function is based on a ductile fracture mechanics model, which was 
verified experimentally in independent studies. The failure function is the basis for the 
calculation of ac . The analysis was performed for the most unfavourable hypothetical 
accident conditions viz. a feedwater line break (maximum depressurisation of the 
secondary side) with a AP of 20 MPa. 
84 
U
ive
rsi
ty
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics (PFM) Model 
The following conclusions have been drawn from the most recent JSI studies [72, 74J 
for the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant: 
);> The plugging limit range of 8 to 14 mm was found to be optimal in terms of the 
number of plugged tubes versus SGTR probability. It was found that the SGTR 
probability could be changed by a factor of 2 in this range. Lower SG failure 
probabilities can thus be acllieved at the expense of reduced SG performance. 
);> A hypothetical feedwater line break would cause a single SG tube rupture in 
approximately 0.1 % of all cases and a multiple SG tube rupture in less than one 
in a million cases (given a PL < 12 mm). Specifying no plugging limit (i.e. PL --.., 00) 
results in virtually certain multiple SG tube rupture. 
);> The probability of tube rupture was found to be rather sensitive to human errors. 
A probability of human error in the order of about 1 % increased the probability of 
a multiple tube rupture event by about 4 orders of magnitude. These results also 
indicated a need for further investigations in the field of human reliability during 
inspection and plugging procedures. 
);> Sampling size also had a significant effect. Thus, routine 100% inspections of 
tube bundles were recommended. 
);> A comparison was also made of maintenance strategies based on allowable 
crack depth and allowable defect lengtll. Tile crack length strategy was shown to 
be superior in terms of SGTR probability. 
The probabilistic fracture mechanics model developed in this study for the Koeberg 
SG's is based on both approaches discussed above. In most cases, the EdF 
approach is followed, as the data available is more relevant to the Koeberg SG's. The 
reasons for adopting various sub modules are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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7.2 Deterministic Basis 
The failure probability as defined in equation 5 has the following form for this 
particular case: 
Equation 11 
where, 
f(a) = Probability Density Function of Observed crack lengths. 
fc{aJ = Probability Density Function of Critical crack lengths. 
Both functions are joint probability density functions of different parameters. The 
observed crack length distribution is based on inspection data and information 
regarding the measurement error and detection probability (this will be discussed 
later). 
The critical crack length calculation is based on a correlation between burst pressure 
and plastic flow stress (O"f r. Flesch and Cochet [61] have noted a "perfect" 
correlation between test results and a model of this form+. This formulation was also 
supported and developed by Kastner et al. [77]. 
For tubes without defects, the tube rupture criteria (for the free span or non-specific 
zone) can be expressed by the following relationship: 
Equation 12 
where 0" e is the membrane hoop stress due to the pressure differential across the 
tube walls and O"f=k(O"y+O"U1S) where O"y=yieldstressand 
a UTS = ultimate tensile stress. A conventional and conservative value of 0" f is 
obtained for k = 0.5 . 
Flow stress is used to account for strain hardening. 
+ 
This formulation for the instability criterion of a straight pipe having a longitudinal through wall crack was first established by 
Hahn et al. [781 
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For tubes with single or multiple axial defects in the RTZ, the tube rupture criteria can 
be expressed by a modified version of equation 12: 
Equation 13 
where a; is the equivalent membrane hoop stress (taking into account the pressure 
loading on the tube walls and crack lips) and M* is the bulging factor (also referred to 
as the stress magnification factor) specific to the RTZ. The bulging factor accounts 
for crack bulging due to the internal pressure in the tube. 
It was experimentally confirmed [61] that the instability limit pressure of a tube with a 
crack located in the RTZ is higher than that of a tube with the same type of defect 
located in a straight section remote from discontinuities. The gain in critical pressure 
is due to two combined effects: local mechanical strengthening due to seating in the 
tube sheet, which limits bulging, and an increase in the flow stress due to strain 
hardening of the material in the RTZ during the tube expansion process. It was also 
demonstrated that the rupture criterion (equation 13) remains applicable where there 
are several major cracks distributed over the entire tube circumference. 
The performance function as defined in equation 3 for the specific case of SG tube 
integrity may now be stated as follows: 
Equation 14 
where, 
M* = Bulging Factor for a specific cracked tube in the RTZ : M* = /(a j , ae , 0, ¢, t) 
a; = Equivalent Membrane Hoop Stress: a; = /(pp , PS ' Pf' ¢, t) 
af = Flow Stress (Jf = /(a y +aUTS ' k) 
a j = Crack length (Inner Surface) 
ae = Crack length (External Surface) 
Pp = Primary Side Pressure 
Ps = Secondary Side Pressure 
P f = Pressure propagating the crack 
¢ = Tube outer diameter 
t = Tube wall thickness 
£5 = Tube crevice depth 
See Figure 19 below: 
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Figure 19: RTZ - Parameter Definitions 
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The bulging factor in the RTZ may be described as follows: 
where M is the bulging factor in the non-specific zone of an SG tube and 
The exact relationship between M* and ~. has been determined experimentally. 
'" Rt 
EdF and Framatome performed more than 1000 burst tests on Inconel 600 and 
Inconel 690 tubing with various types of damage located in straight sections remote 
from discontinuities and supports (non-specific sections), in the RTZ at the top of the 
tube sheet, in the vicinity of the tube support plates, and in the U-bends (61]. 
The empirical results for single or multiple cracks in the RTZ is as follows: 
( -I 3374 ~-) (J 
A1" = 0.0872 + 0.7265 e . /Rt + 0.9858 lm Equation 15 
I nverting the bulging factor correlation for ac (critical crack length) when M" ('J; = ('J f : 
Equation 16 
where, 
Equation 17 
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Results are plotted for -.!. and _1 (this is equivalent to 0"; which is equivalent to the 
M M O"f 
burst pressure) versus ~ in Figure 20below: 
" Rt 
Figure 20: SG Tube burst criteria for Non-specific zones and RTZ [61] 
11M VS aISQRT(Rt) 
O.O+---------_-·~-~--_--_--_-_--_--___i 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 
a/SQRT(Rt) 
3,0 3.5 4.0 4,5 5,0 I 
It is evident that higher burst pressures were recorded for tests performed in the RTZ 
given a particular crack length. The correlation between the EdF free span data and 
the JSI free span data is remarkably good. This is of particular interest since 
Hernalsteen [79] observed "large discrepancies" when he compared the published 
data, for burst tests in the free span, of several European laboratories. 
The JSI approach was based on the free span data presented above. The additional 
circumferential rigidity in the RTZ was taken into account in the form of a Tube Sheet 
Reinforcing Factor, defined as a correction to the flow stress factor k . It's use was 
however restricted to cracks tangent to the tubesheet, which may not be true for 
numerous cracks propagating from the tube sheet. 
It should be noted that these results are based on machined cracks (laser cut or by 
electric discharge machining). In both types of crack fabrication crack width was 
typically 0.2 mm which may be very different from the tight corrosion cracks being 
simulated [79]. EdF have, however, performed tests on available pulled tubes and 
the above curves were found to be bounding in these cases. Equations 16 and 17 
can thus be used with relative confidence. 
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7.3 Model Outline 
The probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) model proposed in this study is based on 
the EdF and JSI approaches discussed earlier. The EdF approach is of greater 
relevance to the Koeberg SG's due to design and operational similarities. The JSI 
approach was used as an additional insight into the development of PFM models of 
this type. 
The proposed PFM model consists of three distinct sub modules similar to those 
developed by EdF and the JSI. These sub modules are: 
~ Estimation of Initial Crack Size Distribution 
~ Initiation and Growth of Defects 
~ Failure Analysis Module 
The development of these sub modules is discussed in detail in subsequent sections. 
The data used for the model is based on the Koeberg SG most affected by axial 
PWSCC in the RTZ. The inspections results used is based on Outage 113 which 
took place in January 2003. Important information with regards to the SG chosen for 
this study is listed in the table below. 
Table 10: SG 95 Inspection Summary 
Parameter Value 
SGID SG 95 (SG 2 on Unit 1) 
mutage 113 i 
Number of Tubes 3330 
llnst!ection Sgope i 100 % 
. Number of tubes with cracks 1307 
: Total Number of cracks 3304 
rMaximum cracks t!er tube 13 
A schematic of the proposed model is shown below: 
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Figure 21: PFM Model Schematic 
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The model was developed as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with certain algorithms 
written in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA). 
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7.3.1 Random Number Generation 
Random number generators are at the heart of all Monte Carlo simulations. These 
uniformly distributed random numbers are used to generate random variates from 
non-uniform distributions. These non-uniform distributions are typically based on the 
parameters, which describe the deterministic relationship being studied. 
* In most cases, we want the generated pseudo-random numbers to simulate a 
uniform distribution (equal probability) over the unit interval (0,1), that is, the 
distribution with the probability density function, 
{
I, if ° < x < 1 
p(X) = 
0, otherwise Equation 18 
All of the references studied [63, 80, 81, 82, 83, 64] recommend the Linear 
Congruential Generator as a source of random numbers. The form of the generator is 
as follows: 
Xi =(aXi_1 +c)modm with 0 $;xj <m Equation 19 
where Xi is the new random number being generated, Xi _1 is the previous number, a 
is called the multiplier, c is called the increment, and m is called the modulus of the 
generator. I n the above relationship, Xi is the remainder when (a Xi _1 + c) is divided 
by m. This relationship is based on a branch of mathematics called Modular 
Arithmetic. Interested readers may find a brief introduction to this subject by Gentle 
[80]. 
Since such a sequence repeats itself after at most m steps, the period must be 
required to exceed the number of random numbers involved in the experiment under 
consideration. It is thus important to set m to as large a number as possible to 
prevent cycling of random numbers. 
The above relationship cannot be implemented in the VBA code since the data types 
available do not support such large numbers. However, the VBA code does have a 
built in random number generator (the RND function) which has been used for the 
purposes of this study. The RND function is based on the Linear Congruential 
method of the same form as equation 19. This function utilises an internal unsigned 
long data type that is not supported by the VBA language. 
Computerised processes call for perfectly deterministic generation of numbers and the product, not being truly random but 
cyclical in nature is referred to accordingly as pseudo-random or quasi-random. 
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The parameters used are as follows: 
Xi = New random number 
xi-! = Previous random number (an initial value of 327680 is used) 
a = 1140671485 
c = 12820163 
111 = 224 
These parameters are considered adequate based on the criteria set forth in 
reference [80]. The VBA RND function will thus be used in all the algorithms required 
for this study. 
The sequence of uniform random numbers between 0 and 1 will be denoted as 
U(O,l) . 
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7.3.2 Random Variate* Generation 
The generation of random variates from non-uniform distributions is usually done by 
applying a transformation to the generated uniform random numbers. Each 
realisation of a non-uniform random variate can be obtained from a single uniform or 
from a sequence of uniforms. Some methods that require a sequence of uniforms 
require that the sequence be independent. 
The generation of random variates requires that: 
}> The relevant Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) is invertable (or in the case 
of normal and log-normal variates, numerical approximations exist for the inverse 
of the CD F) 
}> A uniform random number generator is available. 
Thus, if we generate a uniform U(O,l) random number and substitute this into the 
inverse of the CDF of interest (with the relevant parameters), we obtain a realisation 
of a variate for this particular CDF. 
For example, consider the generation of an exponential variate with parameter A . 
The CDF is expressed as: 
If we substitute 1Ii (a uniform U(O,l) random number) for Fx{x) and invert the CDF to 
solve for Xi I we obtain: 
1 x. = In{l-u.) 
I A I 
Here, Xi is an exponential variate with parameter A . 
It should be noted that not all distributions have closed form solutions for the CDF or 
its inverse (e.g. Normal, Log-normal, and Gamma distributions). In these cases, 
numerical approximations (in the form of algorithms or subroutines) are available. 
The algorithms used for generating random variates from the distributions used in 
this study are listed in appendix C. 
The method described in the example above is referred to as the Inverse Transform 
method, which is applicable to cases where the CDF has a closed form solution. 
Where no closed form solutions for the CDF exists, the Composition and 
Acceptance-Rejection methods are used [83]. 
Some authors distinguish "random numbers" from "random variates", where the term "random number" applies to pseudo-
random numbers that arise from a uniform distribution over the unit interval (0,1), and the term "random variates" applies to 
pseudo-random numbers that arise from some other distribution. Uniform random numbers are also referred to as "uniforms" in 
some texts. This usage will be adopted here. 
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The following schematic illustrates the methods available for the generation of 
random non-uniform variates from uniform random numbers. 
Figure 22: Generation of Non-Uniform Random Variates 
GENERATION OF RANDOM NdN-llNIFORM:VARIA"tES 
I · INVERSE TRANSFORM METHOD ._] 
Cumulative olnllty Functfon 
Uniform DlatrlbuUon U(O,1) 
i 
I 
o -.-.. --.~.-..... --.--.-.-... - ... - -------.-.- .-.-- ... ----.. ----- --".--
x· Fx"(u) 
=_. II· COMPOSmON METHOD =::::J 
III· ACCEPTANCE-REJEC11DN METHOD 
This schematic represents the essence of a Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS). The 
MCS process may thus be summarised as follows: 
~ Generate a uniformly distributed random number U(O,I) 
~ Generate random variates from the random variables describing the deterministic 
relationship being studied. 
~ Apply the deterministic relationship for each realisation of the parameters random 
variates. 
The generic MCS VBA source code and spreadsheet it interfaces with is given in 
appendix D1. 
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7.3.3 Estimation of True Crack Length Distribution 
The input to this sub module is the measured crack length frequency plot as shown 
below: 
Figure 23: Measured Crack Length Frequency Plot (SG 95, Outage 113) 
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This frequency plot represents the distribution of measured crack lengths in the RTZ 
(the quoted length includes the portion in the tube sheet). We thus have a total of 
3304 cracks in 1307 tubes. The highest number of cracks recorded in a single tube 
was 13. 
The inspection data collected during an outage forms the bases for deciding which 
tubes should be plugged to ensure safe operation. However, due to crack sizing error 
and imperfect detectability, some of the cracks left in operation may actually exceed 
the plugging limit. 
The objective of this sub module is to reconstruct the above distribution to be 
representative of the true defect size distribution, post inspection. The sources of 
error considered in this study are the measurement error, probability of detection 
(POD), and human error. 
The method described here may be considered a hybrid method based on aspects of 
the JSI and EdF approaches. It is similar to the JSI approach (in terms of dealing with 
measurement error) but utilises methods developed by EdF to account for plugging 
probability. The method has two phases: 
> Estimation of true defect size distribution by MCS analysis. 
> Estimation of post inspection defect size distribution 
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7.3.3.1 True Defect Size Distribution 
The true defect size distribution may be defined as follows: 
Equation 20 
where a is the true defect length, am is the random variable representing measured 
defect length, and ae is the random variable representing sizing error. 
The sizing error is in the order of ±1.5 mm [46] and was modelled (as suggested by 
Cizelj et at. [74] as a normal distribution with a mean of 0.0 mm and a standard 
deviation of 0.75 mm. Thus, only random errors, independent of the crack length are 
considered. 
The effect of sizing error was taken into account by performing a direct Monte Carlo 
simulation (MCS) on am and ae • The simUlation simply samples a value from the 
measured crack size distribution and adds a value sampled from the sizing error 
distribution. The resultant distribution is considered to be the true defect size 
distribution. A listing of the VBA code and the spreadsheet is given in appendix D2. 
The random variables used in the MCS and the resultant distribution parameters are 
listed in the table below: 
Table 11: Random Variables for MCS of True Defect Size Distribution 
r Variable 1 * Distribution Unit Truncation Comment I 
~ Ty~ Parameters Reference Log· a = 1.559 I f3 = 0.291 None Measured (Outage am~rmal mm 113) I I . 
I ae I Normal I Jl = 0.00 0" = 0.75 mm ±1.S [74] 
I am + ae I Log- 1_ 13=0.337 l mm Generated by Monte I normaLL -1.545 . Carlo Simulation. I ,.-
* 
For definitions of these distribution parameters see appendix C. 
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7.3.3.2 Post Inspection Defect Size Distribution 
Given the initial distribution of true defect sizes just estimated, the plugging 
probability is needed to calculate the "post inspection" distribution. This allows us to 
account for the effect of maintenance actions taken i.e. the plugging of tubes 
exceeding the plugging limit. The probability that a tube is plugged is a function of the 
probabilities that the tube is inspected, that the defect is detected, that its measured 
size exceeds the plugging limit, and that there is no failure of plugging (essentially 
human error). 
This may be stated as follows (68]: 
P [Plugging!a]= P [inspeCting!a]x P [detection! a]x P [am> PLj a]x P [plugged] Equation 21 
where a is the true defect length, am is the measured defect length and PL is the 
plugging limit. The individual probabilities are defined as follows: 
» P [inspectingla]=_l where Its is the sample scope e.g. a random sample of 1 in 8 
Its 
tubes is typical. Since a 100 % inspection was performed on the SG under 
consideration, this probability takes on a value of one. 
» p[am >PL/a] may be considered to be 1 when a';?PL and 0 when a<PL. This 
simplification is possible since the sizing error has already been taken into 
account in the previous step. 
» P [Plugged] = 1- E where E is the residual non-detection probability used to model 
human errors (EdF use a value of 10-4). 
» P [detectionl a] is the probability of detection (POD). The POD was assumed to 
follow the well known exponential law. The detection probability specific to the 
RPC method is as follows [66]: 
(
a y25 
POD = 1 e 2,37 I Equation 22 
Equation 21 was applied at the "binned" level i.e. after a histogram was generated for 
the true defect size distribution. For a detailed description of this method see 
appendix E. 
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The resultant post inspection defect size distribution plots (for various plugging limits) 
are shown in the figure below. 
Figure 24: Post Inspection Defect Size Distributions 
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Since the above frequency distributions directly affect the tube rupture probabilities 
(particularly the weighting of the right tail), the following conclusions can be drawn: 
:;.. The frequency plots for PL of 11 to 17 mm are virtually indistinguishable. This 
implies that increasing the PL above 13 mm will not increase the tube rupture 
probability significantly. 
~ A significant decrease in tube rupture probability can only be achieved by 
applying a PL of 7 mm or lower. However, this would result in excessive plugging. 
The graph below (Figure 25) illustrates the required plugging frequency given a 
particular PL. Thus for a PL of 7 mm, an average of 180 tubes would have to be 
plugged. However, it will be shown, in subsequent chapters, that the tube rupture 
probability is well within limits even for the most penalising post inspection defect 
size distribution and thus there is no need to plug excessively. 
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.. 
Figure 25: Required Plugging Frequency vs PL (SG 95, Outage 113) 
Barnier et al. [68] has developed a method, which appears to be more rigorous than 
the method described here. This method was used in the EdF approach and was 
adopted in 1995 by the JSI [74]. However, this method still requires a "subjective" 
judgement of the appropriate distribution type for the True Defect Size distribution 
e.g. the EdF analysis was based on a choice between a Log-normal 
(Ii = 1.51, a = 0.626) and Weibull (a = 5.16, fJ = 1.53) distribution for which the 
probability of having a crack length greater than 13 mm is 4.6E-02 and 1.6E-02 
respectively. The difference is nearly 3 fold and may negate the need for such a 
rigorous approach. 
The vertical axis in this graph Is representative of the average number of tubes requiring plugging. This is based on a factor of 
2.53 cracks per tube (i.e. 3304 cracks /1307 tubes affected). 
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7.3.4 Critical Crack Size Distribution 
The critical crack length calculation is based on a correlation between burst pressure 
and plastic flow stress (0-f)' The equation defining critical crack size has been 
derived earlier (equation 16) and is repeated here for ease of reference. 
Q
c 
= {-0.128+ 1.020M* -6.976 e-3.146M·)JRt 
where, 
• 0-f k (0- y + 0-UI'S ) M = - = ----'-----,:.---.:::=~ 
0-; PI (If-o.s) 
The defining parameters may be considered independent random variables (except 
for PJ ) and may thus be subjected to a MCS. The probability distributions of these 
parameters are listed in the table below. 
Table 12: Random Variables for MCS of Critical Crack Size distribution 
Distribution ! I Commentl ! 
Variable Type Parameters 
Unit . Truncation Reference 
i 
i 
I t Normal # = 1.27 0- = 0.04 mm ±3o- [69] 
i¢ Normal # = 22.22 0- = 0.06 mm -30-/2.20- [69] 
0-y + o-UTS Normal #=914 0- = 30 MPa ±3o-
Koeberg Specific 
Data 
!k Normal # = 0.58 0-=0.01 I - ±3o- : [69] 
I I 
The pressure parameter PI is considered to be deterministic since it is characteristic 
of a particular operating situation. The critical crack length is evaluated for two cases; 
Normal operating conditions (PI = 10 MPa) and during the worst case accident 
scenario (PJ = 17.2 MPa). This latter scenario is attributed to a feed water line break 
accident [70]. 
A listing of the VBA code and the spreadsheet used to generate the Critical Crack 
size distributions is given in appendix 03. 
The results are illustrated in Figure 26 below: 
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Figure 26: Critical Crack Size Distribution in RTZ (Generated by MCS) 
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The critical crack size distributions, generated by MCS, has the following parameters: 
Table 13: Critical Crack Size Distribution Parameters 
Parameter Value (mm) 
Normal Operation 
j.1 (Mean) 48.13 
cr (Std. Deviation) 2.87 
FWLB 
j.1 (Mean) 27.58 
cr (Std. Deviation) 1.66 
It is clear from Figure 26 that the critical crack size is well above the plugging limit 
applied at Koeberg, even for the postulated accident condition (feed water line break 
- FWLB). The figure also indicates the advantage offered by the probabilistic 
approach in evaluating critical crack sizes. The conservatism associated with the 
deterministically calculated critical crack size of 16.5 mm, by the CEGB R6 approach, 
[25] is evident. The deterministic analysis also provides no information with regards 
to the uncertainty associated with the calculated value. 
Whereas a deterministic approach gives a first impression of the influence of various 
parameters governing the critical crack size, a probabilistic calculation provides 
something "extra", since it provides the ability to quantify the influence of these 
parameters on the probability of a SG tube rupture. 
A sensitivity analysis was performed to determine the effect of varying the 
parameters, which define the critical crack size. This was achieved by setting each 
parameter value to its mean and extreme values as listed in Table 13, and 
performing a MCS for each condition . The cumulative distribution for critical crack 
size (which is proportional to the fa ilure probability) was then plotted for each 
simulation. The results are illustrated in the graphs below. 
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Figure 27: Sensitivity to Flow Stress Factor 
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The cumulative distribution graphs are proportional to the tube rupture probability 
since curves to the left predict higher probabilities for smaller critical crack sizes. 
Thus, curves towards the left will yield higher tube rupture probabilities than curves to 
the right on the graphs above. These results demonstrate that it would be more 
important to know the distribution of tube thickness and mechanical properties rather 
than the distribution of tube diameters or 1:low stress parameters. These results may 
also be useful to future designers of SG tubes since it highlights the parameters, 
which would yield the most benefit if changed. 
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7.3.5 Crack Growth Law 
The crack propagation model used by EdF (and adopted for this study) was derived 
from a model developed by Ford [84] for stainless steels and adapted to Inconel 600 
on the bases of laboratory tests and operating experience. This model is based on a 
correlation* between the propagation rate da/dt and the stress intensity factor K(a) 
having the following form [66]: 
da ==C[K(a)r (mm/hr) 
dt 
where da/ dt has an upper bound of 1.5E - 05 111111/ hr and 
K(a)= -23.961oga + 3.8a + 28.4 
and m;::;; 1.07 
Equation 23 
Equation 24 
EdF has devoted considerable research to the development of the precise correlation 
between K and crack size [66]. This correlation is based on an evaluation of the 
local residual and operating stresses. 
The total crack length, after a time interval b..t, may thus be defined as follows: 
Equation 25 
where 
b..a = b..t C [K(a )]m Equation 26 
One of the three parameters defining the crack propagation model, C, K(a), or 111 • 
may be treated as a random variable. It should be noted that all three parameters 
cannot be treated as random variables simultaneously since they are not 
independent. As indicated in reference [66] only parameter C will be treated as a 
random variable in this study. This parameter is defined as follows: 
Variable 
Distribution 
Unit Truncation Comment I Type Parameters Reference 
C Log-normal a = -1~.06 I P ==0.84 - - [66] 
This type of correlation is typically used to model Fatigue Crack growth, however. Stress Corrosion Cracking data may also be 
correlated by the Stress Intensity approach as indicated by Ewalds and Wanhill [5] 
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It should be noted that the correlation between da/ dt and the stress intensity factor 
K(a) developed by EdF compares well with that developed by Kawamura and Hirano 
[42], illustrated in Figure 12. 
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8 Results and Discussion 
8.1 Tube Rupture Probability 
A direct MCS was performed to calculate tube failure probabilities. The MCS source 
code and spreadsheet with which it interfaces is given in appendix 04. The MCS 
samples data from the Post Inspection crack length distribution, the crack growth 
factor ( C), and the Critical Crack size distribution for postulated accident conditions. 
The spreadsheet then compares the crack length, at the time being considered, with 
the critical crack length for each realisation of these parameters. A failure occurrence 
is observed when the crack length (at time t) exceeds the critical crack length. 
As indicated earlier, the tube failure probability is calculated from the number of 
numerical experiments, N, and the number of observed failure occurrences, N f' as 
follows (equation 6): 
PTR 
where the number of iterations is determined by the convergence of the Coefficient of 
Variation as defined in chapter 6.2.1. A target value of 0.1 was used as suggested in 
reference [64]. 
Figure 31 below illustrates the Post Inspection crack length distribution and Critical 
Crack size distribution on the same horizontal scale. Since the tube rupture 
probability is proportional to the overlapping area, it is clear that very low tube rupture 
probabilities should be expected. 
Figure 31: Post Inspection Crack Length (t = 0) and Critical Crack Size Distributions 
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The expected low tube rupture probabilities have been verified by the MCS 
performed. After 5,000,000 iterations (given a f:..t of 1 year) no failure occurrences 
were observed. Since the failure probability is simply the number of failure 
occurrences divided by the number of iterations, the tube rupture failure probability, 
given a plugging limit of 13 mm, may be considered less than 2E-07 
(Le. less than 1 15,000,000). 
However, to verify the capability of the MCS method, developed in this study, 
particularly it's ability to converge to a particular solution, an artificial scenario was 
set up to increase the area of overlap and thus the failure probability. This was 
achieved by removing the restriction on the upper bound crack growth rate as 
defined in chapter 7.3.5. The results are listed in the table below: 
Table 14: Tube Rupture Probabilities for Artificial Scenario 
~t ~t = 0 yr ~t = 0.25yr ~t = 0.5yr ~t = 0.75 yr ~t = 1yr 
Tube Rupture 
8.03E-07 1.079E-05 1.831E-04 1.129E-03 2.738E-03 I Probability 
In all cases, the Direct MeS converged to the target value established earlier. A plot 
of tube rupture probability versus time is shown below. 
Figure 32: Tube Rupture Probability vs Time (Artificial Scenario) 
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8.2 SGTR Probability 
* Assuming that a SG tube failure can be described by a Poisson's process. the 
probability P..'iGTR of having one or more tubes failed in a SG tube bundle containing 
M cracks is given by [75] (for large values of M ): 
P -1- (-MPud SGTR - e Equation 27 
The parameters and resultant solution of the equation 27 is given below for the 
Koeberg SGTR Probability: 
Table 15: Koeberg SGTR Probability 
Parameter Value 
SG SG 95 (Unit 1) 
Outage 113 
PL 13 mm 
Operating Condition FWLB 
PTR < 2.00E-07 
M 1307 
PSGTR < 2.61 E-04 
This is well within the upper limit established earlier of 1 E-02. This implies that the 
maintenance regime (inspection frequency and plugging limit) serves its purpose well 
and may in fact be too restrictive. 
Due to the low failure probabilities being considered it is difficult to establish the 
effect of plugging limit on the eventual SGTR probability. However, it is clear from 
Figure 24 that plugging limits of 11 to 17 mm are virtually indistinguishable and would 
result in essentially the same tube rupture probability. Reducing the plugging limit 
would result in SGTR probabilities lower than the value quoted above due to the 
reduction in weighting of the right tail of the distributions. 
It should be noted that these observations are specific to the SG being considered 
and the crack population found during the outage being considered. SG 95 is 
considered the most degraded SG at Koeberg and as such establishes a bounding 
case for the SGTR probabilities of the other SG's. 
* 
Poisson's processes are characterised by their time dependence, namely. the fact that certain events do or do not occur 
(depending largely on chance) at regular intervals of time or throughout continuous intervals of time. The mathematical model 
used to describe processes of this type is the Poisson's distribution [65]. 
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Equation 27 leads to an interesting consideration. This equation indicates that the 
SGTR probability is a function of both the Tube Rupture probability and the number 
of cracked tubes in the tube bundle. Plugging criteria have always been focussed on 
minimising the individual tube rupture probabilities PTR • however. a situation may 
arise where the population of cracked tubes may be the critical parameter. For 
example. a cracked tube population of 1307. in combination with tube rupture 
probabilities in excess of 7.67E-06, would result in an SGTR probability which 
exceeds the limit set earlier of 1 E-2. Thus plugging would be required due to the 
number of cracked tubes and not due to conventional plugging criteria. This situation 
is illustrated in the figure below: 
Figure 33: SGTR Probability vs Number of cracked tubes (Special Case) 
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9 Concluding Remarks and Recommendations 
9.1 Concluding Remarks 
The initial literature review hinted at promising trends between certain metallurgical 
parameters and tube cracking susceptibility. However, a study of these parameters, 
using the Koeberg SG database, could not confirm any of these trends. It would 
however be useful to study these parameters again at a later date when more data 
has been collected, since a larger database might reveal trends not evident at this 
stage. These metallurgical trends might be used to develop "intelligent" inspection 
scopes focussing on the most susceptible tubes. 
The probabilistic fracture mechanics model developed in this study has been based 
on various aspects of the EdF and JSI approaches. A direct Monte Carlo Simulation 
was used to determine the True Crack length distribution, the Critical Crack length 
distribution, and the resultant Tube Rupture probability. This particular study was 
based on the Outage 113 data for SG 95, considered the most degraded SG at 
Koeberg. 
The Post Inspection crack length distribution generated for various plugging limits 
indicated that plugging limits of 11 to 17 mm would yield identical tube rupture 
probabilities. A significant decrease in tube rupture probability can only be obtained 
by reducing the plugging limit to 7 mm, however this would lead to excessive 
plugging and subsequent analysis showed that decreasing the plugging limit is not 
justified. The generation of the Post Inspection crack length distribution was based 
on a subjective choice of various distributions. In all cases, the distribution was 
chosen, which had the "heaviest" right hand tail and would thus lead to the most 
conservative tube rupture probabilities. The EdF and JSI approaches, although 
different to the method used in this study, also rely on this subjective choice of 
distributions. 
The Critical Crack length distribution revealed the disadvantages of typical 
deterministic approaches and also indicated that the plugging limit of 13 mm, as used 
at Koeberg, is well within acceptable limits even for the postulated accident condition. 
The parameters defining the Critical Crack length was subjected to a sensitivity 
analysis. This analysis suggested that it would be more beneficial to know the exact 
distributions of tube thickness and the mechanical properties of the SG tubes as 
opposed to the flow stress factor and tube diameter. This allows future research to be 
more focussed on the parameters that really count. This sensitivity analysis highlights 
the usefulness of probabilistic methods as opposed to the traditional deterministic 
approach. 
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Even before the MCS was performed to determine the Tube Rupture probability, it 
was evident that the probabilities would be very low. This was based on an 
inspection of the area of overlap between the Post I nspection crack length 
distribution and the Critical Crack length distribution. The MCS performed indicated 
zero failure occurrences even after 5,000,000 iterations. This indicated that the Tube 
Rupture probability was less than 2E-07 (i.e. less than 1 I 5,000,000). This implies 
that the overall SGTR probability is less than 2.61 E-04, which is well below the 
established upper limit. These results indicate that the current SG maintenance and 
operating regime (plugging limit, inspection scope, ORT, chemistry, etc.) have 
contributed to a very safe SG. 
It should be noted that the current study only considers axial PWSCC in the RTZ. 
The other degradation mechanisms, such as U-bend cracking and secondary side 
intergranular attack have not been evaluated. 
To verify the capability of the MCS method, particularly it's ability to converge to a 
particular solution, an artificial scenario was set up to increase the area of overlap 
and thus the failure probability. This was achieved by removing the restriction on the 
upper bound crack growth rate. The results indicated much higher Tube Rupture 
probabilities and converged successfully at each time increment. 
The equation defining the SGTR probability includes the Tube Rupture probability 
and the number of cracked tubes. It was shown that the limit of 1 E-02 would be 
exceeded for the current cracked tube population of 1307 if the individual Tube 
Rupture probabilities exceeded 7.67E-06. Therefore, this may be considered an 
additional factor to respect when evaluating SG tube bundles after future outages. 
This study has thus quantified the benefits of the various measures in place at 
Koeberg to ensure the safe operation of the SG's. It has also highlighted the 
advantages of probabilistic methods, particularly the ability of Monte Carlo simulation 
methods to analyse complex situations. 
The significant potential for risk based SG life-time optimisation is thus evident. 
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9.2 Recommendations 
The MCS method developed in this study is considered adequate as an initial 
attempt. Various aspects of the model can be refined and extended. This can be 
achieved easily as the model has been set up in a modular form. The following 
recommendations should be considered in future developments: 
}> Variance Reduction Techniques such as Importance Sampling or Stratified 
Sampling should be included since these methods increase the efficiency and 
accuracy of the simulation. These methods require a relatively small number of 
simulation cycles, however, the level of computational difficulty for each 
simulation cycle increases. 
}> The current model does not take credit for the leak detection ability available to 
the operators. The model developed by EdF accounts for this ability in the form of 
leak detection probabilities. However, information regarding this model is not very 
clear but may be worth further investigation. 
}> The metallurgical trends discussed earlier warrants further investigation, as this 
would highlight susceptible tube batches. This information could be used to 
develop "intelligent" inspection scopes and may also be added as a sub-module 
in the current MCS model. The effect of this modified inspection scope could then 
be quantified. 
}> The sensitivity analysis performed on the parameters defining the Critical Crack 
size indicated that the tube thickness and mechanical properties were most 
significant. It may be beneficial to verify these parameters for use in future 
models. 
}> The method used by EdF to generate the Post Inspection defect size distribution 
appears to be more rigorous than the method used in this study, and should be 
considered for future revisions of this model. 
}> Other degradation mechanisms such as circumferential cracking, U-bend 
cracking, and secondary side intergranular attack should be included in future 
revisions of the model depending on the availability of the instability criteria and 
crack propagation laws defining these degradation mechanisms. 
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Appendix A • Additional Tables 
A. Additional Tables 
Table A1: Main Components of the Koeberg SG Tube Bundles [46] 
Component Description Material 
A single piece forging with a diameter of 
Tube sheet 
3454mm and thickness of 534mm. SA 508 class 3 
2 . x 3330 holes are drilled in the tube sheet to 
receive the heat exchanger tubes. 
3330 inverted U-shaped Vallourec tubes welded 
to the tube sheet. Tube dimensions: 
• OD:22.2mm Mill Annealed Inconel 600 
• Thickness: 1.27mm alloy 
Tube Bundle The bending radius varies from 55.6mm to [Nickel based alloy SB 163 
1519.9mm (ASME)]t 
The straight sections have a maximum out of 
round tolerance of 1.4%. The curved sections 
! have a maximum out of round tolerance of 6%'. 
The support plates are placed at appropriate 
height intervals to maintain proper tube spacing. 
The support plates transmit loads and 
displacements from the shell to the tube bundle. 
Seven 30mm thick, plates containing cruciform 
Integral Tube broached (quatrefoil design) tube penetration 210 C13(AFNOR) 
Support Plates ports which support the tube in four places Martensitic Stainless Steel 
around the periphery of the tube with open areas 
to improve thermal hydraulic properties of the 
secondary water in the vicinity of the holes. The 
choice of material further reduces the risk of 
corrosion and constrictions in the penetrations. 
I 
Plate containing mainly cruciform broached 
Upper Tube (quatrefoil design) tube penetration ports. 210 C13(AFNOR) 
Support Plate Towards the periphery of the plate some ports Martensitic Stainless Steel 
are drilled. I 
Tie Rods Used to secure the support plates. ! St~inless Steel 17-4-1 
Blowdown 
The lower portion of the secondary system has 
System 
two perforated tubes installed on top of the tube 
sheet. 
I 
AVB 
Anti-Vibration bars. Rods used to stabilise the I 
upper tube bundle which is subject to vibration . Chrome plated, Inconel 600 
due to fluid - structure interaction. i 
Tube Wrapper A cylinder surrounding the tube bundle. SA 508 Class 3 
Out of round allowance is equal to the difference between the minimum and maximum diameters to the nominal diameters of 
the tube. 
t Koeberg Unit 1, SG 3 was rejected by Eskom and replaced with a SG fitted with thermally treated Inconel 600 tubing. 
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Appendix A - Addilion=a;.:../-.:T.c.;:a=b=l=e=s _______ _ 
Table A2: Tube Bundle Heat Certificate Data [46] 
Property Unit 1 Unit 2 
SG 1 (96) SG 2(95) SG 3(77) SG 1 (98) I SG 2(99) SG 3.(100) 
C% 0.023 0.027 0.022 i 0.021 0.021 --
Si% 0.314 0.284 ! 0.324 0.329 0.330 
Mn% 0.718 0.710 0.718 0.720 0.714 
Ni% 74.154 74.159 73.951 I 73.956 74.139 
Cr"/o 15.985 16.047 15.980 I 16.022 16.021 
Cu% 0.026 0.032 0.027 0.029 0.028 
Co% 0.032 0.035 I 0.026 0.028 0.028 
Ti% 0.273 0.208 0.316 0.301 0.294 
AI% 0.175 0.176 : 0.208 0.206 0.209 i 
Fe% 8.244 8.266 8.356 8.425 8.332 
,. 
1 
GS 85.290 87.847 L 
83.666 84.100 85.164 
Yield Strength (MPa) 319.106 323.419 I 305.029 301.664 I 309.430 (Room Temperature) l. 
Yield Strength (MPa) 253.635 256.135 ! 248.050 I 245.846 
, 
250.909 (Op. Temperature) I 
UTS (MPa) 701.506 707.659 
, 
705.688 i 704.948 705.679 (Room Temperature) 
I UTS(MPa) 644.346 658.322 645.971 ! 654.441 658.162 (Op. Temperature) i 
GS: Grain Size 
UTS Ultimate Tensile Strength 
According to Afnor NF A04 102 (French Standard) 
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Appendix A - Additional Tables 
Table A3: Koeberg Unit 1 Inspection Summary [46] 
..... Unit 1 
Inspection SG 1 (96) SG 2 (95) SG 3 (77) 
PSI 
Bobbin Coil 100% Bobbin Coil 100% Bobbin Coil 100% 
DIA Test DIA Test DIA Test 
I 
RERUN 100% re-read of PSI BC tapes in 100% re-read of PSI BC tapes in 100% re-read of PSI BC tapes in hot leg hot leg hot leg 
Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 
• periphery (2 deep) • periphery (2 deep) • periphery (2 deep) 
101 • row 1 • row 1 • row 1 
• Previous indications • Previous indications • Previous indications 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
• periphery • periphery • periphery 
I 
Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 
• Previous indications 
Rotating Pancake Coil: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
102 • All BC crack indications • Periphery • Periphery 
Visual Examination: 
• Periphery 
Extension: 
• BC 1 in 4 in sludge zone 
Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 
• periphery (2 deep) 
• Previous indications 
Visual Examination: Rotating Pancake Coil: Visual Examination: 
103 • Periphery • 100% of sludge zone • Periphery 
• High expansion anomalies 
• All BC crack indications 
• 2 leg extensions 
Visual Examination: 
• Periphery 
I 
Helium Leak Test 
Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: 
• periphery (1 deep) • periphery (1 deep) • 1 in 8 
• Previous indications • Previous indications • periphery (2 deep) 
• He leaking Tubes • row 1 
104 • Previous indications 
Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 • 100% of sludge zone 
• 100% of sludge zone • 100% of sludge zone • previous indications 
• previous indications • previous indications 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
• Periphery • Periphery • Periphery 
Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: 
· 1 in 8 • periphery (1 deep) • periphery (1 deep) • periphery (1 deep) • rows 1 and 2 • rows 1 and 2 
• rows 1 and 2 • Previous indications • Previous indications 
• Previous indications 
105 
Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of SG tubes • 100% of SG tubes • 100% of Sludge zone 
• previous indications 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
I • 
Periphery • Periphery • Periphery 
L • SludQe zone L • Sludge zone 
Table continued on next page 
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Inspection SG 1 (96) SG 2 (95) I SG 3 (77) 
Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 
• periphery (1 deep) • periphery (1 deep) • periphery (1 deep) 
• reduced aseismic blocks • reduced aseismic blocks • reduced aseismic blocks 
• Previous indications • Previous indications • Previous indications 
Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of sludge zone • 100% of sludge zone • 100% of sludge zone 
106 • previous indications • previous indications • previous indications 
• All BC crack indications • All BC crack indications • All BC expansion 
anomalies 
U-bend rotating pancake coil: U-bend rotating pancake coil: U-bend rotating pancake coil: 
• Row 1 (complete) • Row 1 (complete) • Row 1 (complete) 
• Row 2 (1 in 8) • Row 2 (1 in 8) • Row 2 (1 in 8) 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
• Periphery I • Periphery • Periphery 
• Sludge zone • Sludge zone 
Hydrates! at 93 bar Hydrotest at 93 bar Hydrates! at 93 bar 
Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 
• periphery (1 deep) • periphery (1 deep) • periphery (1 deep) 
• reduced aseismic blocks • reduced aseismic blocks • reduced aseismic blocks 
• Previous indications • Previous indications • Previous indications 
• Dents under TSP (AVB) • Dents under TSP (AVB) • Dents under TSP (AVB) 
• 1 in 4 under AVB's. • 1 in 4 under AVB's. • 1 in 4 under AVB's. 
107 
Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of SG tubes • 100% of SG tubes • 100% of sludge zone 
• previous indications 
U-bend rotating pancake coil: U-bend rotating pancake coil: U-bend rotating pancake coil: 
• Row 1 (complete) • Row 1 (complete) • None 
• Row 2 (1 in 8) • Row 2 (1 in 8) 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
• Periphery • Periphery • Periphery 
• Sludge zone I • Sludge zone 
Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 
• periphery (1 deep) • periphery (1 deep) • periphery (1 deep) 
• reduced aseismic blocks • reduced aseismic blocks • reduced aseismic blocks 
• Previous indications • Previous indications · Previous indications • Dents under TSP (AVB) • Dents under TSP (AVB) • Dents under TSP (AVB) 
• 1 in 4 under AVB's. • 1 in 4 under AVB's. • 1 in 4 under AVB's. 
108 Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: • 100% of sludge zone • 100% of sludge zone • 100% of sludge zone 
• previous indications • previous indications • previous indications 
U-bend rotating pancake coil: U-bend rotating pancake coil: U-bend rotating pancake coil: 
• Row 1 (complete) • Row 1 (complete) • None 
• Row 2 (1 in 8) • Row 2 (1 in 8) 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
• Periphery • Periphery I · Periphery 
I • 
Sludge zone I • 
Sludge zone I • Sludge zone 
Table continued on next page 
A.4 
U
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
w
Appendix A - Additional Tables~ ____ _ 
Inspection SG 1 (96) SG 2 (95) SG 3 (77) 
Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: 
• Periphery (1 deep) • Periphery (1 deep) • Periphery (1 deep) 
• Reduced sludge zone • Reduced sludge zone • Reduced sludge zone 
• 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 
• 1 in 4 under AVB's. • 1 in 4 under AVB's. • 1 in 4 under AVB's. 
• Previous indications • Previous indications • Previous indications 
• Expansion anomalies • Expansion anomalies • Expansion anomalies 
• Dents under AVB, wall loss • Dents under AVB, wall loss • Dents under AVB, wall loss 
109 & strike indications. & strike indications. 
& strike indications. 
Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coli: 
• 100% of SG tubes • 100% of SG tubes • Reduced sludge zone 
• Expansion anomalies • PreviOUS indications 
(check for circumferential • Expansion anomalies (Hot 
cracks) leg) 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
• Periphery • Periphery • Periphery 
Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: 
• Periphery (1 deep) • Periphery (1 deep) • Periphery (1 deep) 
• Reduced sludge zone • Reduced sludge zone • Reduced sludge zone 
• 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 
• 1 in 4 under AVB's. • 1 in 4 under AVB's. • 1 in 4 under AV8's. 
• Previous indications • Previous indications • Previous indications 
• Expansion anomalies • Expansion anomalies • Expansion anomalies 
(Relevant) (Relevant) (Relevant) 
• Wall loss & strike • Wall loss & strike • Wall loss & strike 
indications. indications. indications. 
110 Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• Reduced sludge zone • Reduced sludge zone • Reduced sludge zone 
• Previous indications with • Previous indications with • Previous indications 
FL > 5mm FL> 5mm • Expansion anomalies (Hot 
• Expansion anomalies (Hot • Expansion anomalies (Hot leg) 
leg) leg) 
U-bend rotating pancake coil: U-bend rotating pancake coil: U-bend rotating pancake coil: 
• Row 1 (1 in 2) • Row 1 (1 in 2) • Row 1 (1 in 2) 
• Row 2 (1 in 8) • Row 2 (1 in 8) • Row 2 (1 in 8) 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
I. Periphery • Periphery • Periphery 
I 
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Table A4: Koeberg Unit 2 Inspection Summary 
Unit2 
Inspection I SG 1 (98) SG 2 (99) SG 3 (100) 
PSI I Bobbin Coil 100% Bobbin Coil 100% Bobbin Coil 100% . DIA Test DIA Test DlA Test 
! i 
I I 
RERUN 
i 100% re-read of PSI BC tapes in 100% re-read of PSI BC tapes in 100% re-read of PSI BC tapes in 
hot leg hot leg hot leg 
Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 
• periphery (2 deep) • periphery (2 deep) • periphery (2 deep) 
201 • row 1 • row 1 • row 1 
• Previous indications • Previous indications • Previous indications 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
I • periphery • periphery • periphery 
Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 
Visual Examination: • Previous indications Visual Examination: 
202 • Periphery Rotating Pancake Coil: • Periphery • All BC crack indications 
Visual Examination: 
• Periphery 
! 
Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 
• periphery (2 deep) 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: • row 1 
203 Periphery Periphery • Previous indications • • Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of sludge zone 
• 2 leg extensions 
Visual Examination: 
• Periphery 
i 
i 
Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 
• periphery (1 deep) • periphery (1 deep) • periphery (1 deep) 
• row 1 • row 1 • row 1 
• Previous indications • Previous indications • Previous indications 
204 
Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of sludge zone · 100% of sludge zone • 100% of sludge zone • previous indications • previous indications • previous indications 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
• Periphery • Peri~he~ • Periphery 
Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 • periphery (1 deep) 
• periphery (1 deep) • periphery (1 deep) • reduced aseismic blocks 
• reduced aseismic blocks • reduced aseismic blocks • row 1 
• row 1 • row 1 • previous indications 
• HL expansion anomalies • previous indications 
205 Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of sludge zone • 100% of SG tubes • 100% of sludge zone 
• all BC indications • previous indications 
• all BC indications 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
• Periphery • Periphery Visual Examination: 
i I • Periphery 
Table continued on next page 
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Inspection 
206 
207 
SG 1 (98) 
Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 
• periphery (1 deep) 
• reduced aseismic blocks 
• Previous indications 
Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of SG tubes 
U-bend rotating pancake coil: 
• Row 1 (complete) 
• Row 2 (1 in 8) 
Visual Examination: 
• Periphery 
Hydrotest at 93 bar 
Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 
• periphery (1 deep+wedges) 
• sludge zone 
• 1 in 4 AVB zone 
• Previous indications 
Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of sludge zone 
• previous indications 
• expansion anomalies 
U-bend rotating pancake coil: 
• Row 1 (complete) 
• Row 2 (1 in 8) 
SG 2 (99) 
Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 
• periphery (1 deep) 
• reduced aseismic blocks 
• Previous indications 
Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of sludge zone 
• previous indications 
• all BC indications 
U-bend rotating pancake coil: 
• Row 1 (complete) 
• Row 2 (1 in 8) 
Visual Examination: 
• Periphery 
Hydrates! at 93 bar 
Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 
• periphery (1 deep+wedges) 
• sludge zone 
• 1 in 4 AVB zone 
• Previous indications 
Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of SG tubes 
U-bend rotating pancake coil: 
• Row 1 (complete) 
• Row 2 (1 in 8) 
SG 3 (100) 
Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 
• periphery (1 deep) 
• reduced aseismic blocks 
• Previous indications 
Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of SG tubes 
U-bend rotating pancake coil: 
• Row 1 (complete) 
• Row 2 (1 in 8) 
Visual Examination: 
• Periphery 
Hydrotest at 93 bar 
Bobbin Coil: 
• 1 in 8 
• periphery (1 deep+wedges) 
• sludge zone 
• 1 in 4 AVB zone 
• Previous indications 
Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of sludge zone 
• previous indications 
• expansion anomalies 
U-bend rotating pancake coil: 
• Row 1 (complete) 
• Row 2 (1 in 8) 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
• Periphery • Periphery • Periphery 
~ ________ -+~.~-=S~IU~d~QEe~Z~o~n~e __________ ~ __________________________ +I_. __ ~S~lud~gEe~z~o~ne~ ________ ~ 
208 
Bobbin Coil: 
• Periphery (1 deep) 
• Reduced sludge zone 
• Expansion anomalies (cold 
leg) Cases Sa. 7, 8a. 12a, 
12b, 12d, 12e 
• Wall loss, dents under TSP 
and AVB, Strike. 
Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of reduced sludge 
zone 
Bobbin Coil: 
• Periphery (1 deep) 
• Reduced sludge zone 
• 1 in 8 
• 1 in 4 AVB zone 
• Expansion anomalies 
Cases 7, 8a, 12e 
• Wall loss, dents under TSP 
and AVB. Strike. 
Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of reduced sludge 
zone 
Bobbin Coil: 
• Periphery (1 deep) 
• Reduced sludge zone 
• Expansion anomalies 
Cases 3. 5a, 7, 8a, 12e 
• Wall loss. dents under TSP 
and AVB, Strike. 
Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of reduced sludge 
zone 
• 
• 
previous indications • 
expansion anomalies (hot • 
leg) 
previous indications • 
expansion anomalies (hot • 
leg) 
previous indications 
expansion anomalies (hot 
leg) 
U-bend rotating pancake coil: U-bend rotating pancake coil: U-bend rotating pancake coil: 
• Row 1 (complete) • Row 1 (complete) • Row 1 (complete) 
• Row 2 (1 in 8) • Row 2 (1 in 8) • Row 2 (1 in 8) 
Visual Examination: 
• Secondary side 
Visual Examination: 
• Secondary side l 
Visual Examination: 
• Secondary side 
Table continued on next page 
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Inspection I SG 1 (98) SG 2 (99) SG 3 (100) 
Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: 
• Periphery (1 deep) • Periphery (1 deep) • Periphery (1 deep) 
• Reduced sludge zone • Reduced sludge zone • Reduced sludge zone 
(1 in 2) (1 in 2) (1 in 2) 
• 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 
• 1 in 4 in AVB zone • 1 in 4 in AVB zone • 1 in 4 in AVB zone 
• Previous indications • Previous indications • Previous indications 
• Expansion anomalies • Expansion anomalies • Expansion anomalies 
209 
(relevant) (relevant) (relevant) 
• Wall loss, Strike. • Wall loss, Strike. • Wall loss. Strike. 
Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of SG tubes • 100% of SG tubes • 100% of SG tubes 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
• Periphery • Periphery • Periphery 
Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: Bobbin Coil: 
• Periphery (1 deep) • Periphery (1 deep) • Periphery (1 deep) 
• Reduced sludge zone • Reduced sludge zone • Reduced sludge zone 
(1 in 2) (1 in 2) (1 in 2) 
• 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 • 1 in 8 
• 1 in 4 in AVB zone • 1 in 4 in AVB zone • 1 in 4 in AVB zone 
• Previous indications • Previous indications • Previous indications 
• Expansion anomalies • Expansion anomalies • Expansion anomalies 
(relevant) (relevant) (relevant) 
• Wall loss • Wall loss • Wall loss 
210 
Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: Rotating Pancake Coil: 
• 100% of reduced sludge • 100% of reduced sludge • 100% of reduced sludge 
zone zone zone 
• Previous indications with • Previous indications with • Previous indications with 
FL >5mm FL> 5mm FL > Smm 
• Expansion anomalies (Hot • Expansion anomalies (Hot • Expansion anomalies (Hot 
leg) leg) leg) 
U-bend rotating pancake coil: U-bend rotating pancake coil: U-bend rotating pancake coil: 
• Row 1 (1 in 2) • Row 1 (1 in 2) • Row 1 (1 in 2) 
• Row 2 (1 in 8) • Row 2 (1 in 8) • Row 2 (1 in 8) 
Visual Examination: Visual Examination: Visual Examination: 
• Periphery • Periphery • Periphery 
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Table A5: Tube Inspection and Plugging History - Unit 1 
UNIT 1 
Tube Inspection History. [59J Tube Plugging [85] 
Tube #. I Reason 
Outage 
Outage Start EFPD SGno. 
% eracked RI el 
Dates Tubes , 
I 11/01/1982 0 1 02 01 
· Manufacture dent causinQ probe blockaQe 
03 i 01 Manufacture dent causing I2robe blocka9.-e 
2 10 i 93 · Manufacture dent causing probe blockage 
PSI 19 i 85 10 wall loss (signal) 
i 3 24 83 
10 wall loss (signal) 
I 25 78 · 00 wall loss 
43 42 10 wall loss (signal) 
02/01/1986 300 1 27 84 00 wall loss (loose part) 
23 64 I see initiation (abnormal expansion) 
101 2 23 i 66 
see initiation (abnormal expansion) 
24 65 : see initiation (abnormal expansion) 
I 24 67 . see initiation (abnormal ex~ansion) 
102 15/08/1987 600 1 28 84 I 00 wall loss (loose partt 
103 18/02/1989 912 2 (13) - - i-
I 17/0811990 1263 (13) 26 83 Preventatively plugged due to tube 
26 84 R27 e84 damage 
26 85 " 
104 
1 
i 27 83 
.. 
28 83 i .. 
27 85 " 
2 (26) 05 94 Tube damage during He test 
i 31/01/1992 1558 1 I 13 (19) - - i -105 
2 18 (42) - - -
20/08/1993 I 1901 1 (26) 21 L 60 see - Availability Plugging 
(48) 01 I 17 Preventatively pluQged due to pwsee at 
05 33 Tube expansion zone in order to reduce 
106 2 06 39 
SG leak rate. 
06 44 " 
06 51 .. 
11 32 u 
12/0211995 2222 
1 
23 (31 ) 28 78 · 00 wall loss Qoose ~art) 
107 
~ 29 78 00 wall loss (loose part) 
2 31 (52) - I - -
108 
I 14/06/1996 2538 1 I (33) 01 92 I 10 wall loss in U-bend 
2 (54 - - -
109 
02109/1997 2917 1 27 (36 - - -
I 2 i 35 (56 - - -
110 
15101/1999 3334 1 (41) - - -
2 (58) 
14/04/2000 i 3722 1 
. 30 (39 02 52 U-bend sec 
I 04 01 Dent causing Probe block 
111 2 37 (59) 
3 35 32 OD wall loss - Mandatory Plugging 
112 
07/09/2001 4133 1 i 31 (40) 
2 38 (59) 20 55 Axial sec - 11 cracks in 270" 
17/01/2003 4539 31 {42 01 02 Dent - Preventative pluQQinQ 
! 02 02 " 
02 03 .. 
03 02 .. 
03 03 " 
113 
1 
04 02 " 
04 03 I .. 
05 01 " 
05 I 02 " 
i 06 01 .. 
2 39 (60) 25 I 43 I Axial sec - 11 cracks in 270u 
Total Plugged: 45 
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Table A6: Tube Inspection and Plugging History - Unit 2 
UNIT 2 
Tube Inspection History [59] Tube Plugging 
Tube #. Reason 
Outage OutageStart I EFPD i SG# % Cracked R! Ci . Dates • Tubes I 
22/11/1982 0 24 55 Manufacture; incorrect tube sheet drillinQ 
1 24 59 .. 
24 63 . 
PSI 
2 
29 11 Tube sheet not drilled 
! ( no hole in TS on cold lea side) 
3 i 08 50 ID wall loss (signal) I 18 38 " I 
201 21/03/1987 308 · · . 
20/08/1988 616 41 65 Loose Parts 
202 2 41 64 .. 
42 64! .. 
203 22/1211989 940 · · -
I 02105/1991 1240 1 [ (4) · · . 
204 2 ! (12) - · -
3 (4) - - -
01/01/1993 1553 1 
(8) 01 08 Preventatively plugged due to U-bend wall 
205 
loss potentially affected by heat treatment 
2 9 (20) · - -
3 (9) - - -
I 09/09/1994 1870 1 4 MY - - -
206 2 (23) - - -
3 8 (11) - - -
05/01/1996 2195 1 (13) 01 84 Indication in 8'th TSP - U-bend transition 
207 2 13 (26) - - -
3 (14) · - -
20f02l1997 2503 1 (15) 01 27 U-bend RPC Drobe stuck in U-bend 
208 2 (38) 
3 (15) 
22/04/1998 2861 1 6 (15) - - -
209 2 15 (30) 
3 11 (16) 
18/09/1999 3282 1 (16) 
(42) 01 18 Preventatively pluQQed due to U-bend 
210 2 01 71 indications 
01 75 .. 
3 (16) 
12101/2001 3683 1 7 (16) 
2 17 (32) 
211 13 (19) 15 89 Circumferential Crack (50 degreeS)1/' 3 
19 87 Circumferential Crack (117 dearees) 
05/04/2002 3974 1 7 (16) 
212 2 17 (33) 
3 13 (19) 
Total PIUQ!:!ed: 17 
• Values in brackets indicate percentage of cracked tubes in the sludge zone (300 tubes). Values in brackets and shaded in 
grey indicate percentage of cracked tubes in the reduced sludge zone (150 tubes). It was not possible to include some of the 
overall values since the inspection scopes covered 1 in 8 samples and previous indications. An indication refers to an eddy 
current signal :.<: 200 mV 
# Due to the greater risk involved with circumferential cracks, Koeberg is obliged (in accordance with the EdF maintenance 
policy) to perform full inspection scopes on all SG's, until it can be proven that the circumferential cracks detected in Outage 211 
was an anomaly. 
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B. Known SG tube rupture incidents World-wide 
~.9~~~;~:t;tR~"tt!~~J 
The U.S. nuclear industry experienced its first steam generator tube rupture at Point Beach Unit 1 in 
Wisconsin. The steam generator tube rupture occurred in less than 5 years operation. Subsequent 
inspection revealed that 127 tubes had degraded wall thickness greater than 60%. The steam 
generators at Point beach were Westinghouse model 44's with mill-annealed Alloy 600 tubing and 
were replaced in 1984. These are the same steam generators that are still installed at Indian Point 2. 
Cause: Wastage due to large sludge pile (ineffective cleaning) 
Rupture Location: Above tubesheet, outer row on hot leg. 
Leak Rate: 28,200 IIhr 
~'9Z61SGftR12~'lJs'A ~ ..•. ~gi •.. Z>.~." •• "w... • •. 1.> .... ,J 
Surry Unit 2 reactor located near Williamsburg, Virginia, experiences the second steam generator 
tube rupture at a U.S. nuclear plant. The steam generator tube rupture occurred in less than 4 years 
operation. Subsequent inspection of nine U-bend sections of the steam generator tubes revealed a 4.5 
inch crack, four of the other eight pulled tubes revealed cracking that was undetectable with inspection 
techniques available at the time. 
Cause: PWSCC of top tube support plate - inward movement of tubes - high 
stresses and ovalisation of tubes at apex. 
Rupture Location: Apex of U-bend (row 1, column 7). 
Leak Rate: 75,OOOllhr 
If91!'SGI J3TSef""Uim 
i.0 ..... i§.""' •.•.• 0i.l{ .... kt _Jg'>."i~) 
Doel 2 (Belgium) experiences the first non-US steam generator tube rupture, 4 years after 
commissioning. The tube rupture occurred at the apex of U-bend (row 4, column 24), because of high 
residual stresses and ovalisation during fabrication. 
Cause: PWSCC - high residual stresses and ovalisation during fabrication 
Rupture Location: Apex of U-bend (row 1, column 24). 
Leak Rate: 30,600 IIhr 
~9113jR~1~ct(9iJ 
The NRC designates steam generator tube integrity as an Unresolved Safety Issue and plans were 
established to evaluate the safety significance of degradation in PWR steam generators. 
~;~tf;~s@j;R';4mJS:~) 
Prairie Island Unit 1 near Minneapolis, MN experienced a spontaneous tube rupture caused by a 
loose part in the steam generator. NRC issues Information Notice 79-27 Steam Generator Tube 
Ruptures at Two PWR Facilities, documenting the accident at Prairie Island as well as a similar 
accident at the Doel 2 nuclear reactor in Belgium. Both reactors were Westinghouse 2-loop plants. 
The Prairie Island accident released approximately 30 curies of radiation into the environment. 
Cause: Loose part - sludge lancing equipment left in SG. 
Rupture Location: Periphary 76 mm above tubesheet on hot leg (row 4, column 1). 
Leak Rate: 76,200 IIhr 
1982~~SGZRS~l:isA C,,".,~!;~" .k,,~., ~.J.,~.,_~ 
The Ginna reactor located near Rochester, NY experienced a spontaneous tube rupture caused again 
caused by a loose part in the steam generator. The steam generator tube rupture occurred in less 
than 5 years of operation. Inspections in April of 1981 revealed eddy-current indications that were not 
interpreted as needing plugging. The Ginna accident released 90 curies of radiation into the 
environment. Had there been any damage to the core of the reactor, the bypass of the containment 
would have provided highly radioactive fission materials a direct pathway into the environment. 
Cause: Loose part - tube fretting on plugged tube(bundle base). 
Rupture Location: Periphary 126 mm above tubesheet on hot leg (row 42, column 55). 
Leak Rate: 174,0001lhr 
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~:~~2;~ii~!lbgfiq4s~~·~u.~Ci 
Consolidated Edison sues Westinghouse over the Indian point 2 steam generators. Every utility, with 
the exception of the Tennessee Valley Authority, that has purchased a Westinghouse reactor has 
subsequently sued the corporation over problems with their steam generators. 
~~M;'i~~mJ:lr6l(Q§~j 
Fort Calhoun (military installation), near Omaha, NE, experienced a spontaneous tube rupture. The 
ruptured tube had been included in the last steam generator tube inspection and occurred after less 
than 10 years of operation. Re-evaluation of the data from that inspection revealed a 99% through wall 
defect where the tube eventually ruptured. 
Cause: ODSCC - corrosion of carbon steel vertical support leading to tube 
Rupture Location: 
Leak Rate: 
~@~~grr:~~~.(~~,~j 
ovalisation and excessive levels of stress. 
U-bend adjacent to vertical support bar (row 84, column 29). 
25,500llhr 
North Anna Unit 1 near Fredricksburg, VA experienced a spontaneous tube rupture. The rupture was 
caused by a 360 degree through wall crack and occurred after less than 10 years of operation. The 
plants technical specifications did not require much inspection of the area that eventually ruptured 
because it was on the cOld-leg side of the steam generator. Thus in the previous inspection only 13% 
of the tubes in this area were inspected. The tube that eventually ruptured was not among the 13%. 
Cause: High cycle fatigue due to lack of AVB support and denting. 
Rupture Location: Above upper support plate cold leg (row 9, column 51) 
Leak Rate: 144,600llhr 
~~Bil;JJ)Jc{§J8ff!riii}j~ 
NRC Commissioner Kenneth Rogers acknowledges that multiple tube ruptures can lead to a 
meltdown of the nuclear reactor: 
The concern is with sudden multiple tube failures- common mode failures. For 
example, such failures could come about by having essentially uniform 
degradation of the tubes. Degradation would decrease the safety margins so 
that, in essence, we have a 'loaded gun, I an accident waiting to happen. Under 
those conditions, a pressure transient or a seismic event could rupture many 
tubes simultaneously. That could a/Jow primary coolant to enter the secondary 
system and the resulting high pressure to lift the relief valves that are outside 
containment on the steam line, thus permitting primary water to by-pass 
containment and communicate with atmosphere directly, resulting in a LOCA 
(loss of coolant accident) 
'I98,,~:~N8§~f~l[l!9:~ 
NRC issues Information Notice 88-31: Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis 
Deficiency acknowledging that if the break location becomes uncovered, a 
direct path might exist for fission products contained in the primary coolant to be 
released to the atmosphere. The licensee further concluded that the offsite dose 
consequences exceeded those calculated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis 
Report (UFSAR) because tube uncovery could produce a direct path for fission 
product release. 
~9881~:SGtt:rf8\i.JSjr , . j."L.".~,,,,._,,,J,, J 
Indian Point 3, located 35 miles (-56 km) from New York City, experiences an incipient tube rupture 
after 13 years of operation. A 456litres/hour leak developed over a two and a half hour period. This 
amount of leakage was 7 times the technical specification limit. Subsequent inspection revealed a 250 
degree circumferential crack. 
Cause: High cycle fatigue. 
Rupture Location: Above upper tube support plate (row 45, column 51) 
Leak Rate: 456 IIhr 
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~:~8~~I~tiIJ"i'~i[Q;§r;) 
McGuire Unit 1, located near Charlotte, NC, experienced a spontaneous steam generator tube 
rupture after less than 8 years of operation. The rupture was caused by stress corrosion cracking 
involving multiple sites along the tube. Prior to the rupture, primary to secondary leak rate had been 
low. The rupture released approximately 30 curies of radiation in to the environment. 
Cause: ODSeC - possibly a manufacturing defect. 
Rupture Location: 711 mm above tubesheet cold leg (row 18, column 25) 
Leak Rate: 114,OOOl/hr 
~]~~;~;§,9~:;1qr{!fSA) 
Beaver Valley Unit 2, located near Pittsburg, PA, experiences an incipient tube rupture due to wear 
caused by loose parts. The subsequent inspection revealed that the loose part had removed 97% of 
the tube wall. Three adjacent tubes were also damaged with wear 62 to 97% through the tube wall. 
Cause: Loose parts 
Rupture Location: Above tube sheet hot leg (row 31, column 16) 
Leak Rate: 80 I/hr 
ff9§O=~We.x'"nf'Trousi?S'ed ~""m".,,,,,,,,.,,,,,,5i,ltJgWJ<L""'" "",M .. ,,, 
Duke Power Company sues Westinghouse over the steam generators in the four reactors at Oconee 
and Catawba stations. Duke alleged that Westinghouse had hidden problems with Inconel or Alloy 600 
since 1964. Internal Westinghouse memoranda were cited by Duke in support of their allegations: 
An August 17, 1964 Westinghouse memo stated, "Mr. Simpson was informed 
that he was not to inform anyone with the exception of his boss of the inconel 
corrosion problem, to prevent a hold on steam generator production. " 
A June 11, 1968 Westinghouse memo contained the following hand written 
note: "What do we tell them at this stage? That the alloy is crumbling before our 
eyes or that service experience is so far good? 
'1~~Q!t~~1i,~J'1~:i{YS~) 
Maine Yankee, located near Bath, ME experiences an incipient tube rupture. The licensees staff re-
analysed their steam generator data from 1988 and found the indication that may have been the 
precursor to the accident. 
Cause: ODSeC 
Rupture Location: Apex of U-bend (row 6, column 43) 
Leak Rate: 3181/hr 
"" .,.- -', -1"C-,'~-( --' -" "' .. " ,-,-, - ~_';'-" :iqr-~:-"~\1:q1"';"""-/::;' 
~~,§,~;i,t§9d,m(1l~~(;JiU:)~!)J 
Mihama Unit 2, Fukui, - SGTR, leaking 55 tonnes of radioactive primary (reactor) coolant water into 
the secondary steam-generating circuit. Some radioactivity was released to the atmosphere and the 
plant's emergency corecooling system was required. It was reported later that the accident was 
caused by human error, some anti-vibration bars being wrongly installed by workers and sawn off 
short to make them fit. 
Cause: 
Rupture Location: 
Leak Rate: 
Fati~ue (vibration of a wrongly positioned anti-vibration bar) 
360 rupture 
158,900 IIhr 
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~'99Z:~GtJ'{ft3';8r '~~EfSA 
',,-d ,~",',"""',,' '''''''''m".""~,,K ,,,,, ",) 
McGuire Unit 1 and Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 both experience incipient tube ruptures. In both 
instances, inspections in the previous year missed indications of tube wear that exceed the 40% 
through wall threshold. 
McGuire Unit 1 
Cause: ODSCC 
Rupture Location: Above lower tube support plate, cold leg (row 46, column 46) 
Leak Rate: 37 IIhr 
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 
Cause: ODSCC 
Rupture Location: Expansion transition zone (explosive expansion) hot leg (row 67, col 109) 
Leak Rate: 57 I/hr 
d992:Wes lnltlotr''''e;lSued ,,,'''' "",_,%,.,",t_,Qd' "M_,.""",." 
Precipitating Portland General Electric's (PGE) decision to close the Trojan reactor in Oregon, Mr. 
Hopenfeld filed a differing professional opinion (DPO) regarding an NRC decision to allow the nuclear 
reactor to operate with seriously degraded steam generator tubes. The issue was that "a main steam 
line break (MSLB) outside containment could trigger a multiple steam generator tube failure which 
could then result in a core melt because of depletion of coolant inventory." NRC documents leaked to 
the Union of Concerned Scientists revealed that the risk of a meltdown at the Trojan reactor was 300 
times greater than the NRC's Safety Goal standard. Trojan was eventually shutdown and PGE sued 
Westinghouse rather than replace the steam generators. 
~·~~~lf.N,g~;§~~~m~gt 
In a memo, which had been withheld from public disclosure, the NRC's Director of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation reported that "steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) events appear to be unavoidable. II 
The memo also pOints out that NRC regulation is less stringent than other countries. "Regarding 
steam generator tube inspection programs, it is clear that the U.S. lags behind the major European 
countries in terms of scope of inspection.... Further, the leak rates allowed were reported to be 
consistently much lower than that allowed by U.S. Technical Specifications. If 
1993~i'SGmRlff5"'('11SA} 
:',,:. >"~" <~, ys.;!';>, ,~ ,j .tL"'4':~i':%"M~ ~"'<";'~"".1,:', 
Palo Verde Unit 2 located near Phoenix, AZ. experienced a spontaneous tube rupture after less than 
seven years of operation. A month prior to the tube rupture the licensee had observed an increasing 
trend in radiation monitoring activity. NRC's Augmented Inspection Team later determined that the 
licensees monitoring method had been inaccurate and had caused the leak rate to be underestimated 
by a factor of ten. 
Cause: 
Rupture Location: 
Leak Rate: 
199t:5 liii'I'''!Retilid "'~,,., . , "'"'~''''''' ""'''''''''' 
ODSCC due to bridging deposits 
Free span between 8'th and 9'th TSP's. hot leg (row 117, col 144) 
54,600llhr 
Maine Yankee was shut down in July due to steam generator tube cracks that had been present since 
1990 but had gone undetected. The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company claimed that. even with 
the Circumferential cracks, the steam generator tubes could have withstood a worst-case-accident. 
Whether Maine Yankee s assertions were true or in fact it violated the NRC's requirements for steam 
generator tube integrity has never been determined. After attempting unsuccessfully to find a buyer for 
Maine Yankee, the utility retired the reactor. 
~;~~JiliN:ag\~Iijj!I,~rt{~K~§:;Q,) 
NRC issues Generic Letter 95-03: Circumferential Cracking Of Steam Generator Tubes to notify 
addressees about the recent steam generator tube inspection findings at Maine Yankee Atomic Power 
Station and their safety significance. Later that year the NRC issued Generic Letter 95-05, Voltage-
Based Repair Criteria for Westinghouse Steam Generator Tubes Affected by Outside Diameter Stress 
Corrosion Cracking. The alternate repair criterion allows a greater number of tubes with crack 
indications to remain in service. 
B.4 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
C
pe
 To
wn
Appendix B - Known SG tube rupture incidents World-wide 
~:y,.".,,,,,_., ~~_~r- fNf;V~'''A''",<~' ': ~;;70'~"~-'~-~_ 
;,"9~~§,b~~~f:i!Jc:~R~lltiQ!1 
Ms. Connie Hogarth filed a 2.206 petition with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission requesting 
that the operating licenses for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3 be suspended until the 
licensees have completed the actions requested by Generic Letter 95-03. 
~~i~l{RQ§ti~!:Q1jiilt 
NRC denies Ms. Hogarth's 2.206 petition stating that due to '~he steam generator inspections required 
by their technical specifications, both Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3 are required to 
monitor primary-to-secondary leakage to ensure that, in the event that steam generator tubes begin to 
leak, operators will be able to bring the plant to a depressurised condition before a tube ruptures. " 
The NRC acknowledged that stress corrosion cracking of the Indian Point Unit 2 steam generator 
tubes was first detected during the 1993 refueling outage. However, Unit 2 steam generator tubes that 
showed signs of circumferential cracking have been removed from service. 
g»~~J!i\,~~11~9i1 
Commonwealth Edison retires the Zion Unit 2 reactor rather than replace the steam generators. Zion 
Unit 1 is shut down five months later. The reactors operated for less than 24 years. 
Jj99'~llRO::lnfo1¥mut~oHa&!f""~9 ~,,, ... J2t""' __ '~'~""'N~_~ rm;.~ .... ~U:I.;!L"4'.'''''''~'''''_' 
NRC issues Information Notice 97-79: Potentia/Inconsistency In The Assessment Of The Radiological 
Consequences Of A Main Steam Line Break Associated With The Implementation Of Steam 
Generator Tube Voltage-Based Repair Criteria. The notice states that Commonwealth Edison's 
Braidwood reactor miscalculated the accident consequences of a main steam line break when it 
applied for license amendments to implement the new repair criteria. The notice goes on to 
acknowledge that other licensee had made the same mistake in their license amendment requests. 
~f998.}\NRd~iron 
1-;" ,~, ,'," ".' ... "h"'_'~_";_· .o<_w/-,,"" __ _ ",";.-'_, __ ,_ 
NRC kills plans for a steam generator rulemaking and a proposed generic letter. instead deferring to 
the Nuclear Energy Institutes 97-06. The staff was leaning toward rulemaking and the generic letter 
because reactor technical specifications were not adequate to ensure safety from new, more severe 
from of steam generator tube degradation. 
ifi§9!'NRClActfOii 
,,_v, "";",-,~,,,,.,;;;,~",,,,*¥,,,,,, ,,-"~ ___ '-"~_'>" 
NRC staff grants Indian Point 2 a license amendment that allows Consolidated Edison to forego 
steam generator tube inspections required by their technical specifications. This was supposed to 
allow a one time exemption from the 24 month inspection interval and removed the requirement that 
the NRC approve the Indian Point 2 steam generator inspection program. 
~Qo1f~~~'(;8iit{q~Al 
Indian Point Unit 2 is forced to shut down on February 15th due to a steam generator tube failure. 
NRC later acknowledged that both Con-Ed and the NRC staff had mishandled the 1997 steam 
generator tube inspection and that the 1999 license amendment was based upon faulty analysis. 
Cause: PWSCC of top tube support plate - inward movement of tubes - high 
stresses and ovalisation of tubes at apex. 
Rupture Location: Apex of U-bend (row 2, column 5) 
Leak Rate: 18,000 IIhr (-150 gpm) 
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2.·.· 002~G']'i11J.tlrsouttf~Korea 
.. _"'0.""'~'" .1L,.,"'.Jl .... ,,~~"'<."~~"_ "J 
Uljin Unit 4. A guillotine rupture approximately 7.5 cm above the tube sheet was identified as 
triggered by significant circumferential and longitudinal cracking in the tube. The final investigation 
report concluded that the main causes were several cracks above the tube sheet. The tube leakage 
enlarged to a rupture as the unit was being shut down for maintenance, which is an unusual time for 
such an incident, and the cause for the leakage is still being sought. The steam generator tubes were 
inspected for degradation that might have caused the leak before the unit was restarted and only 
minor corrosion problems were found. 
Cause: Stress corrosion cracking. 
Rupture Location: Guillotine rupture about 7.5 cm above the tube sheet 
Leak Rate: 
It should be noted that no EDF SG has suffered an SGTR. However, numerous instances of 
unplanned outages due to high primary to secondary leaks have occurred. At the end of 1993 two 
instances of unplanned outages due to high primary to secondary leaks was recorded for Framatome 
type 51 B SG's (same type as at Koeberg). 
Source: www.wise-paris.org 
www.citizen.org 
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C, Univariate Distributions and Methods of Random Variate Generation 
This appendix lists the definitions of the univariate distributions used in this study and the procedures 
used for generating random variates from these distributions. Usually, more than one procedure is 
available for generating random variates from a particular distribution. These algorithms differ in 
speed, accuracy, storage requirements, and in complexity of coding. The particular algorithms used in 
this study were selected, based on their popularity and relative simplicity, from the following 
references: [80, 81, 82, 83]. 
The following notation will be used: 
,.. The random variable X (with a specific value of x) has a Probability Density Function (PDF) 
Ix (x) and Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Fx (x). Where the CDF is defined as 
Fx(x) = Jfx(x) dx 
D 
,.. The sequence of uniform random numbers between 0 and 1 will be denoted as U(0.1) 
Exponential Distribution Y:, .' 
Defining Parameter: Hazard Rate A. (> 0) A. 
/x(x):::: A. e-h O~x<oo 
PDF: 
0 otherwise 
CDF: , Fx(x)=I-e-;'x 
Defining Equations: I 
I Mean: I ~ 
I Variance: 1_1 , • 2 
i A 
To Generate X by the Inverse Transform Method: 
Let U(O,I) = FxCx) = }_e-h 
1 
Random Variate 
:.X=--ln(l-U) 
A. 
Generation: Since (1 U) is distributed in the same way as U 
1 
X =--In(U) 
A. 
:. X has an exponential distribution 
1··· Generate u from U (0,1) 
Algorithm: 1 2 .. · --lnu -? X 
A. 
3··· Deliver X 
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Normal Distribution 
Defining Parameters: 
Defining Equations: 
Random Variate 
Generation: 
Algorithm: 
j1 = Sample Mean of random variableX Location Parameter j1 
Scale Parameter a a = Sample Std Deviation of random variable X 
[ 
(x-I'l'] 
1 - 2eT' 
--e oo<x<oo 
O'-J2;i PDF: 
o otherwise 
CDF: 
I Mean: j1 
Variance: 
The PDF for the normal distribution may be denoted as 
N(,u,O' 2 ) 
Since X = j1 + a Z where Z is the Standard Normal Variable 
N(O,l) we only need to consider generation from N(O,l). 
We use the Box - Muller method to generate random variates 
from N{O,l): 
If U 1 and U 2 are independent random numbers from U(O,l) then 
variates 
ZI =~-2Inul cos{21ruJ 
Z2 =~-21nul sin(21ru 2 ) 
are Independen t Standard Normal variates. 
1 ... Generate 2 independen t random numbers, u I & u 2 from U (0,1) 
2··· Compute ZI & Z2 
3"'j1+O'Z j -4X i i=1,2 
4··· Deliver Xi 
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. Log-normal Distribution 
Scale Factor a (> 0) a Meanoflny 
Defining Parameters: 
Shape Factor fJ (> 0) fJ = Standard deviation of In y 
r (Iny-a)'] 
PDF: frey) 
.!._l_)-~ 
O~y<C() 
yfJ& 
0 otherwise 
y I CDF: Fy(Y) = Jf(y) dy 
Defining Equations: 0 ! 
Mean: J1 = e 2 
Variance: 0'2 =e2a+p'(eP' -1) 
I 
Random Variate Adaptation of Box-Muller method for the Normal distribution. 
Generation: 
) ... Generate Z from N (0,1) 
Algorithm: 
2··· J1 + O'Z ~ X 
3 ... e x ~ y 
4··· Deliver Y 
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Weibull Distribution I 
Defining Parameters: 
Shape F actor a (>0) Parameter estimation by the Maximum 
Scale Factor fJ (>0) Likelihood Method 
i 
I 
I 
I ' r a -!.. 
PDF: 
i f {x)=-xU-1e lp Osx<cx; 
'x jr 
=0 otherwise 
CDF: 
( x lQ 
Fx{x);; 1- e lpJ 
Defining Equations: i 
! Mean: fJr(1 + i.) 
I 
\ ex 
I Variance: I fJ2r(I+~) [fJ r (l +±Jr 
To generate X by the Inverse Transform Method: 
Random Variate 
Let U(O,l) = FAx) = l-e- (~r 
I 
Generation: :. X;; fJ[-ln{l- U)J;;-
Since (1-U) is distributed in the same way as U 
I 
X = fJ[-lnU];;-
1···Generate u from U(O,J) 
Algorithm: 
I 
2 .. · fJ [-In U];;- -+ X 
3··· Deliver X 
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D. Visual Basic Source Code 
The Visual Basic Source Code (with comments) used in this study, is presented in this appendix. 
D1 - Generic MCS Source Code 
The following algOrithm was set up to sample from Normal and Log-normal Distributions. As described 
in appendix C, two uniformly distributed random numbers are required at each iteration for these types 
of distributions. Other distributions (Exponential and Weibull) require only one uniformly distributed 
random number at each iteration. The following Source code represents a generic MCS analysis case 
subject to a two parameter situation. The actual VBA source codes used in this study are variations of 
this algOrithm. 
Sub Ge nericMCS ( ) 
, GenericMCS (With Truncation) 
, Macro recorded by R Damon (August 2003) 
'This module generates random numbers and uses these to sample from parameter distributions 
' according to the distribution type and truncation limits . 
' Declare Variables 
Dim n As Long 
Dim r owans As Long 
Dim itera tions As Long 
Let n = 0 
Let rowans = 1 5 
' Declare variables as Long Integers 
Let itera t ions = Ra nge( " B2 " ) . Valu e * 0 . 5 
' Clear previous data 
Range ( " C1 5: M65536 " ) . Se l ect 
Se lectio n . ClearContents 
Range(" B3" ) . Select 
Do Until n = iterations 
Let n = n + 1 
Let Range( " B3 " ). Value = 2 * n 
' Generate Random Variables for Parameter 1 
Let Range ( " C9").Value = Rnd 
Let Ra ng e(" CI O") . Val ue = Rnd 
Do Until Range("C13 " ) . Value > Range("C7 " ).Va lue And Range("C1 3" ) . Va lue < Range("CS ").Val ue 
Let Range( " C9 " ) . Va lue = Rnd 
Let Ra nge("CIO") . Value = Rnd 
Loop ' Truncate at Upper and Lower Bounds 
Let Ce lls( r owans , 3) . Va l ue = Range( " C1 3 " ).Value ' Write Data to List 
Do Until Range( " CI4 " ) .Value > Range( " C7 " ) . Va lue And Range( " C1 4" ) . Value < Ra nge ( " CS ") . Val ue 
Let Range( " C9 " ). Value = Rnd 
Let Range( " CIO " ) . Va lue = Rnd 
Loop ' Truncate at Upper and Lower Bounds 
Let Cell s( rowa ns + I , 3).Va lue Range( " CI 4" ). Val ue ' Write Data to List 
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' Generate Random Variables for Parameter 2 
Let Range( " D9 " ) . Value = Rnd 
Let Ra nge (" DI0 " ) . Valu e = Rnd 
Do Until Rang e( " D13 " ) . Va l ue > Range ("D7 " ) . Val ue And Range( "D1 3 " ) . Value < Ra nge( " D8 " ).Va lue 
Let Range ("D 9") .Va l ue = Rnd 
Let Range( " DIO") . Value = Rnd 
Loop ' Truncate at Upper and Lower Bounds 
Let Cell s ( rowa ns , 4) . Valu e = Range( " D13 " ) . Va l ue ' Write Data to List 
Do Until Rang e( " D14 " ) . Value > Range ( "D7 ") . Value And Range( " D14 " ). Value < Range( " D8") . Ya lue 
Let Ra nge("D9 " ) . Val ue = Rnd 
Let Ra nge( " DIO " ) . Val u e = Rnd 
Loop 
Let Cell s(rowans + I , 4) . Value = Range ( " D14 ") . Va lue 
Let Ce lls(rowans, 5 ).Va lue = Range(" E1 3 " ) . Va lue 
Let Cells (rowa ns + I, 5 ). Value = Range( " E14 " ) . Yal ue 
Let rowans = rowans + 2 
Loop 
End Sub 
The code interfaces with the following spreadsheet. 
A 
1 
~T_ ... It .. MIoM. 
_ 3_ C..- ........ 
4 
e 
--t 
6 
7 
7 
8 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
~ 
18 
18 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
_ 2e 
26 
27 
29 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
39 
RIncIomNo·, 
8td Nonn DMII>ts 
Rondom V.w.s 
B c o E 
P __ I P __ .rZ 0.. ....... 
Ii 
11 
LowrBcMrnd 
u....BcMrnd 
wo.n 
wo.n 
Z. 
Z. 
X, 
X. 
' Truncate at Upper and Lower Bounds 
' Wri t e Data to List 
' Write Relationship result to List 
' Write Relationship result to List 
F G H J 
Gontl~_ I 
from TruncMt<! OM~ 
I Random VariallleOefirOlion I 
1 Random N ......... Gonor .tt<! In Row 9 oM 10 1 
1 St<lndard NonnaI D.viat<Ps Gonet'ated in Row n and 121 
1 Random Variat<Ps Gonet' ated in Row 13 and M 1 
___ I Sampl~ of OMa written to fist 1 
the Standard Nonnal Deviates and Random Variates are calculated as described in appendix C. 
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D2 - Source Code for the MCS of Initial Crack Length 
Sub aini ti al () 
, ainitial Macro (With Truncation) 
, Macro recorded by R Damon (August 2003) 
' This module generates random numbers and uses these to sample from parameter distributions 
'according to the distribution type and truncation limits. 
' It then calculates the Initial crack length Distribution (with measurement errors) 
' Declare Variables 
Dim n As Long ' Declare variables as Long Integers 
Dim rowans As Long 
Dim i t era t i o n s As Long 
Let n = 0 
Let r owa n s = 15 
Let itera t i o ns = Range ( "B2 " ). Va l ue * 0.5 
' Clear previous data 
Range( " C15 : M65536 ") .Select 
Sel ec t i o n.ClearConte n t s 
Ra nge ( " B3 " ) . Selec t 
Do Until n = itera t ions 
Let n = n + 1 
Let Range( " B3" ). Va l u e = 2 * n 
' Generate Random Variables for a MEASURED 
Let Ra nge( " C9") . Va l ue = Rnd 
Let Range ( " Cl O") . Value = Rnd 
Let Cel l s(rowa n s , 3 ) . Va l ue = Rang e ("CI3 " ) .Va lue 
Let Ce l l s ( r owans + I , 3) . Val u e = Range ( " C14 " ) . Value 
'Generate Random Variables for MEASUREMENT ERROR 
Let Ra nge( "D9") . Val u e = Rnd 
Let Range (" Dl O" ) .Va l u e = Rnd 
' Write Data to List 
' Write Data to List 
Do Until Range("Dl3 " ) .Value > Range( "D7 "). Value And Range("Dl3").Va lue < Range( "D8 " ).Value 
Let Range("D9") . Value = Rnd 
Let Ra nge( " DlO ") . Va lue = Rnd 
Loop ' Truncate at Upper and Lower Bounds 
Let Ce l ls(rowans , 4) . Value = Range("Dl3").Value ' Write Data to List 
Do Until Ra ng e ( " Dl 4" ) . Va l ue > Ra ng e( "D7").Va l ue And Rang e( " Dl4 " ) . Val u e < Ra ngel " D8").Value 
Let Range( " D9"). Value = Rnd 
Let Range(" DlO") .Value = Rnd 
Loop 
Let Cell s ( r owans + I , 4 ) . Va lue = Ra n g e (" DI4 " ). Va l ue 
Let Ce lls (rowans, 5 ) .Value = Range( " E1 3 ") . Value 
Let Ce ll s(rowans + I , 5).Va lue = Ra nge("E14").Va lue 
Let r owa ns rowa n s + 2 
Loop 
End Sub 
' Truncate at Upper and Lower Bounds 
'Write Data to List 
'Write Measured + Error to List 
' Write Measured + Error to List 
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The code interfaces with the following spreadsheet 
A B L c; 0 1 E C F G H 
I MH5U1e<1C''''''l~1 r f I Measuremm EnOl I G.,..ltfolan .... f,omT,..,.,~Dau 
30180 
1--l!I~-I-~~'-+-':::"-=:~--lI--- ----I ----I Random IIbnbofs ~,a«>d in Row 3 and II I 
I--~-t-~:":::=-+-=::"--ll------t ----I Standlld NormolOooJi_ G.Mf~ in Row n and 121 
1-_=-_t-.....:==-+_..::::::....-JI-_.::2.3$S::..:.:_~ ----IRModomVoriMHG.nlfate<linR""' 13and14 1 
8.147 
~ 
5277 
.. 4.973 
2.582 
2-653 
8.4SS 
7.434 
4.451 
4.~81 
4.21i3 
2-36.~ 
4.n2 
3.787 
4.932 
5.S18 
3.983 
5:474 
5.301 
3.603 
4.352 
7227 
8.~5 
4.503 
8.088 
- __ I Sa,.., .. of Data .,ritlen to list I 
J 
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D3 - Code for the MCS of Critical Crack Size 
Sub acr i ttrunc( ) 
, acrit Macro (With Truncation) 
, Macro recorded by R Damon (August 2003) 
' This module generates random numbers and uses these to sample from parameter distributions 
' according to the distribution type and truncation limits. 
' It then calculates critical crack length for each parameter selection 
'Declare Variables 
Dim n As Long ' Declare variables as Long Integers 
Dim rowans As Long 
Dim iterat ions As Long 
Let n = 0 
Let rowa ns = 15 
Let iterat i on s = Range( " B2 "). Value * 0. 5 
' Clear previous data 
Rang e ( " C1 5 :M65536") . Se l e ct 
Select i o n .Cl ea r Contents 
Rang e ( " B3 " ) . Select 
Do Until n = iterations 
Let n = n + 1 
Let Range( " B3 ") . Value = 2 * n 
' Generate Random Variables for TUBE THICKNESS 
Let Ra nge( " C9" ) . Value = Rnd 
Let Range( " ClO " ) . Value = Rnd 
Do Unti l Range("C13" ).Va lue > Range( " C7 " ) . Value And Range( " C13 " ).Value < Rang e (" CS") .Value 
Let Range ( " C9"). Va lue = Rnd 
Let Range( " Cl O" ). Value = Rnd 
Loop ' Truncate at Uppe r and Lower Bounds 
Let Ce lls (rowans, 3).Value = Rang e ("C13").Value ' Write Data to List 
Do Until Range (" C14 " ) . Value > Range( " C7 " ) . Value And Range( " C12 " ). Value < Range( " CS " ).Value 
Let Range (" C9"). Va l ue = Rnd 
Let Range( " CIO") .Value = Rnd 
Loop 
Let Cel ls( rowa ns + 1 , 3). Va l ue = Range( " C1 4 " ) . Val ue 
' Generate Random Variables for TUBE DIAMETER 
Let Range (" D9 ") . Value = Rnd 
Let Range ("DlO ") . Va l ue = Rnd 
' Truncate at Upper and Lower Bounds 
' Write Data to List 
Do Until Range( "D13") .Value > Range( "D7") .Value And Range("D13") .Va lue < Range( " DS " ) . Value 
Let Range (" D9 ").Value = Rnd 
Let Range(" DIO") . Value = Rnd 
Loop ' Truncate at Upper and Lower Bounds 
Let Cells (rowans , 4) . Value = Ranq e("D1 3 " ). Value ' Write Data to List 
Do Until Range( " D1 4" ).Value > Range( " D7 " ) . Value And Range( " D1 4" ) . Value < Ra nge(" DS" ) . Value 
Let Range( "D9"). Value = Rnd 
Let Ra nge ("DIO") .Va lue = Rnd 
Loop ' Truncate at Upper and Lower Bounds 
Let Cells(rowans + 1, 4) . Value Range( " D1 4 " ) . Value ' Write Data to List 
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' Generate Random Variables fo r YIELD STRENGTH + UTS 
Let Ra nge( " E9" ) . Val ue = Rnd 
Let Range( "El O" ) . Va l ue = Rnd 
Do Until Range( "E13" ) .Va l u e > Range( " E7 " ) .Value And Ra nge( "E1 3 " ) . Va lue < Ra ng e("E8") .Va l ue 
Let Range (" E9 " ) .Va l ue = Rnd 
Let Range( " EIO " ) . Value = Rnd 
Loop ' Truncate at Upper and Lower Bounds 
Let Cells (rowans , 5) . Va lue = Range ("E1 3 " ) .Value ' Write Data to List 
Do Until Range( " E1 4" ).Value > Ra nge(" E7 " ) . Value And Range ( " E14 " ) . Val u e < Rang e ( " EB " ) .Va lue 
Let Ra n g e(" E9") .Va lue = Rnd 
Let Range( " ElO " ) . Value = Rnd 
Loop 
Let Cel ls (rowa n s + 1 , 5 ) . Val u e = Range( "E1 4 " ) . Value 
' Generate Random Variables for TUBE HEAT COEFFICIENT 
Let Ra nge( " F9 " ) .Value = Rnd 
Let Range( " FlO " ) . Valu e = Rnd 
' Truncate at Upper and Lower Bounds 
' Write Dat a to List 
Do Until Ra nge( "F1 3 " ).Va l ue > Range( "F7 " ) . Value And Range ("F13").Value < Ra nge ( "FB"). Va lue 
Let Range ( "F9" ) . Va l ue = Rnd 
Let Rang e( " FlO") .Value = Rnd 
Loop ' Truncate at Upper and Lower Bounds 
Let Cell s (rowans , 6) .Val ue = Range( " F1 3 " ) . Value ' Write Data to List 
Do Un t il Range( " F1 4" ). Value > Ra nge( " F7 " ).Value And Ra ng e( " Fl 4" ).Value < Ra nge(" F8") .Va l ue 
Let Ra ng e(" F9") . Valu e = Rnd 
Let Range ( "FIO " ) . Val u e = Rnd 
Loop 
Let Ce ll s(rowans + 1, 6) . Va lue = Range (" Fl4 " ) .Va l ue 
Let Cells (rowans, B).Value = Range( "H1 3 " ) . Va l ue 
Let Ce l ls (rowa ns + 1 , B) .Va lue = Range( "H1 4" ) . Value 
Let Cel l s (ro wa n s , 9) . Value = Range ( " I l3" ) . Va lue 
Let Ce l l s (rowa n s + 1, 9). Val u e = Range( " I1 4 " ) . Val u e 
Let Cells(rowa ns , l O) . Va l ue = Ra nge("J13 " ).Va l ue 
Let Cell s (rowa ns + 1 , 10).Va lue = Range( " J14 " ) . Value 
Let Cells(rowa ns , 1 2) . Value = Range ( "L I3" ) . Va lue 
Let Cell s( rowa n s + 1 , 1 2 ) . Va l ue = Range( " L14 ") . Value 
Let Cel l s( r owa n s , 13).Value = Ra nge( " M1 3 " ) . Va l ue 
Let CeII s (rowa ns + 1 , 13) .Value = Ra nge( "M14") . Va lue 
Let rOvlans 
Loop 
End Sub 
' Truncate at Upper and Lower Bounds 
' Write Data to List 
' Write Flow tress to List 
' Write Flow Stress to List 
' Write Membrane Stress to List 
' Write Membrane Stress to List 
' Write Bulging Factor to List 
' Write Bulging Factor to List 
' Write a CRIT to List 
' \~rite a CRIT to List 
' Write 2 x a CRIT to List 
' Write 2 x a CRIT to List 
0 .6 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Appendix D - Visual Basic Source Code 
The code interfaces with the following spreadsheet 
_-r-_-,A__ L B c _ p ...,.. ....... __ ,E I .!' o:I:: G 
- ........ • .. 01 
+~"::=I 3OODO 
C •• OATA 11totIHr'·MT.,..... -=J kom TnftCMtd OM. NoT--. - ~ • t .... .0-) ...... ...., k Pr-.0IFa) .. ...., .... (IFII) II' , /I. L2JO 22.220 ..... '" o.seo r..ouI . 'JI'JI:,....~ 
I • OJMO II.MO 21.173 OJIIO 
7 ~- 11110 22.M ~.131 D.IIIO • - U80 22JR _.on ..... • RIMomNo', . !111.11 o Xl' 06111 o.tn orm ., IAn Oll'l' ~108 tI.3l) ~.rn 
• Sld ...... OooIaI Z. 1. 0.788 .Q.3'28 ·14«1 
12 Z. 0.784 ..... .... .\.83e 
13 
_v_ 
X. 1311 22JII 104.1111 ua SlL3I 137.118 3.73 
14 X. l30I . 22.lS7 . - . 11.&14 . . 521.31. 138.41 ... U2. ~ ,r-~ 22.20& 921638 M82 536.36 14~73 168 ~ 22.281 068. ... .... , .7a .. 14an 3.34 
~ l263 22.l192 9IUII7 0.594 54829 14tn 3.111 • 124$ 22.2S7 898.6111 o.m 515.2!5 145.39 3.S1 
15 t290 22.207 ...... O.!!CO I513.S:l 139.48 3.6$ 
20 un 22.236 880.620 O.Sl7 .'lUlI MU1 3.54 
- 21 ~ 22.W5 -- M83 15Z7.6I 143.39 168 ~ l3f7 22.173 !I62l!6O M1S mll4 13613 • .06 
f.- un 22.224 939." O.~ 529.66 137.13 3.11 t266 22.248 0It= OJ176 !12!1.20 M2.41 3.63 
}e t:105l5 22.273 93U54 0.586 iIIl123 132.80 ' .15 
~ Sample of ----< t270 22.22!5 832.894 0_ 522.. 14t34 168 ~ Data U31 22.15' ......... o.m 5l4.36 134.54 ' .12 . 2! written In t21I5 22.283 899.707 M81 522.11 140.13 3.73 
~ list t304 22.15' 1180.236 D.S76 1f0723 07.47 3.63 
~ U24 22.12. ....... 0:.1587 549.31 135.13 '.D7 
~ t280 Z2J2!l 849.!l4O 
_
482.48 ... 114 3M 
.B 1307 Z2J615 832.D09 0_ 544.70 13726 3.97 
39 t2!lO 22.31l3 894.484 0.59' !l28.31 ... "" 1615 
34 t289 22.17. 893.809 0_ 525.13 139.32 3.n 
~ t200 22.233 834_ 0.576 48113 Ma n 3.JO 
.1f l230 22.198 - 0.!!e2 519.09 146.66 3.54 ~ t235 22.1Ii3 mm OMI! 523.03 - 3.5S ~ u... 22.236 .... m ..... _70 M2.Q4 3.87 
.l! l337 22.111 87U187 IUI81 48915 13368 3.61 
[ 
1Iar .. (InIn) 2ac."( ..... ) ...... 
~ ua 
.c..fiS 
4.,.. 
V .4'98 liLJ 
1.&01 • I 
lUll 21.14 . 14.35 • 2t.71 . 
13.44 26.88 
2.31 2'.63 
14 .• 21.36 
13.07 26.14 
t3.74 27 ..... 
13.n 2623 
13."" 27.06 
15.34 -14.54 23.D3 
13.64 27Ir 
15.315 3tJO 
13.82 2723 
II." 3120 
13.33 27.11 
13.82 27.64 
115.38 3O.n 
13.D2 26.114 
14.92 2S.84 
13.41 2692 
14J15 29" 
12.20 ..... 
12.87 2973 
13.07 26.14 
14.:>5 28.70 
13.86 27n 
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D4 - Code for the MCS of Tube Failure Probability 
Sub FProbData ( ) 
, FProbData Macro (Without Truncation) 
, Macro recorded by R Damon (August 2003) 
' This module generates random numbers and uses these to sample from parameter distributions 
' according to the distribution type . 
' It ther. compares Post Inspection Crack Length plus Crack Growth to Critical Crack Length 
' FProbData also Lists all generated data to t he spreadsheet for further analysis 
' Declare Variables 
Dim n As Long ' Declare variables as Long Integers 
Dim n fail As Long 
Dim rowans As Long 
Dim cov 
Dim covta rget 
Let n = 0 
Let nfai l = 0 
Let c ovt arget = Range("K9") .Value 
Let co y = Range ("KlO") . Va lue 
Let rowa ns = 1 5 
'Clear previous data 
Range (" J8 " ).Sel e c t 
Selection.Clea r Contents 
Range(" B2 "). Selec t 
Do While Range("KlO ") .Value >= Range("K9") . Value 
Let n = n + 1 
Let Ra nge(" B2 " ) . Value = 2 * n 
'Generate Random Variables for aINSP 
Let Range ("C9") . Va l ue = Rnd 
Let Range( " ClO " ). Value = Rnd 
Le t Cells (rowans, 3) .Value = Range("C13") .Value 
Let Ce lls(rowans + I, 3) .Val ue Ra nge( " C14"). Va lue 
'Ge nerate Random Va riables f or C 
Let Range("D9").Value = Rnd 
Let Range( "D10"). Va lue = Rnd 
Let Cells(rowans , 4) . Value = Range ( " D13 "). Value 
Let Cell s ( rowans + 1, 4) . Va lue = Ra nge(" D14 " ) . Val ue 
Let Cells (rOl-fanS , 5) .Value = Range("E13 " ) .Value 
Let Cells (rowans + I , 5).Value = Range("E14"). Value 
Let Cells(rowans , 6) . Value = Range (" F13 " ) . Val ue 
Let Cells (rowans + 1 , 6).Val u e = Range(" F1 4 " ) . Value 
Let Cells (rowans , 7) .Value = Range( "G13") .Value 
Let Cel ls( rowans + 1, 7) . Val ue = Range("G14") .Value 
Let Cells(rowans , 8) .Value = Range ( " Hl3 " ) . Value 
Let Cells ( rowa ns + I , 8 ) . Value = Range( " H1 4"). Va l ue 
' Write aINSP Data to List 
' Write aINSP Data to List 
' Write C Data to List 
' Write C Data to List 
' Write K(aINSP)Data to Lis t 
' Write K(aINSP)Data to List 
' Write da/dt Data to List 
' Write da/dt Data to List 
' Write delta a Data to List 
' Write delta a Data to List 
' Write aTOT Data to List 
' Write aTOT Data to List 
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' Generate Random Variables for aCRIT 
Let Range( "I9") . Val ue = Rnd 
Let Ra nge(" II O"). Va lue = Rnd 
Let Cells( r o wa ns, 9) .Value = Range("I13") .Value 
Let Cel ls (rowans + 1, 9) .Va1ue = Range("I14").Value 
Let Ce lls ( rowans , 10) . Value = Ra nge(" J I 3") .Va lue 
Let Cells (rowans + 1, lO ) . Va l u e = Range (" JI 4"). Value 
If Ra nge("H13") .Value >= Range("II3") .Value Then 
Le t nfai l = nfail + I 
Let Range( "J8"). Valu e = n fail 
End If 
If Range("H14") .Value >= Range("I14") .Value Then 
Let nfail = nfail + I 
Let Rang e(" J8 "). Value = nfail 
End If 
Let rowans = rowans + 2 
Acti v e Window . Small Scroll Down : =l 
Loop 
Acti v eWindow.ScrollRow (2 * n) 
End Sub 
The code interfaces with the following spreadsheet 
' Write aCRIT Data to List 
' Write aCRIT Data to List 
' Write Status to List 
' Write Status to List 
' Count E'ailures 
' Count E'ailures 
' Scroll down one row 
' Scroll to end 
A .8_ --I. C D .L-- E F G .. I~ J . K 
t Iposlinspecnoncracklengll l\ 0.__ ,"""".-. I - I 
2 """ __ J - ~I __ .L \~~ __ ...t __ "'~_t~t~"~~I_~!::=t=:t.IO=~:-::;~· =~-=:-:;:o...:"':::;I.ls<;. ;:~'"T_=_.J 
! a. .. D.ATA I - C Q- ~ -.... _Tao" aCNT hl7 cow 
, If lJotI -12.01 1.O7 27.111 n 
+ !,"-,-...: .-=-4_.:U4::::.7-J-....:: ... ::!..r.N-::O'-;I;:lm"'~;-S;-el::-1"+---+----I :::.:: 
_. Iu....... on 3:2..m IDO 
• RIndomND'. t-...;~~~+---70= .. :':- t--':"'.,.:=iMaximum 0* ProbofF'..... j)1(IQ T.-gtt 
to oIOJI om .""~ daldl \~ om ~,..... 0100 eunno -coetliClenlofvarialionl 
n 801__ Z. .... 4SZ4 lOE." .... "" " Target and Current 
l2 z..uoo 2.,. ...... -3.l1li "---- r I!FaIiUrtl Value 
'":D;;-.'r.""::::::: .... :::m:::.;:-:::::-i ____ -.:;lC,~':. __ il----"iUl4:t=~--t-::-:3.?:-:42IE~~c: .. ::c~t--"".::H:-,,::::·. :::.~--_:. . --..,":"'"'~tc:.o<~--il---""::U24~::-----t-----::-: .... ==~::--It::-=2U4~=~::-2:_-It::::::::~ Probability = c=::J 
M Me U48.., UOIE4I . 28M7.. 2.nE-03 . lUll ... 22.132 .. 22..412 .. FA&... nFali/n --.r-
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D5 - Histogram Source Code 
The following code was developed to generate Histograms when required. 
Sub Histogra m() 
, Histogram Macro 
, Randolph Damon (August 2003) . 
' Histogram 
Dim CountA , r ow, rowe , col , b in , r owa n s , c o lans , mi n , ma x , i n c rement, b inold, b i n o 
, Declare Parameters 
Wo rksheets ( "His togram") .Activate 
Let mi n = Rang e("D3") .Val ue 
Let max = Range("D4").Value 
Let increment = Range("D6"). Val ue 
Let rowt = Range("D7 " ) .Value 
Let b i n = min - incre ment 
Let b i nold bin 
Let r owans 2 
Let col a n s 7 
Let bino 0 
Do Until bin >= ma x 
Loop 
bin = bin + increment 
rowans = rowans + 1 
Range( " Fl ").Value = bi no 
bino = bino + 1 
CountA 0 
row = 2 
co l = 1 
Do Until r ow = rowe + 2 
row = row + I 
Loop 
, Count each occurance between binold and bin i . e binoid < x <= bin 
I f Cells(row, col) .Value > binold And Cells (row, col) . Value <= bin Then 
Coun t A = Co untA + 1 
End If 
Ce lls (rowans, colans - 1 ) .Value = bin 
Cel l s(rowans, col ans ).Val u e = Co untA 
binold = bin 
End ub 
The code interfaces with the following spreadsheet 
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A 
1 v ..... 
2 I • 
3 .. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
3 
5 
3 
4 
6 
6 
3 
5 
4 
3 
7 
4 
I) 
I) 
I) 
3 
6 
S 
21 7 
22 4 
23 5 
24 5 
25 5 
26 5 
27 4 
28 7 
29 5 
30 5 
31 6 
32 7 
33 8 
34 6 
3ti 5 
36 4 
37 8 
38 4 
39 7 
8 C;:;_--,--=D--1--E_1 F __ G H 
Culrtnl Bin NoI-_12=--+ __ ~ 
2.000 
1.8 Mal 14.000 
1.1 No. of bins 12 
1.4 Increment lOGO 
1.8 T ot.II 3304 
1.6 3304 
1.1 
1.6 
1.4 
1.1 
1.9 
1.4 
1.9 
1.8 
1.8 
1.1 
1.8 
1.8 
1.6 
t4 
1.9 
1.6 
1.6 
1.8 
1.9 
2.1 
1.9 
1.6 
1.4 
2.1 
1.4 
1.9 
Raw Data (fhe 
Sample Data 
Listed here is for 
the Measured 
Crack Length 
SG95, Outage 113 
2.000 
1--?3.0~0~0-+---:4;:S=1-l--IThere are 491 occurances for 2 < x S 31 
4.000 SS5 
5.000 731 
6.000 623 
7.000 278 
8.000 101 
9.000 45 
10.000 17 
11000 13 
12.000 2 
13.000 0 
14.000 
Parameters Defining the Normal Distribution: 
Mean and Standard Deviation x 
Parameters Defining the Lognormal Distribution: 
Mean and Standard Deviation ofln(X) 
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E. Determination of Post Inspection Defect Size Distribution 
Given the True Defect Size Distribution generated by MCS, the Post Inspection 
Defect Size Distribution was determined by applying the equation defining the 
plugging probability at the "binned" level (Le. the equation was calculated for each 
frequency class after a Histogram was generated for the True Defect Size 
Distribution). The process followed was as follows: 
);> Generate a Histogram for the True Defect Size Distribution. 
);> Calculate the Relative Frequency for each frequency class taking the plugging 
probability and POD into account. 
);> Fit various distributions to the new Histogram using the Excel Solver tool. 
);> Subjective choice of the most appropriate distribution. 
An example of the Spreadsheet used for this purpose is illustrated below. This 
particular example is for a plugging limit of 13 mm. 
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Appendix E - Determination of Post Inspection Defect Size Distribution 
The distribution parameters were determined by minimising the error between the 
proposed distributions (Log-normal, Weibull, Normal, and Gamma) and the 
calculated, Post Inspection, frequency distributions. This was achieved, using Excels 
Solver tool, which is illustrated below: 
Solver Pal'ameters . ':".:;If. . 
In this case, the target cell is the average error for the proposed distribution and the 
cells to be changed are the distribution parameters. 
The choice of distribution was based mainly on the weight of the right hand tail 
section. The most conservative distribution (i.e. with the largest tail area) was 
chosen. This is illustrated below for the case of a 13 mm plugging limit. 
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Appendix E - Determination of Post Inspection Defect Size Distribution 
3.00E -01 ,----------------------------------, 
2.50E-01 t-----------:>...-~----------------------1 
2.00 E -01 +-------/----'o..li' 
1.50E-01 
1.00E-01 
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1.60E-02 ..---------------------------------, 
1.40E-02 +-+-------------- --------- ------1 
1.20E-02 +---\----- ------ ------------ - - ----1 
1.00E -02 +--\--------------- - - ------ ------1 
B.00E-03 ~'"Fll-\----------------------------I 
6.00E-03 
4 .00E-03 
2.00E-03 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
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In all the cases investigated the Log-normal distribution displayed the "heaviest" tail 
and was thus chosen to model the Post Inspection Defect Size distribution. 
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